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INTRODUCTION
During the period between the world wars Sweden’s trade with Germany 
constituted about one-fifth of Sweden’s total foreign trade. During 
the second world war Germany became completely dominant as a 
trading partner. During the war years the extent and composition 
of Swedish-German trade received formal expression in yearly trade 
agreements.
The most valuable single item exported to Germany during the 
second world war was iron ore. Its comparative importance also increased 
during this period, constituting about 8% of Sweden’s total exports 
by the middle of the 1930s and about 14% during the war years.1)
The Swedish export of iron ore during the second world war is among 
the most widely discussed problems of modern Swedish economic and 
political history. The importance of Swedish iron ore for the German 
war potential has been the central topic of discussion, in which different 
scholars have held diametrically opposite points of view. Some have 
maintained that the Swedish iron ore was a conditio sine qua non for the 
German armament industry, while others have contended that although 
the Swedish iron ore played an important role quantitatively, if deliveries 
from Sweden had been suspended they could have been replaced by 
other iron ore—home produced or imported—by existing stocks, or by 
increased supplies of scrap-iron. In the light of the assessment of the 
importance of Swedish iron ore for Germany political events, i.e. the 
relations between Sweden and the Great Powers at war, have also been 
interpreted.2)
x) SOS, Handel. The relative importance of Swedish iron ore among Swedish 
exports has never been greater than during the second world war.
2) There is hardly any point in giving an account here of all the works in which 
the Swedish iron ore exports have been dealt with—often in sterotyped interpreta­
tions. For discussion about the importance, measured in terms of percentage, of the 
Swedish exports of iron ore, see Fritz (1973), p. 133 ff. The impression that the iron 
ore was of very great importance, which is apparent e.g. in Medlicott, I, pp. 180 ff.
7In wartime differing views were already held on this important 
question,* * 3) and the various opinions of the scholars depend at least 
to a certain extent on the sources on which the scholar in question has 
based his research. The contradictions among the scholars seem to be 
due mainly to an incomplete knowledge of certain technical and economic 
realities for the German steel industry which existed during this period.
A review of the conditions of the German steel industry (Chapter I) 
will therefore provide a fruitful starting-point for fresh research. As the 
production of steel in Germany at the end of the 1930s and during the 
war years was completely inadequate to cater for the country’s expanding 
need, it is first of all of interest to examine the reasons for the shortage 
which arose. After these general considerations the research which 
follows will be devoted to the German supply of iron ore in the context 
of the question whether the supply of iron ore was a bottle-neck for German 
steel production. To answer this question the supply must be examined 
in terms of changing political availability (II), transport possibilities 
(III), the economics of iron ore supply (IY) and the technology 
of the steel industry (V). Swedish iron ore will also be put in the forefront 
of this report. However, more consciously than before Swedish iron ore 
is being placed in a wider context—this applies also to the concluding 
chapter (VI) on Swedish trade policy—and not until then will it be 
possible to draw cogent conclusions.
and Woodward, pp. 42 ff. derives from the exaggerated English view. The scholars
who have worked with German sources hold an almost diametrically opposite view: 
see the discussion in Fritz (1973), p. 133 ff. Even in later works these scholars have 
persisted in their view, Jäger (1969), pp. 176 ff. (note however p. 136, where the 
opposite view is expressed) and Milward (1970), p. 212. Broyn also subscribes to 
the latter view, pp. 110 f.
3) Even within the trade policy department of the Swedish Foreign Office there 
was a feeling of uncertainty about the real importance of Swedish iron ore. Con­
temporary analyses—by own and outside experts alike—remained on a very 
general level, and the conclusions are tentative and full of reservations. Preliminär 
promemoria 28/3-39 (Hägglöf), PM beträffande Tysklands järnförsörjning 30/3-40 
(Tigerschiöld, Jernkontoret), H40Ct (UD A).
ITHE GERMAN STEEL INDUSTRY 
A. Introduction
In order to be able to discuss with fair success the role of Swedish iron 
ore in a German war economy it is vital first to stop and consider the 
development of the steel industry in Germany during the period between 
the wars and during the years of the second world war. The exposition 
which follows is in two stages, a statistical account of the quantitative 
development of the production of pig-iron and ingot steel,1) and also a 
discussion about general conditions in this field. Towards the end of 
this discussion the supply of iron ore will also be mentioned, and there 
the questions to be dealt with in the research which follows will be 
introduced.
B. The quantitative development of the production of pig-iron and
ingot steel
1. The Production in ‘AltreicK
The widespread trade slump during the first years of the 1930s obviously 
also strongly affected the German steel industry, and brought about a 
large decline in production. The German production of pig-iron in 
1932 did not amount to a third of the production of 1929. During the 
following years a significant recovery took place. The production of
1I Certain advantages accrue from the use of the production of pig-iron and ingot 
steel as a gauge of the general development of the steel sector. Information about the 
production of ingot steel is to be preferred to information about the rolling mill 
production, since the former includes steel casting, which was of great importance 
for the manufacture of ammunition. Eisenwirtschaft seit Kriegsausbruch p. 5, RlOIII/6 
(B A). The best statistical account of the German steel industry is a confidential 
publication, Übersichten über die Eisen schaffende Industrie Deutschlands 1937, 
FD 264/46 (IWM).
91929 was only exceeded for the first time in 1936, and 1938 became 
the best year in terms of production. During the war years a certain 
decline occurred, which cannot however be considered in any sense 
catastrophic. In 1944 larger quantities of pig-iron were still produced 
than in 1935.
Table 1. The production of pig-iron in Germany 1928-19 44
(1000 tons)
Year Production Year Production Year Production
1928 11 760 1934 8 717 1940 13 955
1929 13 239 1935 12 846 1941 15 441
1930 9 698 1936 15 302 1942 15 332
1931 6 061 1937 15 960 1943 15 972
1932 3 932 1938 18 045 1944 13 369
1933 5 247 1939 17 478
Source: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 288.
The production of pig-iron was to a large extent concentrated in the 
Ruhr area. During the latter years of the 1930s this district was respon­
sible for about 70% of the total German production. From 1942 on­
wards its share was reduced to well over 60%.2)
Pig-iron was produced by melting down iron ore in furnaces using 
coke as fuel. The pig-iron was divided into various categories according 
to the chemical composition of the iron ore, mainly its phosphorus 
content. High phosphorus pig-iron was called Thomas pig-iron. This 
pig-iron as well as the specially low phosphorus Bessemer pig-iron
2) Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944 p. 288. For a more detailed 
regional breakdown, see these statistics. Furthermore the production was concentrated 
in large units. The largest steel concern in Germany, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, possessed 
a blast furnace capacity of over 8 million tons of pig-iron in 1937. The concern shows 
the following development of production (in thousands of tons):
Year Pig-iron Ingot steel Year Pig-iron Ingot steel
1938/39 7 594 8 953 1942/43 6 531 7 658
1939/40 5 917 7 534 1943/44 5 961 7 209
1940/41 5 907 7 452 1944/45 752 901
1941/42 5 307 7 080
Source: FD1455/45 (IWM)
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was then transported in liquid form into a convert where it was blown 
into steel. Thomas pig-iron was the dominant variety in the German 
production of pig-iron. In the pre-war period as well as during the 
actual war years the pig-iron produced from phosphorus iron ore con­
stituted about two-thirds of the total German production of pig-iron.3)
Part of the pig-iron was sent, together with scrap iron (the steelworks’ 
own circulating scrap as well as other scrap, see below, p. 23) to steel 
furnaces driven by producer-gas in order to make ingot steel, called 
Martin steel. For the acid Martin process much low phosphorus iron 
ore was needed as a base, and for the basic variation, which was totally 
predominant, iron ore with a fairly low phosphorus content (0.1% 
at the most) was required.
The German foreign trade in pig-iron was insignificant during this 
period, and therefore it did not succeed in influencing the volume of 
ingot steel production. Therefore this shows a development similar 
to the production of pig-iron:
Table 2. The production of ingot steel in Germany 1928-1944 
(1000 tons)
Year Production Year Production Year Production
1928 14 368 1934 11 916 1940 19 141
1929 16 246 1935 16 446 1941 20 836
1930 11 538 1936 19 216 1942 20 480
1931 8 292 1937 19 849 1943 20 758
1932 5 764 1938 22 656 1944 18 318
1933 7 612 1939 22 508
Source: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 288.
Ingot steel was also divided into different categories according to its 
chemical composition. The Bessemer steel and the acid Martin steel 
with their low content of phosphorus were the best in terms of quality, 
and were used as basic materials for the manufacture of tools, ball­
bearings et cetera. Electric steel was often alloyed steel of high quality. 
The basic Martin steel did not have the distinguished quality of acid 
steel but it was used for superior purposes, inter alia in the armament 
industry. Thomas steel was used for general purposes, e.g. as building 
iron, for railway tracks, et cetera.
3) Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 288.
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Table 3. The quality of the German production of ingot steel in 1936-1944
(%)
Year Thomas Bessemer Martin Electric
1936 42.3 55.5 2.1
1937 41.5 — 55.7 2.8
1938 41.1 0.8 54.1 3.9
1939 40.8 1.0 53.1 5.0
1940 35.7 1.9 55.6 6.7
1941 37.9 1.8 52.9 7.2
1942 38.4 2.2 51.4 7.9
1943 39.3 2.9 48.2 9.5
1944 37.0 3.5 48.4 11.0
Source: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 289, Statistisches 
Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1941/42, p. 197.
German steel production was characterised by fairly large production 
of Thomas steel and occupied an exclusive position in world production. 
Of the total world production towards the end of the 1930s Martin steel 
constituted 77% (of which only 2% was of the acid variety), Thomas steel 
constituted 16%, Bessemer steel 4% and electric steel 3%.4)
In Germany the dominant ingot steel quality was also Martin steel, 
which however lost some of its importance during the war years. The 
same applies to Thomas steel, while electric steel (for production of high 
quality steel) was advancing rapidly during the war years. Martin steel 
was produced almost entirely by the basic process, 97.5% of it in 1939.5)
The regional allocation of the production of ingot steel in Germany 
also showed a pattern similar in character to that of pig-iron. The Ruhr 
area, which was responsible for well over 70% of the country’s total 
production, had its share cut to well over 60% during the war years.6)
4) Sahlin-Öhman, p. 16.
5) Übersichten über die Eisen schaffende Industrie, p. 31, FD 264/46 (IWM). 
See also Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich 1941/42, p. 197.
6) Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 291. For more detailed 
information, see these statistics. The manufacture of cast iron products is not dealt 
with in the present research. During the war years the production was somewhat 
under 4 million tons per year, ibid., p. 290.
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2. The production of pig-iron and ingot steel in the part of Europe ruled
by Germany
The information on the development of production dealt with so far has 
related to ‘Altreich’, i.e. Germany as she was before 1938. During the 
years just before and during the world war itself Germany’s territory 
and influence over a large part of Europe were extended. This situation 
leads to difficulties when attempting to estimate the ‘total’ German 
production. These problems become more acute in that the statistical 
material does not make it clear as to what and as to which regions the 
statistics are meant to refer.7)
Some form of regional division must be made. The following division 
can be used:8)
1. ‘Altreich’= Germany within the borders which it had before 
1938.
2. ‘Reich’= Altreich+ Austria, Bohemia, parts of Poland (above 
all eastern Upper Silesia), the areas which were lost in the Peace of 
Versailles, i.e. Luxemburg and Alsace-Lorraine.
3. ‘Einflussgebiete’ = all the areas conquered by Germany except 
those included in ‘Reich’.9)
The definitions of ‘Altreich’ and ‘Reich’ should not give rise to any 
difficulties. It is much more difficult to define ‘Einflussgebiete’ which 
may be considered as equivalent to Germany’s total potential. No 
unitary view of conquered Europe is to be found in Germany s internal 
statistics. Instead there were varying groupings. In 1943 Reichsvereinigung 
Eisen divided the steel industry into eleven different districts, of which 
the first six were included in ‘Reich’ while the rest belonged to ‘Ein­
flussgebiete’.10)
7) These conditions have led to misunderstandings, e.g. by Karlbom (1965), pp. 
68 ff., 89 ff.
8) Here the author follows a grouping which has been used previously by 
Jäger (1969), pp. 24 ff.
9) This resulted in the division of the Minett area into two parts, one being ad­
ministrative and therefore also assigned to the ‘Reich’ in statistics, while the other, 
the Meurthe-et-Moselle departement, was treated as a French area, i.e. Einfluss­
gebiete’.
10) Hauptabteilung Statistik der Reichsvereinigung Eisen, T84:44:1322832 (N A).
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District number 1. Northwest Germany 7. Poland
2. Southwest Germany
3. Central Germany
4. Silesia
5. Bohemia-Moravia
6. Austria
11. The Netherlands
9. Belgium 
10. Northern France
8. Meurthe-et-Moselle
It is possible to see here that only certain central areas are considered 
as ‘Einflussgebiete’ while the steel production in other areas is not 
included.
In other statistics from Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisen schaffende Industrie 
relating to the supply of iron ore a distinction was drawn between 
native and foreign ores. For example, as ‘foreign’ iron ore French, 
Norwegian and Swedish iron ore were placed in the same category.11) 
Thus the statistics are not consistent with the existence of a single 
definition of ‘Einflussgebiete’.
It is also a moot point as to which of the three alternatives in question, 
‘Altreich’, ‘Reich’ or ‘Einflussgebiete’ is the most appropriate one to use 
when discussing the German steel industry. The use of ‘Altreich’ 
simplifies matters in making comparisons with pre-war times (as shown 
in tables 1 and 2 above) but it is not adequate to indicate the total 
production from which Germany benefited. ‘Reich’+ the whole of 
‘Einflussgebiete’ hardly fulfils these requirements since much of the 
production in remote countries may only be taken as having strengthened 
the German war economy in a very indirect way. It would probably be 
most reasonable, though not beyond criticism, to work with the concept 
‘Reich’. The best thing would obviously be to employ all three alter­
natives in parallel, and then state precisely what is included within 
‘Einflussgebiete’.
It will now be appropriate to follow this introductory discussion 
with an account of the production of pig-iron in Greater Germany.
11I Zugang bei den Hochofenwerken, Stahlwerken und den mit ihnen örtlich 
verbundenen Giessereien und sonstigen Verbrauchsstellen. Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisen 
schaffende Industrie, R13I/532 (B A).
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Table 4. The production of pig-iron in Greater Germany 1939-1944 
(in millions of tons)
Year ‘Altreich’ Rest of ‘Reich’ Total ‘Reich’ ‘Einfluss-
gebiete’
Total
1939 17.5 1.0 18.5 18.5
1940 14.0 1.5 15.5 — 15.5
1941 15.4 6.0 21.4 3.0 24.4
1942 15.3 6.9 22.2 2.7 24.9
1943 16.0 8.2 24.2 3.6 27.8
1944 13.4 5.7 19.1. 1.8 20.9
Source: ‘Altreich’, see table 1 above. ‘Reich’ and ‘Einflussgebiete’, 1939-1943, 
Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisen schaffende Industrie, Weltgewinnung an Roh­
eisen und Rohstahl 1939-1943, R10III/8 (BA), 1944, Statistische Han­
dakte, Präsident Kehrl, R3/1657B (BA).
Note 1. From 1941 onwards Bohemia-Moravia, Luxemburg and Lorraine are 
included in ‘Reich’, and the rest of France, Belgium and Poland are 
included in ‘Einflussgebiete’.
2. A collation from Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisen schaffende Industrie, Rl 31/524 
(B A), shows somewhat lower figures for ‘Reich’. The discrepancy is 
plainly due to the fact that the later collation did not include Bohemia- 
Moravia.
A corresponding apportionment of the total ‘German’ production 
of ingot steel can also be made:
Table 5. The production of ingot steel in Greater Germany 1939-1944 
(in millions of tons)
Year ‘Altreich’ Rest of ‘Reich’ Total ‘Reich’ ‘Einfluss­
gebiete’
Total
1939 22.5 1.2 23.7 _■ 23.7
1940 19.1 2.4 21.5 - 21.5
1941 20.8 7.4 28.2 3.9 32.1
1942 20.5 8.2 28.7 3.2 31.9
1943 20.8 9.8 30.6 3.9 34.5
1944 18.3 7.5 25.8 2.6 28.4
Source: See table 4. 
Note 1. See table 4. 
2. See table 4.
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Thus the military conquests, above all those in the west, not only 
brought about an increase in the supplies of iron ore but also an important 
capacity for the production of steel. Therefore the military expansion 
constituted an essential contribution to the total production of iron 
and steel. A comparison between the production in Germany during 
the last of the pre-war years on the one hand and during the actual war 
years on the other hand gave the following result.
Table 6. German production of ingot steel 1939-1944 
(‘Altreich’ 1936/38 = 100)
Year ‘Altreich’ ‘Reich’ ‘Reich’ + ‘Einflussgebiete’
1939 109 115 115
1940 93 105 105
1941 101 137 156
1942 100 140 155
1943 101 149 168
1944 89 125 138
Source: Table 5 above.
Thus the production in ‘Altreich’ itself was kept up to the same level
as the average of the last three years of peace. If the comparison is
extended to ‘ Reich’ a sharp rise is apparent in 1941 and a peak in produc-
tion in 1943 . In 1944 production in the area dominated by Germany
was still high above ‘Altreich’s’ pre-war production.12)
12) The total monthly production of ingot steel in 1944 is shown in the following
table (million tons).
Month Ingot steel production Month Ingot steel production
Jan 3.0 July 2.8
Feb 3.0 Aug 2.2
March 3.2 Sept 2.0
April 2.9 Oct 1.7
May 2.8 Nov 1.3
June 2.7 Dec 1.0
Source: Statistische Handakte, Präsident Kehrl, R3/1657B (BA).
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Production conditions are also illuminated by the following table:
Table 7. Production of pig-iron and ingot steel in Greater Germany 1939-1944
(%)
Year Pig-iron Ingot steel
‘Altreich’ Rest of ‘Reich’ ‘Einfluss­
gebiete’
.‘Altreich’ Rest of ‘Reich’ ‘Einfluss­
gebiete’
1939 95 5 — 95 5 —
1940 90 10 - 89 11 -
1941 63 25 12 65 23 12
1942 61 28 11 64 26 10
1943 58 29 13 60 29 11
1944 64 27 9 65 26 9
Source: Table 4 and 5 above.
The production of ingot steel within ‘Altreich’ was comparatively 
higher than the production of pig-iron. This meant among other things 
that pig-iron was transported from blast furnaces in the rest of the 
‘Reich’ to steelworks in ‘Altreich’.
The division of the various qualities of ingot steel as between ‘Altreich’, 
‘Reich’ and ‘Einflussgebiete’ does not form a clear pattern. Certain 
information from the year 1943 may illustrate this situation:
Table 8. The qualities of ingot steel produced in Greater Germany in 1943
(%)
‘Altreich’ Rest of ‘Reich’ ‘Einflussgebiete’
Thomas 39.3 44.7 59.5
Martin 48.2 46.6 33.9
Electric 9.5 8.3 4.2
Other 3.0 0.4 2.4
Source: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 289, Statistische
Handakte, Präsident Kehrl, R3/1657B (B A).
Comparativelylarge quantities of ordinary Thomas steel were produced 
in the rest of the ‘Reich’ and in ‘Einflussgebiete’ as is evident from the 
table. In France in particular, Thomas steel was produced to a striking 
degree, in the Minett area almost 90% of the total steel production.13)
13) According to Milward (1970), p. 213, almost 80% of the French ingot steel 
production consisted of Thomas ingot steel. Die Hüttenwerke in Minettgebiet, in 
Belgien und in Nordfrankreich, Juli 1942, T71:18:408853 ff. (NA).
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C. General conditions in the German steel industry 
1. Introduction
In spite of the sharply rising production of pig-iron and steel in Germany 
during the second half of the 1930s the acceleration in pace seems 
still to have been too slow. In fact the demand for steel rose even faster 
because of extensive investments in industry, especially in the steel 
industry itself, the building of motorways, and not least because of the 
rapidly growing need of the Defence Department for special high 
quality steel among other things. The inadequacy in production became 
apparent from 1937 and was further accentuated when war broke 
out.14)
The German military forces were directly and indirectly large and 
growing consumers of steel. Just as the military forces were favoured, 
so the supply to the civil sector and for export was cut off:
Table 9. German steel consumption 1937-1940 
(%)
Last 6 months
1937
Jan.-Aug.
1939
4th quarter 
1940
Armed forces (direct and
indirect) 38.4 51.2 60.5
Civil industries except
key industries 24.1 22.5 12.4
Key industries (mining,
steel industries, power) 8.7 10.1 12.9
Exports 28.8 16.2 14.2
Source: Reichsstelle Eisen und Stahl, Entwicklung des deutschen Eisenverbrauchs 
nach Gruppen, RlOIIEl (B A).
Note 1. Thomas, p. 179, mentions that the military forces in the summer of 1939 
took 30 % of the total steel production. How he had arrived at this figure is 
not stated. On the other hand the figures in the table above tally fairly 
well with those in US Strategic Bombing Survey, p. 103, for the fourth 
quarter of 1939. Of the supplies to the military forces 38.5% went to the 
army, 19.2% to the navy, 28% to the air force and 14.3% to the ‘War 
construction program’ at this point in time.
14) Klein, pp. 114 f, points out '. . . there was scarcely a meeting between Hitler 
and his economic advisers in which the steel situation was not discussed. Indeed, 
one gets the impression from the transcripts of these meetings, that, from the beginning 
of the war until 1943, a steel shortage dwarfed all othtr economic problems’. See 
also pp, 41,126. Riedel, pp. 482 f.
2
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Thus during the pre-war years and during the war there was a shortage 
of steel in Germany. It was partly a question of a shortage of certain 
special steel, but mainly a basic general shortage of steel which never 
ceased to be a great problem for the German leaders, since not even 
the needs of the military forces could be satisfied.15)
The significant discrepancy between supply and demand led to a 
growing governmental influence in the form of a system of rationing 
—which was complicated, functioned badly and was changed several 
times—to coordinate the distribution and priority of the resources 
which were altogether barely sufficient. In 1937 the distribution of 
steel was put under Hermann Goring and the 4 year plan, and in 1942 
a fundamental change took place through Albert Speer’s reorganisation 
and coordination in Zentrale Planung}6)
A question which arises immediately is: why didn’t the German 
steel industry manage to increase its production faster than actually 
occurred? The question can also be put in this way: which were the 
bottlenecks within the German steel sector? It is not easy to give clear 
answers to the questions because of various factors. Many different 
products were made within the steel industry and nowhere was there 
uniformity in the relationship between supply and demand. It is also 
difficult to apply the bottleneck concept to one single stage, as the steel 
process often went continuously from blast furnaces to rolling mills. 
Also in the present research a longer period of time is studied, during 
which there were of course changes in the relationship between supply 
and demand. Finally the steel industry was also dependent to a high 
degree on the satisfactory functioning of the energy supply and transporta-
15) Thomas, pp. 130,132,179, Milward (1965), p. 110, Janssen, pp. 69 ff. Even 
during the late autumn of 1942, when the German steel production was kept at a 
high level, Speer counted on a deficit of 780,000 tons per month. The average monthly 
production in the Reich in 1942 was 2.4 million tons of ingot steel. Zentrale Planung, 
9:e Besprechung, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM). Perhaps the clearest opinion 
about the shortage of steel is to be found in discussions of the Zentrale Planung, 
especially number 35, where spokesmen for various consumer groups (even the 
various defence forces) were confronted with each other. Zentrale Planung 35:e 
Besprechung 2/3-43, Handakten Milch, vol. 47 (IWM).
16) Thomas, p. 122, Klein, pp. 55, 126 ff. Neuordnung der Eisenbewirtschaftung, 
Vortrag von Präsident Kehrl 26/6-42, FD 4 723/45 (IWM). Deutschlands Rüstung 
im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer 1942-1945, p. 93 (about 
the formation of Zentrale Planung and the information it provides), p. 122, Caroll, 
pp. 132, 169 f., Janssen, pp. 56 ff.
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tion. Thus disturbances within these two sectors could cause bottlenecks 
for the whole of the steel sector.17)
The problems of the German steel industry have of course been 
pointed out in other literature, and there a series of bottlenecks has 
been alleged as the cause of the excessively slow increase in production. 
Therefore the bottleneck problem will be considered in the text which 
follows. First, however, the results obtained by some other scholars will 
be pointed out.
Burton H. Klein has stated that there was really no question of an 
actual deficiency or of bottlenecks within the steel sector. The reason 
for the inadequate production is to be found instead in the malfunc­
tioning of the organisation, especially the system of steel distribution.18) 
Berenice A. Caroll argues in the same way and stresses that the steel 
production (up to 1939) was adequate to cater for all essential needs. 
That a deficiency still arose was due to the fact that non-essential needs 
were not hived off effectively, and that the widespread feeling that there 
was a steel shortage caused an unhealthy increase in demand and in 
stockpiling. Caroll has also pointed out the confused demarcation of 
powers among the various authorities and personal rivalry as causes 
of the paralysis in production.19)
The high increase in production in 1943 has been ascribed to Albert 
Speer’s ability to make a clean break with the old malfunctioning ad­
ministration and to create a new institutional framework.20) Klein has 
questioned this interpretation and thinks that the political leaders did 
not really try to establish an increase in production until 1942. The 
muddle which existed before the ‘Speer era’ was, according to Klein, 
an effect rather than a cause of inadequate production, and in the same 
way the concentration of power in Speer is seen as a consequence of the 
politicians’ deliberate reliance on increased production.21)
l7) About 20% of the goods carried on the German railways in 1937 were goods 
for the steel sector. Hauptring Eisen und Stahl, Rationalisierung in der Eisen schaffenden 
Industrie, p. 4, R10III/7 (B A).
1S) Klein, pp. 114-135, 147-172.
19) Caroll, pp. 140 ff., 168. When Speer became armaments minister in 1942, war 
production and then the steel industry too came within the sphere of five different 
authorities at ministerial level, and below that of eight different authorities, etc., 
Caroll, p. 232.
20) E.g. Milward (1965), pp. 72 ff.
21) Klein, pp. 172, 200 ff. Cf. Caroll, p. 247.
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Klein’s thesis that the German steel industry would have been able, 
through very simple and limited contributions in various fields (e.g. 
increasing the number of coal-miners) to bring about an increase in 
production, seems atractive, but amounts to a crude simplification of a 
complex reality. In this context no detailed refutation of Klein will be 
made—this will be pursued below—but it will simply be established 
that there were real obstacles to production in the German steel in­
dustry.22)
In the following text there will be a short summary of the general 
conditions in the steel industry with special regard to the existence of 
bottlenecks.23) The account starts with the production at the rolling 
mills and then continues in reverse order (cf. the sketch) leading to a 
discussion about the supply of iron ore. These will form the basis of the 
further investigation.
iron ore
ingot steel Ro 11 ingSteel
furnace
Blast
furnace
pig-iron
scrap iron
coke
22) As to the source of the evidence, see the account below. The literature also 
expresses a view which is diametrically opposed to Klein’s, see e.g. The United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War 
Economy, p. 102, Milward (1965), p. 110, Janssen, p. 76, Petzina, p. 102 f, Riedel, p. 
483, Fritz (1973), p. 137.
23) On the other hand the hampering effect on production of the Allies’ bombing 
attacks, which led to reduced production above all during the latter part of the war, 
is not mentioned. See below, p. 54.
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2. The question of capacity
The volume of production of the rolling mills which made rolled iron 
goods, such as girders and other vertical section steel, rails, wire, pipes 
and sheet metal, was partly dependent on the supply of the basic material, 
viz. ingot steel, and partly on the capacity of the rolling mills. The 
supply of ingot steel will be dealt with under 3 (below).
However it is not worthwhile to isolate the question of the capacity 
of the rolling mills alone, since it was often a question of a continuous 
process from blast furnace via steel furnace to rolling mill all under 
one and the same roof. Therefore lack of capacity in one section brought 
about interruptions in the other sections. So it is more logical to deal 
with the question of capacity for the steel sector as a whole, i.e. from 
blast furnace to rolling mill without interruption.24)
With the boom period of the later 1930s extensive investments had of 
course taken place within the steel sector in Germany. The question 
however was whether the investments were large enough to meet the 
sharply increasing needs in the various areas of German economic life. 
Two factors caused additional difficulties for investments in the steel 
industry. One was that Hitler’s insistence on the greatest possible degree 
of self-reliance in using native, extremely low iron ores made great 
demands on extensive investments in concentration plants and blast 
furnaces.25) The other difficulty was deficiency of steel, mentioned 
above, which constituted an obstacle to a faster rate of investment 
within the sector itself, i.e. extending steel works or building new ones. 
Even the extension of the Reichswerke Hermann Goring, the pet project 
of the politicians, was delayed on account of the limited supply of 
steel.26)
In the opinion of certain commentators (including Klein) it hardly 
makes sense to talk about a lack of capacity during the 1930s, as the 
capacity of the steel works was three to four million tons higher than the 
quantities actually produced. According to this view there was also a 
surplus capacity during the war years. After the conquests in 1940 there
24) Hauptring Eisen und Stahl, Rationalisierung in der Eisen schaffenden Industrie, 
p. 5, RlOIII/7 (B A).
25) Hitler, A., Denkschrift Hitlers über die Aufgaben eines Vierjahresplans, pp. 
204 ff. Eisenwirtschaft seit Kriegsausbruch, pp. 79 f., R10III/6 (BA).
26) Zentrale Planung 35:e Besprechung 2/3-43, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 47 
(IWM).
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was a total capacity of ingot steel within the German sphere of in­
fluence of about 42 million tons, which can be compared with an actual 
production of 34.5 million tons during 1943, the most successful year.27)
However other scholars are inclined to lay emphasis on the lack of 
sufficient capacity as a cause for the insufficient volume of production. 
The civil as well as the military increase in demand had happened far 
too quickly and the investments within the steel sector had not kept 
a sufficiently rapid pace owing to the difficulties mentioned above.28)
However Klein’s comparison between capacity and actual production 
is not a fair one. The figure given above of a total capacity of ingot steel 
of 43 million tons includes among others the capacity of France (about 
10 million tons), of Belgium (about 4 million tons) and of Luxemburg 
(about 3 million tons).
With the German conquest of France, the French blast furnaces 
had to be supplied with coke from the Ruhr, since deliveries from 
Great Britain had ceased for obvious reasons. From what follows 
hereafter it will be evident that there was a substantial shortage of coke 
in Germany. Therefore the French blast furnaces could not obtain 
enough coke to melt down the ore. Thus it became difficult or impossible 
to make use of the capacity gained by conquest to the full extent. So the 
actual circumstances which prevailed on the German steel market 
make it impossible to carry out, as Klein has done, a simple addition of 
Germany’s old capacity to that which was newly acquired by con­
quest.29)
Finally another point should also be mentioned. As has been suggested 
above, an increase in the use of native ore of low iron content would 
entail the need for a greater blast furnace capacity to produce pig-iron 
of a given quantity than the use of imported ores of high iron content. 
With the expanding production in Germany of native iron ore there was
27) Klein, pp. 41, 107, 115, 117. The same train of thought in Jäger (1969), pp. 
301 f.
2S) The United States Bombing Survey, p. 102, Milward (1965), p. 110, Petzina, 
p. 102, Janssen, p. 76, Riedel, p. 483.
29) Cf. The United States Bombing Survey, pp. 103 ff. The coal shortage in France 
was often put forward as being an obstacle to production, see e.g. Reichswirtschafts­
ministerium, Nachrichten von den Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen in Frankreich, 
T71:21:412106 (NA).
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an obvious risk of an insufficiency in the capacity for melting down 
the iron ore in the blast furnaces, whereas the capacity in the steel 
furnaces and rolling mills had been adequate. In the spring of 1940 
this problem became a reality.30)
3. The production of ingot steel
For the production of Thomas ingot steel pig-iron was needed, and pig- 
iron and scrap iron were required for the production of Mirtin steel. 
In addition heat was needed for the steel furnaces, and also for the 
production of certain special kinds of steel and alloyed metals.
The supply of pig-iron was dependent on the production at the blast 
furnaces which will be dealt with next in part 4. The import of pig-iron 
was utterly insignificant in relation to the native production.
As has already become apparent (p. 11), the German ingot steel 
comprised about half the Martin steel and a growing proportion of the 
electric steel. Therefore in this connection the provision of steel furnaces 
using scrap iron as the basic material will be of great significance. Ore 
and scrap iron were to an extent interchangeable, and a decrease in the 
supply of iron ore could in theory be compensated for by an increase 
in the supply of scrap iron. A diminished supply of scrap iron could 
also result in a bottleneck for the German steel industry.
Earlier literature has not been able to provide satisfactory information 
about the supply of scrap iron for the German steel industry. On the 
one hand it has been suggested that the supply of scrap iron in Germany 
increased during the war, because of intensive propaganda among 
other things, and that because of this the demand for ore was reduced.31) 
On the other hand it has been doubted whether scrap iron could have 
had such importance.32) However neither side has had any proof for 
its beliefs.
During the pre-war years the need for scrap iron in the German 
steel industry increased. Supplies had come to an increasing extent as 
imports from countries which became Germany’s enemies during the 
war, viz. the U.S.A. and Great Britain. Because of this the German
30) Fritz (1973), p. 137.
31) E.g. Petzina, p. 107.
32) Jäger (1969), pp. 134 f.
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scrap iron supply position should a priori have deteriorated from 1939 
onwards.33)
Before the actual account of the supply of scrap iron is given some 
observations will be made. When calculating the supply of scrap iron 
it is important to distinguish the various types of scrap iron. The sub­
stantial part of the scrap iron which was fed into the steel furnaces was 
re-worked steel or circulation steel, i.e. the scrap iron which was produced 
during the actual manufacture of ingot steel and the products of the 
rolling mills. This scrap iron had the additional advantage that its 
properties were known. A table of the supply of scrap iron in Germany 
in 1943 shows the relations between the various types of scrap iron.
Table 10. The German scrap iron balance planned for 1943 
(1000 tons and %)
Source of supply ‘Reich’ ‘Einflussgebiete’ Total y/O
Circulation scrap iron 11 640 1 450 13 090 72
Ordinary scrap iron,
‘Aktion’-scrap iron 3 420 250 3 670 20
Building scrap iron from
Eastern Europe 1 450 - 1 450 8
Imports 50 - 50 -
Stock 590 — 590 —
Total 17 150 1 700 18 850 100
Use
Pig-iron production 2 500 240 2 740 15
Exports 650 - 650 3
Steel production 14 000 1 460 15 460 82
Total 17 150 1 700 18 850 100
Source: Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Schrott-Bilanz 1943, R10III/52 (B A).
The interesting feature in this connection is hardly the circulating 
scrap iron but the supplies of ‘new’ scrap iron. For most of the years 
it is possible to estimate the net addition of scrap iron.
33) On the German supply of scrap iron, see Heavy Industries of the German 
Reich, Iron and Coal Trades Review, 1939, p. 473.
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Table 11. The net German supply of scrap iron 1938-1943
(millions of tons)
Year Domestic scrap iron Imports Exports Net addition
1938 2.5 l.i _ 3.5
1939 3.0 0.7 — 3.7
1940 3.2 0.4 — 3.6
1941 3.0 1.1 0.2 3.9
1942 0.9 0.2
1943 4.9 0.3 0.4 4.8
Source: Production 1938-1941: R10III/77 (BA), 1943: the previous table. Import/ 
export: Monatliche Rohstoffübersichten. T77:198:934006. (NA).
Note 1. From 1941 onwards the imports came mainly from conquered areas in 
the Soviet Union.
Itis evident from the table that the net addition of scrap iron to German 
steel works did not undergo any significant changes during the war. 
Consequently the shortage of scrap iron which was already substantial 
before the outbreak of war remained during the war. With the exception 
of the year 1943 when German supplies of scrap iron, thanks to Speer’s 
action with regard to scrap iron, were judged to be satisfactory, the 
shortage of scrap iron constituted a bottleneck for the German steel 
industry.34) Since during the whole period, according to the information 
set out above, scrap iron constituted about 20% and iron ore (pig-iron) 
about 80% of the basic material for the production of steel, scrap iron 
could not make good any possible decline in the supply of iron ore.
As to the energy supply to the steel furnaces of heat gas from the coke 
ovens and electric heat it is obvious that changes within these fields 
could have a restrictive effect on production. The generation of gas 
in the coke ovens was dependent on the coal supply as was the current 
supply to the electric steel furnaces. As will become evident from what 
follows, the whole period was characterised by insufficient supplies of 
coal and coke. During the severe winter of 1939/40 production stopped 
at several steel furnaces because of lack of gas and in the future also 
shortage of gas was to cause interruptions in production.35)
34) Hauptring Eisen und Stahl, Rationalisierung in der Eisen schaffenden Industrie, 
p. 8, R10III/7 (B A).
35) Fritz (1973), p. 138. Zentrale Planung 16:e Besprechung 23/10-42, 51 :e Be­
sprechung 17/12-43, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46-47 (IWM).
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To manufacture certain special grades of steel the steel had to be 
alloyed with other metals. A cut in the supply of important alloy metals 
could therefore hamper production. The general view in the literature, 
supported by Jäger’s well-documented work, is however that the German 
steel industry was hardly short of alloy metals. The maintainance of 
imports, conquests of important deposits and technical innovations 
meant that alloy metals never gave rise to any significant bottleneck.36)
4. The production of pig-iron
Pig-iron is produced by the melting of iron ore in blast furnaces. Coke 
was used as fuel. The volume of pig-iron production is therefore depen­
dent on the mining of iron ore and coal and their transportation to the 
blast furnace. The supply of iron ore will be dealt with below.
As to the supply of coke produced from coal it is hardly convincing 
to maintain that Germany had a shortage of coal, being one of the 
world’s richest countries in coal. Yet the very shortage of coal, ‘Engpass 
Kohle’, constituted one of the most important bottlenecks for the 
German war economy in general and the steel industry in particular 
(in spite of the fact that at least from 1942 onwards the steel industry 
had had priority in allocations), due to two other factors, namely the 
shortage of labour and the poorly functioning transport system. Shortage 
of labour was beginning to tell in Germany during the latter years of 
the 1930s. With the ever increasing conscription into the armed forces, 
the shortage, mostly of skilled labour, was accentuated. For various 
reasons replacements in the form of prisoners of war and foreign labour 
could not adequately fill the vacuum left by the miners who had been 
called up.37)
The German transport system had not been equipped during the 1930’s 
to meet the demands of the boom period for greater transport facilities. 
The military conquests set new distances for transport, which in turn 
involved increased circulation of railway engines and carriages. When 
the priority needs of the armed forces had to be satisfied as well, the 
German railways and canals did not manage to transport the required
36) Jäger (1969), passim, especially pp. 307 ff.
37) Eisenwirtschaft seit Kriegausbruch, p. 28, R10III/6 (B A), Klein, p. 124, note 64, 
Janssen, pp. 73 f., 208 ff., Deutschlands Rüstung, pp. 170 ff. In Zentrale Planung 
endless discussions were held about the problem of recruiting labour, e.g. meeting 
no. 16-18, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM).
27
quantities of coal and coke. The shortage of engines appears to have 
been of special significance. Added to that was the fact that the very 
extensive exports of coal had to be carried by rail and this aggravated 
still further the shortage of coal and carriages.38)
Without further documentation here of the situation in the coal 
and coke markets it is probably plain that the shortage of coke from 
1939 onwards hampered the production of pig-iron in the blast furnaces. 
The extent of this obviously varied from region to region and at different 
times. However it would probably be impossible to demonstrate 
statistically what the shortage of coke meant for the production of Ger­
man pig-iron during the war.39)
Was the shortage of iron ore also an obstacle? Earlier literature, 
dealing with questions of this sort, has not been unanimous in its opinion. 
Some have thought that there was a constant shortage of ore,40) others 
that there was a shortage of ore up to the conquest of the French mines 
in the summer of 1940,41) and yet others that there is hardly a question 
of any kind of shortage of ore.42) The importance of Swedish iron ore for
3S) Eisenwirtschaft seit Kriegsausbruch, pp. 62 f., R10III/6 (BA). OKW1WiRiiAmt, 
Verkehrsbericht 10/3-42, T77:367:1210260 (NA), Der deutsche Verkehr im Jahre 
1943, FD 3042/49 (IWM), Thomas, pp. 197, 359, 363, Janssen, p. 210. Deutschlands 
Rüstung, p. 131. Thus for example in December 1941 no less than 44 trains a day 
went from the Ruhr and Upper Silesia to Italy carrying coal, i.e. approximately one 
every half hour. OKW,WiRüAmt, Übersicht über die Lage innerhalb des Verkehrs­
wesens, Monat Dezember 1941, T77:367:1210455 (NA).
39) In the Institute of Economic History at Gothenburg University Sven-Olof 
Olsson is preparing a paper on Swedish coal imports from Germany in which condi­
tions on the German coal market will also be discussed. To illustrate the consequences 
of the coal shortage reference can be made to the fact that in the autumn of 1942 a 
delivery of a million tons of ore from Spain was declined by Zentrale Planung on 
the ground that the shortage of coke made it impossible to have it melted down. 
In the depressed situation the smaller consignment of steel which was to have been 
delivered to Spain in return was regarded as more valuable. Zentrale Planung, 16:e 
Besprechung 23/10-42, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM). Certain information 
is available about production losses. During the second quarter of 1943 the decrease 
in the production of ingot steel was estimated at about 375,000 tons a month due to 
shortage of energy, 350,000 tons due to enemy action (damage+alerts), 100,000 tons 
due to various disturbances and 25,000 tons due to shortage of labour. Tätigkeits­
bericht des Hauptringes Eisenerzeugung 28/7-44, T71:34:428467ff. (NA).
40) E.g. Karlbom (1965 and 1968).
41) E.g. Klein, p. 117, Riedel, pp. 495 f.
42) E.g. Milward (1967) and Jäger (1967).
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the German war economy has also been assessed in the light of the 
particular opinion held about the ore situation generally. The contra­
dictory state of research makes it important to examine the question 
from fresh angles.
When it comes to the view of the iron ore supply as a possible bottleneck 
and fetter on the German steel industry, the following questions must 
be posed.
A) How was iron ore supplied and how was that supply affected by 
political situations abroad and military events?
B) The question of the iron ore supply is first of all a question of 
transport. Did the transport situation permit advantageous use of the 
political possibilities?
C) In spite of mobilisation for war and war itself the German steel 
industry was subject to economic laws, and of course it tried to minimise 
the cost of raw products. How was the supply of iron ore maintained 
from this point of view?
D) Iron ore is however no fixed entity. Its chemical composition shows 
rich variations. Among other things the phosphorus content plays 
a great part in the quality of the finished steel. A low phosphorus 
content in the ore makes it a suitable basic material for better qualities 
of steel, the demand for which grew particularly heavy in Germany 
at this time. Was the demand for a grade of ore of low phosphorus 
content especially difficult to satisfy? Therefore in the research which 
follows the German iron ore supply will be examined from the points 
of view of foreign politics, transport, economics and metallurgy. Only 
then can the question whether the iron ore supply formed a bottleneck 
for the German war economy be answered with precision.
II
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SUPPLY OF IRON ORE
A. Introduction
Having regard to the absolutely fundamental importance of the steel 
industry for a modern industrial state and its prospects of having a 
viable armaments industry it is self-evident that the supply of iron ore 
to the German steel industry was the subject of considerable political 
interest during the second half of the 1930s.1) This interest was accentuat­
ed by the military warfare—in theoretical discussions as well as later 
in harsh reality—combined with important economic warfare in which 
a possible cut in the deliveries of iron ore from Sweden to Germany 
was one of the main factors.2)
From this it follows that Germany’s need of iron ore helped to form 
German foreign policy as well as to influence the behaviour of her 
enemies. On the other hand changes in the political borders also meant 
changes in the supply of iron ore to the German steel industry. These 
two different aspects, viz. the importance of iron ore in shaping foreign 
policy and the influence of political changes on the supply of iron ore 
to the German steel industry are linked together in this chapter. Sweden’s 
role in the present context is specially noted.
By way of introduction, however, some general points will be made. 
Iron ore is a far from uniform product. Variations in its iron content 
and the rest of its chemical composition mean that it is difficult to make 
comparisons between various types of iron ore. The chemical composi­
tion of the ore in fact dictates the way in which it is processed and the 
use to which it is ultimately put. In the present chapter consideration
') On the steel consumption of the German military forces see above, p. 17.
2) The standard work in this field is still Medlicott, W. N., The Economic Blockade, 
I-II- The iron ore question is mentioned in many places, mostly concentrated in 
part I, pp. 180 ff.
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will first be given to the ore’s iron content, and a conversion into iron 
tons will therefore be carried out. These conversions can never claim 
to be completely accurate. It is therefore quite natural that corresponding 
conversions made by other scholars seldom or never tally with those 
included here. However a somewhat rough conversion is preferable 
to a precise computation of ore tons only, which is common in the 
literature. But it is plainly necessary that the converted figure, i.e. the 
ore’s average iron content, should always be taken into account.3)
In addition to the reservations which have been mentioned yet another 
observation must be made. This concerns the actual source for the 
statistical account given below. The figures to be found in printed 
as well as unprinted accounts in fact very seldom tally with one another. 
The reason for this is to be found in the different ways of collecting 
the information, varying definitions of products and regions, et cetera.4) 
Thus the information given here about quantities does not claim to be 
exact or definitive. Where different sources show significant discrepancies 
with regard to a particular matter this will of course be noted below.
B. The period up to the outbreak of war 
1. The supply of domestic iron ore
In the Treaty of Versailles after the first world war Germany had lost 
her main sources of iron ore to France, viz. the deposits of minett 
ore in Lorraine. The German production of iron ore in the 1920s was 
therefore on a much smaller scale than during the period before 1914. 
In addition the iron ores which were mined here and there in Germany 
invariably had a low iron content, on average just over 30%. The
3) See for example the different information about quantity in Karlbom (1965), 
p. 89, Milward (1967), pp. 130 ff. and Jäger (1969), p. 180. The difficulty of deter­
mining the iron ore content in a country’s total iron ore production is obviously 
due to the fact that this is composed of a range of different ore qualities with different 
iron contents. As an example it can be stated that the Swedish iron ore (piece-ore) 
during the years just before the outbreak of the war had an average iron content of 
just over 60%. During the war years the average content fell to about 57.5% at the 
lowest. The iron content of the ore concentrate and the briquettes was somewhat 
higher. SOS: Bergshantering 1936-1944. The problems have been discussed by 
Jäger (1969), p. 131.
4) This difficulty was already apparent to commentators at the time, e.g. Friedens­
burg, F., Die deutsche Roh- und Treibstofflage, T77:214:951572 (NA).
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insignificant deposits combined with the low iron content meant that 
the degree to which Germany was self-supporting, i.e. the native produc­
tion in relation to the steel industry’s total consumption of iron ore, was 
low, just over 20%. This meant that nearly 80% of the iron ore consumed 
in the German blast furnaces consisted of imported ore, all calculated 
in tons of iron. Of the larger countries of the world only Japan and Italy 
were self-supporting to a lesser extent.
The large imports naturally strained the German balance of payments. 
However, for the new German leaders in the 1930s the small extent to 
which Germany was self-supporting was more alarming from another 
point of view. A tense political situation or a war could lead to a cut in 
foreign deliveries which could rapidly bring Germany to her knees. 
But a stockpiling, however large, could not make up for the loss of 
the imports. Therefore the supply of iron ore was considered to be the 
Achilles heel of the German steel industry.5)
Therefore within the framework of the German four-year plan a very 
great effort was made to increase the mining of iron ore within the 
boundaries of Germany, above all in newly opened mines in the Salz- 
gitter area (east of Hanover) and in southern Germany (Dogger-ores). 
The aim of the substantial investments which took place was to raise 
the level to which Germany was self-supporting as much as possible.6) 
However the concept of being completely independent of foreign iron 
ore was one which only found expression in the context of propaganda.7)
5) There was a rich flowering of metaphors to illustrate the importance of the 
German imports of iron ore. Von Grundherr on one occasion coined one of the most 
descriptive ones in Auswärtiges Amt. There he warned Sweden about ‘pressing on 
the inflamed sciatic nerve’. Vpm 21/9 1938, H40Ct (UD A).
6) Here there will be no further discussion of the substantial effort to increase the 
domestic ore and steel production which was being made in the government ad­
ministration within the framework of the German Four Year Plan and which led to 
controversies between spokesmen for the steel industry and the bureaucracy. The 
literature on this is substantial. A highly partial contemporary author is Rheinländer, 
P., Die deutsche Eisen- und Stahlwirtschaft im Vierjahresplan (1939). A modern account 
of the background to the Four Year Plan and what it accomplished is Petzina, pp. 
48-53, 102-108. There are also many interesting comments by Caroll, especially on 
pp. 93-105, 122-139.
7) See e.g. von Grundherr’s explanation to Muhl, the Swedish naval attaché, of 
Göring’s speech in Nuremberg on Germany’s ability to be self-supporting with 
regard to the question of iron ore. Vpm 21/9 1938, H40Ct (UD A).
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Political and military opinion was of course in favour of the effort 
in question. Its economic consequences, viz. lower quality and dearer 
iron ore for the steel works along with impaired profitability and/or 
raised steel prices, were deliberately brushed aside by the politicians, 
in spite of the fact that the industry was sceptical of an increased use 
of native ores, both on economic and metallurgical grounds.8) A 
comparison between the costs of different ores is made in a later chapter 
(page 77).
The conscious effort to increase the native production of iron ore 
certainly led to a sharp rise in production during the latter years of the 
1930s:
Table 12. Germany’s production of crude ore 1928-1939 
(1000 tons)
Year Tons of Ore Tons of Iron Year Tons of Ore Tons of Iron
1928 6 475 2 089 1934 4 343 1 372
1929 6 374 2 081 1935 6 044 1 849
1930 5 741 1 845 1936 7 570 2 259
1931 2 621 842 1937 9 792 2 759
1932 1 340 443 1938 12 351 3 360
1933 2 592 828 1939 14 710 3 928
Source: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 281.
Note 1. Concentrated ore is included in the statistics, cf. Jäger (1969), p. 131.
8) Hitler’s views on the implementation of the policy, ‘ohne Rücksicht auf die 
Kosten’, are to be found in his Denkschrift, p. 209. In this connection it may also be of 
interest to give the views of the German industrialist Fritz Thyssen on the start of 
ore mining and steel production in Salzgitter, even if the evidence dates from 1945: 
'. . . When the Hermann-Goringwerke were started, the whole German industry was 
opposed because the HGW were built on ore deposits which had been found by my 
firm and the ore, from our experience, could not be used with success by putting it 
into the blast furnace alone. All the other works were of the same opinion with us 
and we made a meomorandum explaining that it was much too early to build big 
works on these deposits without knowing if Mr. Brassert pretended if the ore could be 
used alone for making pig-iron and steel. All the works were prepared to sign, but at
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The sharp rise in production was made partly through using ores 
with a lower iron content. The average iron content fell from about 32% 
at the end of the 1920s to about 27% towards the end of the 1930s.9) 
This problem gives rise to further discussion later.
The table above only includes tAltreiclT. From October 1938 
Austria’s iron ore production ought to be included in ‘Reich’. At the 
end of the 1930s the Austrian iron ore production had increased and in 
1939 it rose to more than 2.7 million tons of iron ore, which meant 
853,000 tons of iron.10) ‘Reich’s’ total production would thus amount 
to 4,781,000 tons of iron. This meant that the German production of 
iron ore had increased one and a half times again from 1935 to 1939.
2. The imports of iron ore
The imports of iron ore also rose sharply, even if not at the same rate 
as the home production. The level of self-support was therefore only 
raised slowly, and at the end of the 1930s there was a long way to go 
before the target set up in the middle of the decade was reached. The
the last moment two of them, Krupp and Mannesmann, received telegrams saying 
that if they signed the memorandum they would be treated as traitors, and con­
sequently they did not sign. The memorandum could have been influential if all had 
signed, but of course if two of the most important works refused ... So the HGW 
were built with an enormous amount of money, some say 2\ billion Marks. And they 
could not work with the ore there, but had to introduce Swedish ore.’ Interrogation 
of Dr. Fritz Thyssen 7/9-45, FD 3059/49 (IWM). On the opposition from the German 
steel industry, see also Petzina, pp. 103 ff., Caroll, pp. 145 ff., and on the 'peace 
treaty’ between Reichswerke Hermann Göring and the steel works in the Ruhr, 
Eichholtz, p. 51.
9) Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 281. The Salzgitter ore 
only had an iron content of about 20% and it was not until after concentration that 
the iron content reached 25-27%. Industria, 1939, p. 392.
10) Bericht über den Steierischen Erzberg, Reichswirtschaftsministerium, R7VII:129 
(B A). The annexation of Austria meant '. . . eine erfreuliche Erleichterung der 
Rohstoffversorgung. An erster Stelle sind hier die Österreichischen Eisenerzlager in 
Steiermark und Kärnten’. Die Bedeutung der Österreichischen Volkswirtschaft für 
das deutsche Reich, OKW, WiRüAmt, T77:411:1267070 (NA).
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apportionment of imports as between the various countries is shown 
in the following table:
Table 13. Germany's imports of iron ore 1935-1939 
(1000 tons of iron content)
Year Sweden Norway France Luxem- Spain French Spanish New- Other Total
burg North North found- Coun-
Africa Africa land tries
1935 3 305 308 1 684 110 661 96 95 144 6 403
1936 4 949 316 2 058 170 534 239 - 86 116 8 467
1937 5 450 306 1 722 461 156 332 - 404 386 9 217
1938 5 395 671 1 517 533 542 340 398 561 408 10 365
1939 6 226 619 829 470 369 444 256 416 689 10 318
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1933. United States Bombing 
Survey, p. 247.
Note 1. The conversion from tons of ore into tons of iron has been made using 
the following simplified calculations of the average iron content of iron 
ores: Sweden and Norway 60%, France and Luxemburg 30%, Spain 
50 %, French North Africa 45%, Spanish North Africa 55% and Other 
Countries 40%. Cf. the qualification above, p. 29.
As is shown, the imports increased sharply, above all from the 
Scandinavian countries and those outside Europe, while the deliveries 
from France and Spain stagnated. The relative contributions of the 
delivering countries are shown in the following table:
Table 14. Germany's imports of iron ore 1935-1939 
___________________________________ (%)_______________________________ __
Year Sweden Norway France Luxem- Spain French Spanish New- Other
burg North North found- Coun-
Africa Africa land tries
1935 51.6 4.8 26.3 1.7
1936 58.5 3.7 24.3 2.0
1937 59.1 3.3 18.7 5,0
1938 52.1 6.5 14.6 5.1
1939 60.3 6.0 8.0 4.6
10.3 1.5 - 1.5 2.2
6.3 2.8 - 1.0 1.4
1.7 3.6 - 4.4 4.2
5.2 3.3 3.8 5.4 3.9
3.6 4.3 2.5 4.0 6.7
Source: See the previous table.
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Thus Sweden was the most important delivering country and her 
proportion was maintained throughout the period. Its importance 
justifies a closer examination of the Swedish exports. First, however, 
German’s imports from other countries will be discussed.
German imports of iron ore from France constituted only a minor 
part of the French production of iron ore, and consisted mainly of 
minett ore with a comparatively low iron content, which was used 
above all in the blast furnaces of the Saar.11) Imports from France 
stagnated during the period and her comparative proportion declined 
in consequence. With the outbreak of war at the beginning of September 
1939 French deliveries of iron ore naturally ceased completely.
Spain had for a long time been a substantial exporter of low phos­
phorous content grades of ore both to Great Britain and to Germany. 
The total Spanish export, which was about 5.6 million tons of iron 
ore in 1929, fell considerably during the Spanish civil war. In 1935 
the total export amounted to 1.9 million tons and in 1937 to only 0.9 
million tons.12) Germany tried to use her political connections with the 
victorious Franco regime and the Spanish national debt to Germany 
in order to acquire and make substantial investments in Spanish iron 
ore mines to secure and increase continuous imports.13) However the 
German efforts had not led to any significant results even by the time 
war broke out.14)
The uncertain imports of iron ore from Spain made Germany try 
to find new suppliers from further afield. As far as quantity was con­
cerned delveries from deposits in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco could
11I In 1938 the blast furnaces in the Saar area consumed 5.2 million tons (tons of 
ore) of iron ore. Of these, 4.3 million tons came from France, which in turn constituted 
over 80 % of the total of French exports of iron ore to Germany. Der Bezug der 
Deutschen Hochofen und Stahlwerke an Eisen- und Manganerzen 1938, Reichs­
wirtschaftsministerium, Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisen schaffende Industrie, T71:14:404616 
(NA).
12) Die Wirtschaftsstruktur Spaniens, OKWWiRiiAmt, T84:134:1437023 flf., 
T84:135:1437139 f. (N A).
13) Entstehung, Entwicklung und gegenwärtiger Stand des Rowak/Sofindus- 
Konzerns, R7V1E140 (BA). AzD AP, Bd Dill, pp. 423 ff., 464. See also Van der 
Esch, p. 13, Merkes, M., pp. 26, 128 ff.
14) In actual fact the German organisation in Spain only acquired a lot of worthless 
mines and mining claims. Entstehung, Entwicklung und gegenwärtiger Stand des 
Rowak/Sofinduskonzerns, R7VIE140 (B A).
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compensate for the loss of the Spanish ores. The German hunger for 
ore also reached the other side of the Atlantic. During the second half 
of the 1930s growing quantities of iron ore were imported from New­
foundland.
The fact that Sweden was responsible for half of Germany’s total 
imports of iron ore naturally made that country of special interest to 
the German steel industry and thus also to the German political leaders. 
The interest in Sweden was also accentuated for other reasons. For 
her part Germany assumed that France if she were in a critical situation 
or at war would instantly cut off her deliveries of iron ore to Germany. 
Great Britain, by virtue of her military superiority at sea, could also 
cut off the more significant imports from North Africa and Newfound­
land as well as the Norwegian deliveries across the North Sea. Finally, 
the imports from Spain had diminished alarmingly.
Against the background of the very unsatisfactory level of self- 
support and the unwillingness or inability of the other exporting countries 
to keep up deliveries in wartime conditions the well-documented interest 
in Swedish iron ore is understandable, and in 1937 it led to an ‘offensive’ 
against Sweden by Germany and England simultaneously to get her to 
increase deliveries of iron ore to each country respectively. This ‘offen­
sive’, which has been noted earlier in the literature, was pursued both 
on a commercial and a political level.15) The latter was in itself natural, 
bearing in mind that the Swedish state owned half of the two largest 
Swedish iron ore mines, Kiruna and Gällivare, and also regulated by 
Government agreements the volume of exports from these two mines 
and the next largest in Grängesberg.
Thus it was Germany’s obvious uneasiness over the country’s future 
supply of iron ore which led to a request for increases in the deliveries 
of iron ore and a change in the Government agreement. This uneasiness 
was of course increased by the general boom with its accompanying 
shortage in the supply of steel, and above all by the currently growing 
interest of the English in Swedish iron ore.
The English request for increased deliveries also had to a certain 
extent a background of changes in the international structure of the 
trade in iron ore. At the same time as this demand for steel rose sharply—
15) Hägglöf, pp. 21 ff., Meinander, pp. 229, 238 ff. Hermann Göring was involved 
on the German side, and Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, on the 
English side.
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reinforced by the armament programme—the ever reducing Spanish 
deliveries caused serious problems for England.
In addition the English blast furnaces went over to the Thomas 
method of pig-iron production on a growing scale, and in so doing their 
interest in Swedish phosphorous ores increased. The Germans also sus- 
spected that the increased English demand was dictated by a desire 
thus to reduce the Swedish shipments of iron ore to Germany.16) The 
suspicion of Germany was also directed towards Sweden. The in­
creased exports to England, which were at first considered a natural 
commercial spreading of risk on the part of the ore sellers in 
Sweden, were now looked upon as influenced by considerations of foreign 
policy. It was also considered serious by the Germans that the increase 
in the export quantities—in order to be passed in the Swedish Parliament 
—had to be attended by a desire to be able to export more to England.11)
During this ‘olfensive’, which can be regarded as a prelude to the com­
ing of the iron ore problem, and Sweden being confirmed in the role 
allotted to her, she was put under pressure which led to the alteration 
of the Government agreement. Thus it was made possible to increase 
exports to Germany as well as Great Britain. Because of the trade 
slump in the following years the quantities assigned to Great Britain 
were not collected in full, but instead were allotted—at least in part— 
to the German steel industry.18)
16) Deutsche Gesandtschaft, Stockholm to Auswärtiges Amt 6/10 1936, 15/1,18/3 
1937, HaPol Schweden Eisenerz Bd 2 (A A), Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund 
styrelseprotokoll 7/4 1937 (G A), Brewett t. Vererker 27/4-37, N2247/1509/42 (P R O).
17) Aufzeichnung 19/1 1938, Die deutschen Erzbezüge aus Schweden, HaPol 
Schweden Eisenerz Bd 2 (A A). The fact that the proceedings in parliament were 
delicate is evident from a piece of advice from the trade councillor Vinell in Berlin 
to the Germans, not to press the question too far in official circles, because the Swedish 
government would then have difficulties in forcing it through because of increased 
opposition in Sweden, from the press inter alia. Vermerk 18/1 1937, HaPol Schweden 
Eisenerz Bd 2 (A A). German apprehension was made more intense by the fact that 
the management of Grängesberg was considered markedly well disposed towards 
England, or as the German envoy expressed it in a report to Berlin, '. . . dass wir 
bei der Leitung des massgebenden schwedischen Erzunternehmens Grängesberg 
AB keine gefühlsmässige Sympathie für unsere Interessen sondern eher eine aus­
gesprochene Hinneigung nach England vorauszusetzen müssen’. Deutsche Gesandt­
schaft to Auswärtiges Amt 18/3 1937, HaPol Schweden Eisenerz Bd 2 (A A).
ls) Out of 2,533,000 tons contracted to Great Britain only 1,482,000 tons were 
collected, PM 28/3 1939, H40Ct (UD A). Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund 
styrelseprotokoll 12/4 1938, 25/11 1938 (GA), Söderblom to Prytz 14/7-38, H40 
Ba (UD A).
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As a further example of the uncertainty which was felt in Germany 
during the spring of 1939, mention may made of a proposal which was 
put to the Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund concerning the 
possibility of storing a million tons of ore in the Ruhr, which were to 
be owned by Sweden although the buyers had paid the freight as well 
as the interest charges. As a justification for this a request was made 
for access to Swedish iron ore in the event of a sudden cut in deliveries. 
However the proposal was never put into effect, obviously for political 
reasons.19)
What was the assessment, on the German side, of the chances of 
obtaining iron ore from Sweden if there was a state of war? The question 
was certainly not one of little significance, but it was more difficult to 
answer than, e.g. the question about deliveries from France or North 
Africa.
There was hardly the fear—even if it was sometimes expressed—that 
Sweden would cut off her exports of ore for political reasons or—even 
WOrse—have them transferred to Great Britain. During the summer 
of 1939 the English planned purchases in Sweden, not primarily because 
their own steel works were in dire need of Swedish ore, but rather in 
order to reduce the shipments to Germany.20) Repeated assurances 
from the Swedish politicians indicated that there would be a continuous 
delivery of ‘normal’ quantities, which was considered consistent with 
Sweden’s policy of neutrality.21) The English superiority at sea made 
the German observers realise that the substantial shipments from 
Narvik, which constituted at least half of Sweden’s total exports of 
iron ore in the latter years before the war, could hardly be maintained 
in full in the event of a war. There was a doubt about the extent of this 
reduction and whether there would be a total stoppage. However reliance 
was placed on a substantial part of the traditional shipping of Narvik 
instead being routed to the Baltic port of Luleå, in spite of the fact that 
this port, as distinguished from Narvik, was frozen up for half the year.
19) Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund styrelseprotokoll 20/3 1939, 15/6 
1939 (GA).
20) Prytz to Sandler 27/4 1939,1/5 1939, Prytz to Hägglöf 13/7 1939, H40Ct (UD A).
21) Richert to utrikesministern 18/4 1939, H40Ct (UD A). Hägglöf pp. 14 ff.
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A reduction of about 3 million tons (tons of ore) was forecast in a 
report in January 1939.22)
This made the question of transport across the Baltic of even more 
vital importance. As long as the Germans saw the Soviet Union as a 
threat transport across the Baltic remained insecure. If at the outbreak 
of war the Soviet Union was numbered among Germany’s enemies, 
the Germans did not believe that they would be able to maintain the 
imports from the north of Sweden.23) However in the context of improv­
ing relations between Germany and the Soviet Union during the summer 
of 1939 Germany’s shipping position also improved, and with the 
planning of alternative ‘Mob-Falls’, the forecast for the German steel 
industry as regards the question of her iron ore supply was a much 
brighter one.24)
3. Summary
The great effort to bring about a sharp increase in the national produc­
tion of iron ore in Germany led during the latter part of the 1930s 
to a raised level of self-support, which was further improved by the 
incorporation of Austria into ‘Reich’. The rate of increase was however 
a slow one. The following tables provide information about the total 
supply of iron ore in Germany during the second half of the 1930s.
22) In the years 1936-1939 over 2.5 million tons of ore a year were shipped from 
Luleå. Sammandrag av Luleå leveranser (Summary of Luleå deliveries) (G A). The 
Germans calculated that Luleå had an annual capacity of about 4.5 million tons. 
Vermerk 20/1 1939, HaPol Schweden Eisenerz Bd 2 (A A). In this connection it can be 
said that even the Swedes estimated Luleâ’s normal capacity at 4 million tons. By the 
use of small technical devices it was possible to ship 5 million tons. PM 28/3 1939, 
H40Q (UD A).
23) Reichsamt für wehrwirtschaftliche Planung, Der deutsche Aussenhandel im 
Kriegsfall. T84:195:1561347 (NA), OKW WiRüAmt, Die Eisenerzversorgung 
Deutschlands im Kriege, 28/2 1939, T77:701:1913702ff. (NA).
24) OKW WiRüAmt, Entwurf 28/6 1939, T77:701:1913675 (NA). During the 
spring of 1939 the German steel industry operated on the basis of two alternative 
‘Mob-Programs’, one in which Swedish deliveries were pre-supposed to have 
stopped, and the other in which they were assumed to have continued. Eisenwirt­
schaft seit Kriegsausbruch, pp. 14ff., R10IIL6 (BA).
40
Table 15. Germany’s iron ore supply 1935-1939 
(1000 tons iron content)
Year Domestic production Imports Total
‘Altreich’ Rest of
‘Reich’
Total Sweden Other
Imports
Total
1935 1 849 1 849 3 305 3 098 6 403 8 252
1936 2 259 — 2 259 4 949 3 518 8 467 10 726
1937 2 759 — 2 759 5 450 3 767 9 217 11 976
1938 3 360 — 3 360 5 395 4 970 10 365 13 725
1939 3 928 853 4 781 6 226 4 092 10318 15 099
Source: See previous tables.
Table 16. Germany’s iron ore supply 1935-1939
(%)
Year Domestic production Imports Total
‘Altreich’ Rest of
‘Reich’
Total Sweden Other
Imports
Total
1935 22.4 22.4 40.1 37.5 77.6 100. o
1936 21.1 — 21.1 46.1 32.8 78.9 lOO.o
1937 23.0 — 23.0 45.5 31.5 77.0 100. o
1938 24.5 — 24.5 39.3 36.2 75.5 lOO.o
1939 26.0 5.7 31.7 41.2 27.1 68.3 lOO.o
Source: Table 15.
Thus the German iron ore situation during the end of the 1930s was 
not satisfactory if complete self-support was desired above all. As far as 
steel production was concerned the great dependence on other countries 
constituted a threat, as most of the delivering countries could be expected 
to cut off deliveries if war broke out. However the most important 
delivering country, Sweden, was prepared to continue her exports on 
a normal scale in the event of war breaking out. Therefore the deliveries 
to Germany became mainly a question of transport and in the last 
resort a question of whether it was possible to ship iron ore across 
the Baltic.
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Without in this connection going into the various reasons for the 
Soviet-German pact at the end of August 1939 and its consequences, 
one result should be established here and now: the Baltic acquired the 
character of a German sea.25) Thus at a single stroke a radical improve­
ment took place in the German supply situation. Through political 
decisions the imports from Sweden now seemed assured for a long 
time to come.
C. The first year of the war (September 1939-June 1940)
1. The supply of domestic iron ore
German iron ore production, which was already growing sturdily and 
continuously before the outbreak of war, went on expanding during 
the autumn of 1939 and the spring of 1940 at an increased rate, mainly 
thanks to the mining which had started at the Salzgitter mines.26) The 
development of production is shown in the following table:
Table 17. German iron ore production 1938-1940 
(1000 tons of iron)
1938, quarterly average 840
1939, quarterly average
of 1st and 2nd quarters, 1 103
1939, 3rd quarter 1 174
1939, 4th quarter 1 315
1940, 1st quarter 1 184
1940, 2nd quarter 1 471
Source: Previous tables, and information from Planungsamt, printed in Milward 
(1967), pp. 130 if.
25) The protection of the Baltic became one of the most important tasks for the 
German navy. Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1, 31/8 1939. In September 
the English were harbouring some hazardous plans for invading the Baltic. Starck, 
I, pp. 115 f.
26) Production in Salzgitter rose from 86,000 tons (of ore) in August 1939 to 
418,000 tons in June 1940. Friedensburg T:77:214:951586 (NA).
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From the year 1939 to the year 1940 production rose in ‘Altreich’ 
by 28% to a total of 5,019,000 tons of iron, while production in Austria 
as a whole was on the same level as in previous years.27) Besides, the 
year 1940 became the best year from the point of view of production 
during the whole of the period under examination.
There is a natural explanation for the sharp increase in production 
after the outbreak of war. For reasons which have been mentioned 
earlier and which will be further explained below, German imports 
of iron ore decreased considerably, and therefore increased demands 
were made on domestic production in order to keep the steel industry 
going. Several factors dictated that the expansion was still relatively 
limited.28) The general shortage of labour also affected the mining 
industry. The insufficient means of transport of a Germany at war 
prevented substantial carriage of domestic iron ore, and finally the 
cold winter of 1940 caused a general decline in production. Pig-iron 
from ores of low iron content also required, comparatively, much coke 
and labour. There was a widespread shortage of both of these in Germany 
at the relevant time. Finally, the actual capacity of the blast furnaces 
precluded too substantial a use of the poorer ores. Because of this, 
imports of ores with a high iron content remained vital for the German 
steel industry.
2. The imports of iron ore
As regards imports the development immediately after the outbreak 
of war was as predicted. Imports from France ceased, as did the greater 
part of the imports of ore which came across the Atlantic. The loss 
has been estimated at 36% (according to the iron content) of the normal 
pre-war imports.29) As far as exports from Sweden were concerned 
shipments via Narvik were reduced but could be kept going in the shelter 
of Norwegian territorial waters.
21) Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 281.
2S) Here there will be a reference once and for all to another examination of the 
period September 1939-June 1940 by the author. Fritz (1973), p. 133 ff.
29) Jäger (1969), p. 171.
Table 18. Shipments from Narvik, September 1939-April 1940 
(1000 tons of ore)
Corresponding shipments for the previous year in brackets
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1939 Sept. 165 (462) 
Oct. 227 (418) 
Nov. 249 (418) 
Dec. 294 (464)
1940 Jan. 511 (609)
Feb. 290 (587)
March 376 (724)
April 168 (687)
Source: Sammandrag av Narviksleveranser (Summary of Narvik deliveries) (G A).
More important than the deliveries from Narvik, however, were 
shipments from Luleå across a Baltic protected from enemies. These 
in fact rose to an extent which the Germans, for their part, had hardly 
dared to count on. The satisfaction over this was just as striking in 
Germany as the annoyance which it provoked in England:30)
Table 19. Shipments from Luleå in the autumn of 1939 
(1000 tons of ore)
Previous year’s shipments in brackets
1939 Sept. 592 (374)
Oct. 579 (230)
Nov. 514 (155)
Dec. 186 (-)
Source: Sammandrag av Luleâleveranser (Summary of Luleå deliveries) (G A).
Since the shipments from the next largest shipping port on the Baltic, 
Oxelösund, were also almost twice as high (519,000 tons for September- 
December 1939, compared with 286,000 tons for the corresponding 
period in 1938) German satisfaction is very understandable. However, 
with the closure of the port of Luleå due to ice barriers, the supply 
decreased substantially during the first half of 1940:
30) In a memorandum of September 1939 about the supply of steel the Germans 
reckoned on a yearly delivery of about 3.2 million tons (tons of ore) from North Swe­
den. OKW WiRiiAmt, Versorgung mit Eisen und Stahl 17/9 1939, T77:367:1210648 
(NA). During the period September-December 1939 alone 2.s million tons (tons 
of ore) were shipped from Luleå and Narvik. Thomas, pp. ISOff., Medlicott,. p 145.
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Table 20. Germany’s imports of iron ore 1938-1940 
(1000 tons of iron)
Period Total From Sweden Sweden’s 
% of total
1938, quarterly average 2 591 1 349 52
1939, quarterly average of
1st and 2nd quarters 2 790 1 481 53
1939, 3rd quarter 2 753 1 535 56
1939, 4th quarter 1 711 1 546 90
1940, 1st quarter 641 460 72
1940, 2nd quarter 867 789 91
Source: See table 17.
As shown in tables 17 and 20 the total supply of iron ore to Germany 
decreased during the first six months of 1940 and a considerable use of 
stocks had to be made. However it has been established in other con­
nections that a shortage of iron ore was hardly the reason for the drop 
in production which afflicted the steel industry in Germany in 1939/ 
1940.31)
It is absolutely clear that the supply of Swedish iron ore—in spite 
of decreased deliveries in the spring of 1940—constituted a substantial 
contribution to the steel industry. It was therefore important that 
Sweden should be willing to continue her deliveries even when there 
was a state of war.32) Obviously Sweden had no choice. Germany’s 
ability and desire to deliver important goods to Sweden were explicitly 
directly dependent on the Swedish deliveries of iron ore to Germany.33) 
On the other hand it is possible to discern a perceptible nervousness 
and uneasiness in Germany, and various rumours about the Swedish 
iron ore found expression in all sorts of ways. The sale of the Gränges-
31) Fritz (1973), p. 133.
32) In a discussion within the Reichswirtschaftsministerium in the autumn of 1939 
it was established that ‘Schweden ist gewissermassen Exportland Nr 1. In diesem 
Land keine Versorgungsschwierigkeiten aufkommen lassen’. Besprechung im RWM 
23/11 1939, T71:48:422364 (N A).
33) Right from the start of the war the Germans were ready and willing to supply 
Sweden with vital goods in connection with Swedish exports of iron ore. PM angående 
överläggningar rörande de svensk-tyska handelsförbindelserna (Memoranda con­
cerning discussions on Swedish-German trade links) 26/9 1939, HP64Ct (UD A). On 
the role of Swedish iron ore in Swedish trade policy see below, chapter VI.
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bergsbolag to France in the autumn of 1939,34) like the wish of the 
U.S.A. to purchase the whole of Sweden’s exports of iron ore in order 
to deliver them to Britain,35) was however among the more imaginative.
The imports of iron ore from Sweden, which were important for 
Germany—though hardly indispensible from a short-term point of 
view—led to clear efforts by the allies to reduce, or rather completely 
cut off the Swedish deliveries. The planning of the allies as well as 
subsequent events in the north of Scandinavia have long been known 
to research, and so a short summary will be given here, together with 
some notes.36)
English interest was focused mainly on Narvik, the importance of 
which was apparently overrated by the English. It appears that they 
did not take into account either the fact that Luleå was to manifest 
so great a latent shipping capacity during its short season.37) During 
the Russian-Finnish war in the winter of 1939/1940 however, there was 
a transformation in the possibilities of encroaching on the actual ore 
fields themselves in the north of Sweden. An allied rescue expedition 
on a limited scale was to be put ashore in Narvik, and was to march 
through the north of Sweden to the assistance of Finland. The sympathy 
for Finland’s fight which was generally widespread in Sweden would 
make the allied march through Sweden easier from the point of view 
of public opoinion. The main task of the expedition was in fact to 
gain control of the Swedish ore fields of Kiruna and Gällivare which 
accounted for the major part of the Swedish exports of ore to Germany. 
The planning of the allies was stimulated by the exiled German industrial­
ist Fritz Thyssen who made highly exaggerated pronouncements to 
the effect that victory would go to the side which won control over the 
Swedish iron ore. In the English Cabinet it was reckoned in January
34) TheSwedish embassy in Berlin to Utrikesdepartementet 7/101939, H40Ct (UD A).
35) OKW WiRüAmt, Aktenvermerk 2/11 1939, T77:430:1293155 (NA).
36) The latest work is by Woodward, whose report follows War Cabinet Con­
clusions (PRO) closely. See also Wahlbäck, pp. 250ff., Synnergren, pp. 184ff., 
Carlgren, pp. 81 ff.
37) Boheman, pp. 13, 87, 115. As mentioned above, note 22, in January 1939 the 
Germans estimated Luleâ’s capacity at 4 million tons a year. In actual fact during the 
year 1940 no less than 5. t million tons were exported from this port. Sammandrag av 
Luleâleveranser (Summary of Luleå deliveries) (G A). That this was possible is due 
to the fact that the Swedes tried in every way to make deliveries easy. Memorandum 
26/6 1941, HP64Ct (UD A).
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1940 that a cut in the deliveries of iron ore from the north of Sweden 
would bring Germany to her knees within a year.38)
The English-French initiative met with opposition from Norway 
and Sweden to a march overland. Passive permission at least was con­
sidered to be a necessary condition for the action’s prospects of success. 
In addition considerable doubt arose in the English government as to 
the action’s consequences in various fields (e.g. that the German counter­
measures would succeed). The risk that they themselves might lose 
deliveries of iron ore in an action against Narvik served to increase the 
doubts.39)
The allies ambitions to stop Swedish exports of iron ore finally 
resulted—on 8 April 1940—in the laying of mines outside Narvik and 
in the rest of the Norwegian territorial waters. But at that time Operation 
Weserübung was almost completed.
The plans of the allies to stop German imports of iron ore by using 
Finnish support as a battering-ram became known early on in Germany, 
and counter-measures were being prepared.40) There has been discussion 
in scientific literature as to whether the German attack on Norway 
was a ‘defensive’ act, i.e. done to prevent a cut in the imports of ores, 
or an ‘offensive’ operation designed to facilitate the attack which had 
been planned against Great Britain.41) Obviously the two motives 
cannot be kept quite distinct.
In this connection only a few observations will be made. As shown 
above, the allies’ superiority at sea had not cut off the Swedish deliveries 
of iron ore to Germany. Instead shipments across the Baltic showed a
3S) Thyssen’s statement, see Woodward, p. 50. An English Member of Parliament 
told the Swedish envoy in London that a cancellation of the shipments of Swedish 
ore to Germany would bring the war to an end within six months. Prytz to Sandler 
8/9 1939, H40Ct (UD A), the view of the War Cabinet, see War Cabinet Conclusions 
2/1-40 (PRO). However it was acknowledged that great risks were involved in 
such an action. The importance which attached to Swedish iron ore in fact justified 
the taking of great risks. War Cabinet Conclusions 20/12-39, 17/1-40 (P R O). How­
ever on a few occasions reservations were made about the importance of Narvik, e.g. 
the President of the Board of Trade in War Cabinet Conclusions 10/1-40 (P R O).
39) It was emphasised that Great Britain’s imports of iron ore from Sweden almost 
invariably went via Narvik. War Cabinet Conclusions 10/1, 12/1—40, (PRO), Eden 
to Halifax 10/1-40, N534/19/63, Foreign Office Minute 28/1-40, N2570/19/63, Collier 
Memorandum 7/3-40, N2815/9/56 (P R O).
40) E.g. AzDAP, Bd DVIII, pp. 510, 520 ff.
41) Gemzell, pp. 7 ff. Cf. Tägil, p. 214.
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considerable increase, and German satisfaction over this was plain. 
For the defensive interpreatation to be valid, not only would mine­
laying by the allies outside Narvik be called for but above all there 
would have to be a capture of the actual ore fields and the harbour of 
Luleå. After the peace treaty of 12 March 1940 between Finland and the 
Soviet Union such action could hardly any longer be politically motivated, 
and besides it would have led to Sweden being thrown into the arms of 
Germany. The mine-laying which finally took place could therefore 
hardly provide the motive for a German attack—any more than the 
mine-laying itself was economically motivated—since Luleâ’s shipping 
season was imminent.42) Destruction by the allies of the iron ore mines 
or of the harbours in Luleå and Oxelösund would then have constituted 
a much graver threat to the German iron ore supply. The English did 
not seem to expect a German attack in reprisal for the mine-laying.43)
3. Summary
During the first year of the war the iron ore question came into focus 
in higher politics and helped to shape political events abroad. In this 
respect the English seem to have exaggerated Narvik’s importance as 
a harbour for shipping, or rather to have failed to appreciate the extent 
of Luleâ’s latent potential. The theory that the German attack on Norway 
was dictated above all by the country’s need for iron ore hardly seems 
plausible.
As a consequence of foreign political and military events iron ore 
deliveries from Sweden continued in a stabilized way. The shipments 
from Narvik ceased during the whole of the year 1940 and the ore 
had to be diverted to an increased extent via Luleå, whose exports, 
thanks to Swedish cooperation, were able to be substantially extended. 
Greater Germany became the only buyer of Swedish iron ore, and
42) Both the Swedes and the Norwegians put this point of view to the allies and to 
Germany, in order to avoid, if possible, an intervention in Narvik. Günther and Söder­
blom to Richert 2/4 1940, H40Ct (UD A), see also Bröyn, p. 113, Carlgren, p. 139.
43) Woodward, p. 112. An 'operation Paul’ directed against the shipping from 
Luleå by mine-laying from the air was being prepared in May 1940. To a great extent 
the material on this is not yet available, but see Memorandum by the First Sea Lord, 
N5798/19/63 (PRO). At the same time the possibility was being canvassed in the 
Foreign Office of offering Sweden economic compensation for destruction by the 
Swedes of the iron ore mines, Harris to Mallet 10/4-40, N5299/19/63 (P R O).
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thenceforth the allies were only able to bring about marginal interrup­
tions of the ore shipments from Sweden, e.g. through the sinking of 
ships.
Sweden’s role during this period was a fairly passive one, and her 
dependence on Germany increased. In the trade agreements which 
were made between the two countries iron ore deliveries of 10 million 
tons were provided for (in 1937 and 1938 exports had amounted to 
about 9 million tons).44)
D. The German iron ore supply during the war years 
1. The domestic production of iron ore
As shown in the previous section production in the German mines was 
intensified after the outbreak of war and reached record figures in 1940. 
With the conquest of France and the supply of minett ore, the domestic 
supply of iron ore, i.e. within ‘Altreich’, became less indispensable. 
Production stagnated and showed a downward tendency during the 
war years. Mining even stopped in certain newly dug mines (Dogger).
Table 21. The iron ore production of Germany f Altreichf 1940-1944 
(1000 tons)
Year Tons of ore Tons of iron
1940 19 204 5 019
1941 18 119 4 755
1942 15 341 4 137
1943 15 208 4 080
1944 10137 2 636
Source: Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 281. For the year 1944, 
p. 283, with the iron content estimated to 26%.
The stagnation within ‘Altreich’ was compensated for by a large 
production within ‘Reich’, resulting above all from the conquest of 
France and Luxemburg. The German need for iron ore does not in fact 
appear to have led to any immediate resumption of the offensive in the 
west. Milward, however, has seen a connection between the two, and has 
pointed out that the German dependence on Swedish iron ore could
44) On Swedish trade policy see below, chapter VI.
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in the long run be troublesome for Germany, and that ‘the possibility 
of an alternative source of supply made iron ore appear as the most 
valuable commodity which the French economy had to offer Germany’.45) 
However the fact is—for various technical reasons, and in particular 
as confirmed by what actually happened—that the minett ore was 
hardly an immediately usable alternative to the Swedish iron ore, but 
was rather an alternative to the ore which was mined within ‘Altreich’.46)
The German conquest of France and Luxemburg brought about an 
increase in production within ‘Reich’:
Table 22. The production of iron ore within 'Reich' 1940-1944
(1000 tons of iron)
Year ‘Altreich’ Austria France/Luxemburg Total ‘Reich’
1940 5 019 865 1 489 7 373
1941 4 755 784 5 176 10 715
1942 4 137 771 5 208 10 116
1943 4 080 782 5 920 11 056
1944 2 636 900 3 503 7 846
Source: ‘Altreich’: table 21, Austria: R7VIL129 (BA) and 
France/Luxemburg 1940-1942: Milward (1970), p. 
30% iron content, 1943-1944: R3:1657B (BA), 
1942=the total of the various entries, 1943-1944: .
T71:17:407461 (NA), 
215 converted above 
Total ‘Reich’ 1940- 
R3:1657B (BA).
Note 1. According to another source (Rohstoffbilanzen, Statistisches Reichsamt) 
the total production within ‘Reich’ amounted to 10,188,000 tons in 1942 
and in 1943 to 10,884,000 tons, T84:195:1561073 (NA).
45) Milward (1970), p. 212. As to the French production of iron ore see Milward’s 
work, the chapter entitled ‘Iron Ore’, pp. 210 ff.
46) This interpretation is also made by Jäger (1969), pp. 180 ff. Clodius, one of the 
leading men in Auswärtiges Amt’s trade policy department, contemplating Sweden 
in May 1940, says: ‘Erz und Holz werden wir voraussichtlich auf absehbare Zeit 
noch in sehr grossem Umfange brauchen. Auch die Sicherung der lothringischen 
und nordfranzösischen Gruben als deutsche Bezugsquellen . . . wird hieran nichts 
Grundlegendes ändern’. AzDAP, Bd DIX, pp. 392 f. At one of Speer’s conferences 
with Hitler it was decided that the mining of iron ore should cease in Südbaden, since 
supplies were superabundant after the conquest of the Minett area. Deutschlands 
Rüstung, p. 76. Likewise it was thought that the German domestic iron ores compen­
sated for the loss of the imports from France at the beginning of the war in 1939. 
OKVV, WiRuAmt, Die Eisenerzversorgung Grossdeutschlands während der gegen­
wärtigen kriegerischen Verwicklungen, Dezember 1939, T84:195:1560535 (NA).
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Thus France and Luxemburg contributed at least half of the total 
production within ‘Reich’. Probably the largest part of this production 
was also consumed by the blast furnaces within ‘Reich’.47)
The German (‘Reich’) steel industry had of course the opportunity 
of making use of the iron ore which was mined in other conquered 
areas in ‘Einflussgebiete’. In ‘Einflussgebiete’ too the French ore, 
especially from the departement of Meurthe-et-Moselle, played the most 
important role.48) Deliveries from other areas were only occasional, 
or were of less importance.
Table 23. Iron ore mined in ‘Einflussgebiete’ and used in 'Reich' 1941-1944 
(1000 tons of iron)
Year France
French
North
Africa
Slovakia Soviet Norway Others Total
1941 2 216 65 54 267 62 2 664
1942 2 483 120 62 26 304 31 3 026
1943 2 664 — 132 516 252 72 3 636
1944 983 — 72 - 119 56 1 230
Source: 1941-1942: R13E532-533 (BA), 1943-1944: 184:195:1561073 (NA).
In order to obtain a more complete picture of the total iron ore 
production under German control it would of course be of interest 
to know also what the production was within ‘Einflussgebiete’. However 
the statistical information about this is very uncertain. A rough estimate 
indicates that about half of the total iron ore production within Ein­
flussgebiete’ was delivered to steel works within ‘Reich’.49)
47) Milward (1970), pp. 218 ff.
4S) On the allocation of France to ‘Reich’ and ‘Einflussgebiete’ respectively see 
Chapter I, p. 12.
49) Statistische Handakte, Präsident Kehrl, R3:1657B (BA), Milward (1970),
p. 222.
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On the basis of the information so far accounted for, ‘Reich’s’ total 
supply of ‘domestic’ iron ore can now be compiled:
Table 24. ‘Reich's' supply of‘domestic’ iron ore 1940-1944 
(1000 tons of iron and %)
Year ‘Altreich’
1 000 tons %
Rest of ‘Reich’
1 000 tons %
‘Einflussgebiete’
1 000 tons %
Total
1 000 tons
1940 5 019 68 2 354 32 _ _ 7 373
1941 4 755 35 5 960 45 2 664 20 13 379
1942 4 137 31 5 979 46 3 026 23 13 142
1943 4 080 28 6 702 47 3 636 25 14 418
1944 2 636 32 4 403 53 1 230 15 8 269
Source: Tables 21-23.
Thus during the war years the ‘German’ production of iron ore 
increased compared with the period at the end of the 1930s. The reason 
for this was mainly the conquest of France. Therefore the military 
successes contributed to a sharply increased level of self-support for 
‘Reich’ as compared with pre-war ‘Altreich’. However the raised level 
of self-support which is apparent is mainly a matter of book-keeping.
2. The imports of iron ore
By virtue of the fact that many countries which before the war had 
exported iron ore to Germany were integrated into ‘Reich’ or ‘Ein­
flussgebiete’ total imports of iron ore obviously decreased. While the 
imports in 1938 had amounted to at least 10 million tons (tons of iron) 
during the war years they fell to about half:
Table 25. ‘Reich’s’ imports of iron ore 1940-1944
(1000 tons of iron)
Year Sweden Norway France/
Luxemburg
Spain Others Total
1940 5 339 74 281 _ 311 6 005
1941 5 027 - __ 126 172 5 325
1942 4 205 - — 359 447 5 011
1943 5 568 - — 192 72 5 832
1944 2 628 - - 53 30 2711
Source: 1940: Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1941-1942: R13I:532-533 (BA), 1943-1944: 
T84:195:1561073 (N A).
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The imports from Spain during the war years never reached any 
significant quantities. Because of this Sweden became the totally 
dominant delivering country. Exports continued from there on the whole 
unaffected by foreign political events and no sudden changes in deliveries 
took place. It was the extent of the deliveries via Narvik which varied 
somewhat according to the strength of the navy. In 1941 0.7 million 
tons were shipped, in 1942 1.2, in 1943 2.0, and in 1944 1.1 million tons 
went via Narvik. In yearly trade agreements the quantities were fixed 
at 10 million tons (tons of ore) per year, but these were never collected 
in full. Thus the problems facing the importing of iron ore from Sweden 
were on a level different to that of foreign politics.
3. Summary
After the German military successes in Europe and above all by virtue 
of control over the French iron ore production, the German supply 
of iron ore formed a stable pattern. Production within ‘Altreich’ stag­
nated, while the French iron ores, those in '1Reich' as well as those in 
‘Einflussgebiete’, became the dominant ones in supplying ‘Reich’. 
Of the imported iron ores only those from Sweden were of importance:
Table 26. Germany’s (‘Reich’) supply of iron ore 1940-1944
(1000 tons of iron)
Year Domestic production Imports Total
‘Altreich’ Rest of ‘Einfluss- 
‘Reich’ gebiete’
Total Sweden Others Total
1940 5 019 2 354 — 7 373 5 339 666 6 005 13 378
1941 4 755 5 960 2 664 13 379 5 027 298 5 325 18 704
1942 4 137 5 979 3 026 13 142 4 205 806 5 011 18 153
1943 4 080 6 702 3 636 34 418 5 568 264 5 832 20 250
1944 2 636 4 403 1 230 8 269 2 628 83 2711 10 980
Source: See previous tables.
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Table 27. Germany's (‘Reich') supply of iron ore 1940-1944 
(%)
Year Domestic production Imports Total
‘Altreich’ Rest of
‘Reich’
‘Einfluss­
gebiete’
Total Sweden Others Total
1940 37.5 17.6 — 55.1 39.5 5.4 44.9 100. o
1941 25.4 31.9 14.2 71.5 26.9 1.6 28.5 100. o
1942 22.8 32.9 16.7 72.4 23.2 4.4 27.6 100. o
1943 20.1 33.1 18.0 71.2 27.5 1.3 28.8 100. o
1944 24.0 40.1 11.2 75.3 23.9 0.8 24.7 100. o
Source: Table 26.
Did the political border changes mean that the supply situation for 
the steel works within ‘Altreich’ underwent some kind of change during 
the war years? For the years 1941-1942 the sources permit a comparison 
to be made with the pre-war period:
Table 28. ‘Altreich’s' iron ore supply in 1937 and 1941-1942 
(tons of iron %)
Year ‘Domestic supply’ ‘Imports’ Total
tons of 
ironTotal Sweden’s share France's share
1937 23.0 77.0 45.5 14.4 11 976
1941 31.5 68.5 32.5 23.5 12 784
1942 31.7 68.3 36.1 19.9 13 914
Source: 1937: table 16, 1941-1942: R13L532-533 (BA).
Thus the war years brought about certain changes in ‘Alreich’ 
iron ore supply. The domestic production showed a relative increase 
as did supplies from France, while the imports from Sweden decreased 
both relatively and absolutely. The changes can hardly be called funda­
mental, and the basic composition of the iron ore supplies in the steel 
works was unchanged.50)
50) Of the total Minett ore production (Lorraine, Luxemburg and Meurthe-et- 
Moselle) in 1940-1944 of nearly 114 million tons (tons of ore) 14.7 million tons went 
to steel works in the Ruhr and 20.8 million tons to steel works in the Saar during 
these years. Milward (1970), p. 216. This meant a sharp rise in the consumption of 
this type of ore, especially in the Ruhr area. In 1938 the consumption of minett ore 
in the Ruhr area was only one-fifth of that in the Saar area, Li million tons and 5.0 
million tons respectively. T71:14:404615 (N A).
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E. The end of the war
The iron ore supply to the German steel works reached its maximum 
in 1943. Even during the first quarter of 1944 production was kept 
up around the level of the previous year’s figures. After that there was a 
rapid decline.51)
The supply was reduced by the extensive bombing raids of the allies 
on the German steel industry and the German transport system.52) 
The military successes of the allies on land also of course meant a 
decrease in the deliveries from ‘Einflussgebiete’ and the rest of ‘Reich’. 
The production of minett ore was reduced during the late spring and 
early summer to cease finally from the month of August onwards.53)
The imports were also affected by the changes in foreign politics. 
During the autumn of 1943, when a new Swedish-German trade agree­
ment for 1944 was being concluded, the Swedish negotiators were 
committed to a previous agreement with the Western Powers about a 
reduction in the quantities of exports, which were also reduced in the 
agreement from 10 million tons to 7 million tons.54)
EFnder the pressure of the successes of the Western Powers the Swedish 
attitude hardened further. After pressure from the U.S.A. and Great
51) Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Hermann Röchling, Bericht über das I Quartal 
1944, T71:34:428515 (N A).
52) The allied bombing raids began to take effect from the late summer of 1943 
onwards. The transport system was bombed systematically from September 1944 
and the steel works in the Ruhr from October. 80% of the fall in production in ‘Reich’ 
(from 2 million tons in September to barely 1 million tons in December) is ascribed 
to destruction by air raids. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, pp. 11 ff., 
105 ff., the development of ingot steel production, ibid, appendix table 73.
53) The continuous fall in the production of minett ore is shown in the following 
table (1,000 tons of iron):
Month Production Month Production
Average 1943 935 May 728
1944 Jan. 919 June 673
Feb. 908 July 669
March 1 026 August -
April 928
Source: Präsident Kehrl, Statistische Handakte, R3:1657B (BA). 
54O See below, p. 122.
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Britain as well as the Soviet Union, the transport of iron ore in Swedish 
ships was stopped in August of 1944. At the end of September German 
vessels were also prohibited from visiting the Swedish Baltic ports. 
The traffic via Narvik and the ports on the west coast of Sweden could 
not compensate for that loss, the less so as the state railways refused 
to re-direct goods trucks. Later that autumn deliveries via Narvik 
were stopped as well.55)
Of what significance then were the simultaneous stoppages of the 
iron ore deliveries from France and Sweden for production conditions 
in the German steel industry? Judging by the analyses which were 
made during the autumn of 1944 the stoppages did not constitute 
a disaster or even a serious drawback. The storing of iron ore and scrap 
iron as well as pig-iron, which had increased sharply from the point 
of view of supplies during the good year of 1943, together with the 
production in the areas controlled by Germany, were regarded as being 
so extensive that the effect would hardly be noticeable until the spring 
of 1945, and by that time—according to the administrators—German 
military successes ought to have made it possible for the deliveries to 
be resumed.56)
55) These various influences, which were accentuated by the unusually large exports 
in 1943, which shocked the allies, are clearly described in documents at the Swedish 
Foreign Office, the series HP64Ct, HP64Ba, HP64Ua and H40Ct (UD A), see below, 
p. 119. The Germans also connected the harsh Swedish attitude with pressure from the 
allies, e.g. the German envoy in Stockholm to Auswärtiges Amt 7/6 1944, R7X:46 
(BA), Schnurre, to Auswärtiges Amt 23/8 1944, HaPol Schiffahrtsbez. Deutschlands 
zu Schweden, Band 5 (A A).
56) The stock of iron ore in Germany is shown in table 30 below. In September 
1944 the stock of scrap iron was 1.8 million tons, i.e. it was as high as during the 
spring of 1943. The stock of pig-iron was kept to a constant 1 million tons during the 
whole of 1944. Statistische Handakte, Präsident Kehrl, R3:1657B (B A). In September 
1944 Speer counted on a continuous production—even if reduced in comparison with 
‘Reich’—of Thomas steel for yet another 19 months. The stock amounted to almost 
2 million tons (tons of iron). As far as the grades of low phosphorous ore for the 
production of Martin steel were concerned, the stock was almost as large, but the 
home production potential—apart from Erzberg in Austria—was lower. However 
the production of ingot steel could continue for a further 9| months. Speer to Hitler 
5/9 1944, R3:1525 (BA). In the Four Year Plan the same opinion was expressed. 
The blockade of the Baltic ports ‘ist . . . nicht mehr von so entscheidender Bedeutung 
und findet seine Auswirkung erst im nächsten Jahr nach Verbrauch der Bestände an 
phosphorarmen Eisenerzen’. Not until the middle of 1945 was the armament industry 
to be affected, with a cut of about 30%. Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan to Aus­
wärtiges Amt 25/9 1944, Handakten von Behr (A A).
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The fact that the German steel works would not suffer any acute 
shortage of iron ore is confirmed by available sources. Unfortunately, 
however, there is no information later than January 1945:
Table 29. The German iron ore supply Oct. 1944-Jan. 1945 
(1000 tons of iron)
Month Production 
in ‘Reich’
Imports from 
Sweden
Other imports The steel 
works’ stocks 
at the end of 
the month
1944 Oct. 415 34 32 2 681
Nov. 389 52 15 2 371
Dec. 320 22 18 2 204
1945 Jan. 300 — — ’
Source: Statistische Schnellberichte zur Kriegsproduktion, T84:195:1561122 (N A).
Thus the supply of iron ore to the German steel works was drastically 
reduced. However the German steel industry did not suffer a decline 
in production due only to the shortage of iron ore. Stocks were sub­
stantial and the systematic bombing raids on the German steel industry 
and the transport system caused a decline in production for other 
reasons. Instead the most important bottleneck—already more acute 
at the turn of the year 1944/1945—was the transport system which had 
been bombed to pieces; this caused above all a shortage of coal and coke, 
and as a result of that there was also a shortage of gas and electricity.57) 
Therefore the measures which the Swedes found it necessary to take 
would probably not have expedited the end of the war.58)
57) On the increased transport difficulties at the end of 1943, see Zentrale Planung 
52:e Besprechung 21/12-43, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 48 (IWM), Wagenfür, pp. 
99,101. As mentioned above the sources available for the last 6 months of the war 
are scanty. In the documents the transport difficulties are emphasised above all, 
e.g. Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke to Herrn Reichswirtschaftsminister 7/3-45, 
T71:27:419283 (N A).
5S) It is symptomatic that at a discussion in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium on 
the 18 January 1945 transport problems, energy problems, fuel problems and labour 
problems were discussed, but not however the supply of iron ore. Reichswirtschafts­
ministerium, Versorgungs- und Produktionsprobleme, T:71:34:428592 ff. (NA).
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F. Summary
During the years immediately before the outbreak of the war the question 
of the German iron ore supply was to a high degree a political one. 
The shortage of iron ore which was feared by the Germans—and desired 
by the Allies—helped to shape foreign policies both before the outbreak 
of war and during the first war years.
The actual course of the war helped to provide Germany with a 
considerably strengthened base of raw materials for her steel production. 
Domestic production was maintained at quite a high level (production 
in 1943 was almost half as much again as the average in 1936/38), and 
Germany gained complete control over the French iron ore production 
and in addition an indirect but perfectly satisfactory control over the 
exports from Sweden.59) The positive development of the stocks of 
iron ore in Germany serves to illustrate this condition:
Table 30. Stocks of iron ore in Germany in 1938-1944 
(million tons of iron)
Point in time Quantity Point in time Quantity
4th quarter of 1938 2.5 30/6 1942 3.7
31/12 1939 3.0 31/12 1942 4.6
30/6 1940 1.6 30/6 1943 5.3
31/12 1940 3.1 31/12 1943 5.7
30/6 1941 3.0 Sept. 1944 3.0
31/12 1941 4.8 31/12 1944 2.0
Source: Statistisches Reichsamt, Monatliche Übersichten über die Rohstoff­
versorgung, TS4:46:1325029 (N A), Statistische Handakte, Präsident Kehrl, 
R3:1657 B (BA).
Note 1. The stocks of iron ore in Germany during the war years showed a very 
definite pattern, with a decrease in stocks during the spring and a rein­
forcement of stocks during the autumn. Apparently the shipments from 
Luleå ceased from December to May, which influenced the changes in 
stocks.
59) On this see Chapter VI below.
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So from a general point of view the supply of iron ore during the war 
years did not constitute a political problem of resources.60) It can also 
be established that the supply of iron ore did not form a bottleneck 
for the German steel industry for political reasons.61)
60) The special problems which beset parts of the German iron ore supply will be 
discussed in the following chapter.
61) The same interpretation is made by Jäger (1969) in the summary, pp. 301 ff. 
In a report for 1943 a certain amount of emphasis is placed on the good supply of 
phosphorous iron ore. For various reasons Swedish iron ore and minett ore had 
not been able to be used fully, and so domestic iron ore production had to be restricted 
and labour transferred to other sectors. Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Tätigkeitsbericht 
für das Jahr 1943, R10III:8 (B A).
Ill
THE TRANSPORTING OF IRON ORE BETWEEN SWEDEN 
AND GERMANY
A. Introduction
As has been evident from the previous chapter, it is hardly possible to 
maintain that the German iron ore supply as a whole had to suffer any 
serious cuts during the war years because of political developments 
during the war. However, by way of introduction some reservations 
about the thesis’s absolute validity, in connection with the previous 
chapter regarding the carriage of iron by sea, will be dealt with.
A certain proportion of the German imports of iron ore had in fact 
to be carried on waters which were unsafe for Germany. Thus because 
of inadequate military and political control carriage on these waters 
could result either in the ships being sunk or in the risks, and therefore 
the increased costs, becoming so great that shipments were reduced 
or were compelled to cease. From time to time this was the case with 
shipments from Spain and North Africa, and it also had an effect on 
the volume of shipping across the North Sea from Narvik. When in 
the autumn of 1943 the allies expressed their strong disapproval of the 
exceptionally high figures for the exports of iron ore to Germany during 
that year, the Swedish Foreign Office replied that an increase in the 
quantities exported in comparison with the previous year was due at 
least in part to the fact that the German collection of iron ore from 
Narvik had been able to continue moderately undisturbed by the 
operations of the allies.1) The exports via Narvik which were thus in-
x) UD to the Swedish Minister in London 3/9-43. H 40 Ct (UD A).
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fluenced by the policy of the Great Powers amounted to the following 
quantities:
Table 31. Sweden's iron ore exports to Germany via Narvik 1940-1944 
(1000 tons of ore and as a percentage of Sweden’s total exports of iron ore)
Year Quantity % Year Quantity %
1940 - - 1943 1 944 19.2
1941 730 7.6 1944 1 099 23.9
1942 1 140 13.3
Source: Sammandrag av Narviksleveranser (Summary of Narvik deliveries) (G A). 
Note 1. 1940 refers to the period after April 9th.
The text which follows shows that the traffic on the Baltic was to be 
characterised by a gradual and perpetually increasing shortage of 
shipping. There were several reasons for this, and they will be discussed 
below. The German navy’s allocation of German merchant vessels 
for various missions is suggested as a reason for the shortage of shipping, 
which was sometimes more prevalent. Thus it is possible to maintain 
that in this case also the traffic dwindled for ‘political’ reasons. How­
ever it has been considered appropriate to discuss this problem in the 
context of other shipping questions.
The purpose of the present chapter is in fact to examine whether 
shipping conditions in general had a restrictive effect on the German 
steel industry’s supply of iron ore; in short, was the carriage of goods 
by sea a bottleneck for the German steel works? If the answer is positive, 
the reasons for it must be established.
Along with this—and almost as a result of work on the main problem— 
certain other problems will be discussed too. The carriage of iron ore 
made extremely heavy demands on shipping in relation to the value of 
the product,2) and shipments of iron ore constituted a very significant 
proportion of the total volume of shipping carrying goods between
2) The breakthrough of the Swedish exports of iron ore coincided with, and was a 
partial cause of, the expansion of the Swedish merchant navy around 1900. Fritz 
(1967), pp. 67 ff. The costs of sea transport 1903-1956 are shown by Meinander, 
folded diagram 4.
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Scandinavia and Germany during the war.3) An account of this will 
therefore inevitably shed light on fundamental aspects of merchant 
shipping during the war.4)
B. Shipping conditions during the latter half of the 1930s
The information in the official statistics published by the Swedish 
authorities does not enable an estimate to be made either of the various 
shipping ports, or of the import ports or of the nationality of the ships 
carrying the Swedish exports of iron ore. The German documents 
only give sporadic and incomplete information on these matters. To 
answer questions about them it has been necessary to use materials 
from the export companies themselves. In this respect it is therefore 
highly advantageous that Swedish iron exports were concentrated in a 
single company, the Grängesbergsbolag, which in addition was respon­
sible for the exports from several other smaller export mines. The 
Grängesbergsbolag disposed of its own and other mines’ iron ore 
abroad in the following proportions, calculated as a percentage of 
Sweden’s total exports of iron ore, so that the extent to which the sources 
used are representative—as an actual share of the total—will also be 
shown :
Table 32. The Grängesbergsbolag"s exports of iron ore as a percentage of Sweden's 
total iron ore exports 1935-1914
Year °//O Year °//O Year % Year °//O
1935 88 1938 91 1941 79 1944 77
1936 90 1939 89 1942 77
1937 92 1940 83 1943 82
Source: Sammandrag av Narviks-, Luleå- och Oxelösundsleveranser (Summary of 
Narvik, Luleå and Oxelösund deliveries) (G A)
3) Already during the pre-war period imports of iron ore constituted over 75% 
of the total quantity of German imports from Scandinavia. OKW WiRüAmt, Das 
skandinavische Verkehrsproblem, T84:S9:1379760 (N A).
4) Swedish shipping conditions during the second world war have not yet been the 
subject of scientific research.
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The shipping via the various export ports was characterised by a 
fairly stable pattern during the end of the 1930s. As has been pointed 
out above, Narvik was the most important export port, her comparative 
importance growing as the total exports of iron ore from Sweden in­
creased. After Narvik, Luleå was the most significant export port, 
in spite of the short shipping season, followed by Oxelösund. Other 
export ports, such as Gävle, Hargshamn, Stockholm, Västerås and 
Otterbäcken, were of far less importance in this connection. Thus in 
the year 1937 55% of Sweden’s exports of iron ore were shipped via 
Narvik, 22% via Luleå, 15% via Oxelösund, and 8% via other ports 
(a complete account for the whole period is given below, table 33).
The distribution between Narvik, Luleå and Oxelösund was a natural 
reflection of the volume of production at the country’s three largest 
mines, Kiruna, Gällivare/Malmberget and Grängesberg, each of which 
for reasons of transport economy had its own natural export port. 
Certain smaller quantities of Gällivare ore were shipped via Narvik, 
and also certain Kiruna ore via Luleå. However these ‘transposed’ 
quantities never attained any greater dimensions during the 1930s.
A stable pattern also characterised the import ports for the iron ore 
from Sweden. Rotterdam was the dominant unloading port, followed 
by Emden. Both of these ports served as unloading ports for exports 
to the Ruhr area. Other important unloading ports were Antwerp, for 
Belgium’s imports, and also Stettin, which received the ore which was 
used in the steel works in Upper Silesia and Czechoslovakia. Quite 
naturally the shipping from Luleå and Oxelösund was more strongly 
concentrated round the German Baltic ports than the vessels from 
Narvik were, all of which only frequented such ports as Stettin oc­
casionally. Of the total exports of iron ore from Sweden to the continent 
of Europe in 1937 almost 52% were unloaded in Rotterdam, 27% in 
Emden, i.e. in combination almost 80%, while Antwerp received 9% 
and the German Baltic ports 11%, of which Stettin received two-thirds 
(see below, table 34).
During the latter half of the 1930s Swedish vessels were responsible 
for over 40% of the total of direct trade between Sweden and abroad.5) 
As regards the carriage of iron ore, the Swedish share was in fact smaller.
5) The Swedish proportion was falling, from almost 46% in 1935 to just over 41 % 
in 1938. Svensk Sjöfartstidning, 1941, p. 145.
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The reason for this is partly to be found in the conditions on the freight 
market.
The Swedish export ore—and this still means the Grängesbergsbolag’s 
selling of its own and other mines’ ores—was sold on an f.o.b. basis 
as well as c.i.f. The exports to Germany and Czechoslovakia, which 
constituted about 80% of Sweden’s exports of iron ore, were sold 
f.o.b., which meant that the buyers had to be responsible for the carriage 
by sea, and had to enter into agreements with shipping companies.6) 
This resulted in German vessels acquiring about 40% of the freight, 
Dutch ships 15-20%, and Norwegian ships about 5%. The Swedish 
share fell from 47% in 1935 to barely 30% in 1938, or 4 million tons a 
year. (See table 35).
C. From the outbreak of the war to the start of the blockade of
Skagerack
From 1936, when it amounted to 3.6 million tons gross, the German 
merchant navy had expanded rapidly, and on 1 September 1939 it 
amounted to almost 4.5 million tons gross.7) Because of the allies’ 
superiority at sea a large number of German ocean-going vessels were 
recalled during the period around the outbreak of the war. By virtue 
of the reduction of the ocean trade after the outbreak of war a good 
supply of German shipping was made available in the autumn of 1939, 
inter alia for the carriage of iron ore across the Baltic. Therefore at 
the end of September 1939 the shipping situation looked very promising.8)
At the same time as Germany’s supply of shipping increased in this 
way, Swedish vessels following the outbreak of war were burdened 
with sharply increased costs, above all for insurance against war risks 
and higher wages for the people employed on board. When the German 
vessels were not charged equivalent costs the Swedish shipping com­
panies became much less competitive.9)
These two factors contributed to a large reduction in the trade of 
the Swedish merchant navy, above all in the Baltic. Of the total direct
6) Meinander, pp. 228, 442. The Grängesbergsbolag’s own shipping department 
had precedence in the transporting of ore to Germany.
7) Steinweg, pp. 3 f.
8) Ibid., pp. 5 ff. Svensk Sjöfartstidning, 1941, p. 491, OKW, WiRüAmt, Akten­
notiz 3/6-40, T77:699:1911530. Entwurf 21/9-39, T77:699:1911731 (NA).
9) Svensk Sjöfartstidning 1940, p. 825,1941, pp. 145, 492, Affärsvärlden 1940, p. 542.
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trade between Sweden and abroad, to which Swedish vessels contributed 
over 40% in 1935, Sweden's share was reduced to 36% in 1939 and to 
32% in the following year. Germany’s share increased to a like extent 
and reached its peak in the early summer of 1940.10) Likewise pro­
nounced changes also took place in the carriage of ore, both as to the 
shipping and unloading ports and also as to the nationality of the 
vessels (see below).
D. From the start of the blockade of Skagerack onwards : 
the formal framework
When the blockade started on 9 April 1940 no immediate changes 
ensued for the shipping trade in the Baltic, whereas on the other hand 
shipping via Narvik ceased for the rest of 1940. However, the Swedish 
merchant navy was cut into two almost equal halves, which were to 
operate within two completely different fields for the rest of the war. 
Over 1 million tons dead weight ended up inside the blockade, of which
616.000 tons were coal-fired steamships. Owing to the unusually cold 
winter in 1940 several vessels remained in Sweden on 9 April, which 
made the confined fleet larger than was ‘normal’.11)
While the carriage of iron ore across the Baltic had continued during 
the autumn of 1939 and the spring of 1940 under the influence of an 
unconstrained market situation—leading to the result described above— 
in connection with a new trade agreement between Germany and 
Sweden in June 1940, the two countries also entered into an agreement 
over the shipping trade, which on the one hand laid down freight charges 
for the various types of goods, and on the other hand provided for the 
allocation of the quantities to be carried between vessels of various 
nationalities.12)
10) Svensk Sjöfartstidning 1941, p. 145. In May 1940 German ships accounted for 
72 % of the total of direct shipments between Sweden and abroad, while the Swedish 
share was only 17%. Eneborg (1940), pp. 141 f.
“) There was a total of 304 steamships which together amounted to 616,000 tons 
gross inside the blockade. Of these, 181 vessels (234,000 tons gross) were of less than
2.000 tons gross each. The motor vessels amounted to 373,000 tons gross, of which
193.000 was tanker tonnage. Statens Traflkkommission to Folkhushållningsdeparte- 
mentet 31/10-40 (copy), HP 64 Ct (UD A). Ulff1 p. 911.
12) Niederschrift 13/6-40, HaPol, Schweden Handel 13A (A A). Cf. Hägglöf, 
pp. 138 f. The agreement meant a sharp fall in freight charges, Svensk Sjöfartstidning 
1941, p. 65.
65
With this, complete control of the shipping trade inside the blockade 
started, and continued in force, subject only to minor adjustments, 
for the rest of the war. As to freight rates, the principle was upheld 
whereby the shipping companies were to be compensated for the in­
creases in costs which would occur, but not for reduced profits or reduced 
turnover. Thus the running costs of the shipping companies governed 
the freight rates It was of course of importance for the negotiators on 
behalf of the Swedish government—for reasons which will be explained 
elsewhere, p. 118—to push the freights down as much as possible in 
order to try and maintain a stable price level in Sweden.13)
Therefore the German freighters—plainly with very bad grace—had 
to allow the Swedish shipping companies higher rates than the German 
equivalent. Even though satisfaction was expressed in Swedish negotiat­
ing circles over the fact that Swedish vessels inside the blockade had 
achieved secure employment at reasonable rates, the German con­
cession must still have been based on Germany’s need of iron ore and 
wood products.14)
In the agreement in June 1940 it was laid down that Swedish vessels 
were to ship 200,000-225,000 tons of ore a month for the rest of the 
year. For the following years of the war agreements were made in 
connection with the yearly trade negotiations in the late autumn, which
13) Niederschrift 11/1 1941 with certain adjustments for higher insurance costs, 
Niederschrift 25/4 1941 mit Ergänzung 3-6/5 1941 with an addendum for lay-days 
and return freight in ballast, Niederschrift 8/7 1941 with some adjustments upwards 
for the German-Russian war, Niederschrift 16/12 1941, FIII:7 (SCB A), Vereinbarung 
29/1 1943, Handelskommissionen, vol. 352 (RA), Vereinbarung 10/12 1943, Ha Pol, 
Schiffahrtsbeziehungen Deutschlands zu Schweden Band 5 (A A).
14) As regards the cost structure of the shipping, the development of the freight 
market and the success of the shipping companies only a few general points will 
be made. Apart from the fact that the journeys took longer (convoys, detours, longer 
stoppages for loading and unloading) Swedish shipping inside the blockade—as 
mentioned above—was burdened with considerable increases in costs during the war. 
An estimate of these costs put the increases at about 2.2 5 times the level in the years 
before the outbreak of war. Fuel and insurance costs rose most sharply (about 4 
times), while loading/unloading costs and ship taxes, which had previously been 
the major items of cost, only rose slightly. Eneborg (1942), pp. 176 ff. During the war 
freight charges for the transporting of iron ore must have increased 4 or 5 fold since 
1939, while the average for traffic on Sweden remained at a 3-fold increase in freight 
charges. Eneborg (1942), p. 356. On the dissatisfaction of the shippers, see Wenzel 
to Waldenström 12/9-40 (G A).
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provided that Swedish vessels were to transport 3.5 million tons of 
ore a year out of a total of about 10 million tons, i.e. about 35% of the 
total exports. This quantity was somewhat smaller than the total shipped 
in Swedish vessels in 1937, but was about twice as large as that carried 
in Swedish vessels on the Baltic that year.15) The following section 
will show the extent to which the formal decisions were to be realised, 
as well as the general influence of the war on the shipping trade.
E. From the start of the blockade of Skagerack onwards: carriage of 
goods by sea as a bottleneck for the German iron ore supply
1. The Swedish shipping ports
As previously mentioned in this research, Narvik’s quays and loading 
equipment were destroyed in the battles in the late spring of 1940, 
and the shipping could not be resumed until January 1941, and then
Table 33. Iron ore shipping via Narvik, Luleå, 
1935-1944
(%)
Oxelösund and other Swedish ports
Year Narvik Luleå Oxelösund Other ports
1935 50 18 20 12
1936 49 24 17 10
1937 55 22 15 8
1938 54 21 16 9
1939 44 27 18 11
1940 13 53 17 17
1941 8 49 22 21
1942 13 43 21 23
1943 19 43 20 18
1944 24 31 22 23
Source: Sammandrag av Narviks-, Luleå- och Oxelösunds leveranser (Summary of 
Narvik, Luleå and Oxelösund deliveries) (G A).
Note 1. Under Narvik and Luleå are included ores from Kiruna and Gällivare 
together with Tuolluvaara and Koskullskulle, and under Oxelösund ores 
from Grängesberg and several smaller mines in central Sweden, e.g. 
Blötberget, Ställberg and Stripa. Thus ‘other ports is a balance item (cf. 
table 32).
15) See note 13 above.
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only with a greatly reduced capacity.16) The limits on the shipping 
from Narvik (see table 31 above) were partly due to the destruction of the 
loading equipment and partly to the superiority of the allies in the 
North Sea.17) Instead deliveries from Luleå were able to be extended 
considerably and they reached proportions undreamed of until then 
(cf. above, p. 43).
The great expansion of Luleå as a shipping port was of course followed 
by a strong concentration there of all the shipping in the months, 
normally May-November, when the port was accessible. Already in 
peace-time there was a clearly defined ‘balance’ between Luleå and 
Oxelösund in that shipping from Oxelösund was concentrated round 
the period when the port of Luleå was closed, i.e. the winter and spring 
months. This possibility of using the shipping to the full was exploited 
with advantage at least to the same extent during the war years.18)
16) Meinander, pp. 270 ff.
17) The largest monthly shipments from Narvik after 9/4 1940 amounted to 239,000 
tons (May 1943), which can be compared with average monthly shipments in 1937 
of somewhere near 650,000 tons. Sammandrag av Narviksleveranser (Summary of 
Narvik deliveries) (G A).
1S) The monthly shipments of Kiruna and Gällivare ore via Luleå, and Gränges- 
berg’s ore via Oxelösund from 1935 to 1943 are shown as percentages of the total 
yearly shipments in the following table:
1935-38 1939 1940 1941-43
Oxelösund Luleå Oxelösund Luleå Oxelösund Luleå Oxelösund Luleå
Jan. 12 — 9 — 8 — 17 —
Feb. 13 — 9 — 1 — 4 _
March 13 — 12 — 1 — 6 —
April 11 - 14 — 18 — 13 —
May 8 7 10 10 21 — 19 6
June 5 16 6 15 9 13 8 16
July 6 17 5 12 10 21 3 18
Aug. 6 18 7 10 5 17 3 17
Sept. 4 17 4 17 2 16 4 17
Oct. 4 15 12 17 2 17 5 13
Nov. 7 11 7 15 6 11 4 11
Dec. 11 - 7 5 20 4 14 3
Source: Sammandrag av Luleå- och Oxelösundsleveranser (Summary of Luleå 
and Oxelösund deliveries) (G A).
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It has been pointed out by way of introduction that the three large 
export ports on the whole corresponded to the production of the three 
large export mines, i.e. Kiruna ore—Narvik, Gällivare ore Luleå and 
Grängesberg ore—Oxelösund. With the sharp fall in Narvik shipping 
certain changes also took place in production at the Norrbotten mines. 
In the period before the war the ratio of production as between Kiruna 
and Gällivare was about 75:25. During the war years a change to 70:30 
occurred, which therefore meant that the Kiruna ore was still largely 
dominant but was being shipped via Luleå.
With regard to the whole of Sweden’s shipping a general change also 
took place in the relation between exported Norrbotten ore and ore 
from central Sweden, whereby the latter increased its share. This change 
also has its cause in other circumstances which will be discussed below 
(P- 99).
Thus during the war certain important changes took place, in contrast 
to the stability of the pre-war years. It is clear that these changes, taken 
as a whole, meant a reduction in the volume of shipping. On the other 
hand there are grounds for pointing to the flexibility and adaptability 
which helped to maintain a high shipping capacity.
2. The import ports on the Continent
In the introductory statistical account of conditions in the 1930s emphasis 
was put on the great dominance of Rotterdam and Emden as unloading
Table 34. Percentage of the total imports of Swedish iron ore via the more significant
import ports on the Continent 1935-1944
Year Antwerp Rotterdam Emden Bremen Hamburg Baltic
ports
1935 7 49 36 — - 8
1936 7 51 34 - — 9
1937 9 52 27 1 — 11
1938 9 52 26 1 — 11
1939 5 40 28 9 8 10
1940 1 2 28 29 22 19
1941 — 31 21 16 12 19
1942 — 24 20 20 16 21
1943 — 7 27 26 21 19
1944 - - 20 32 24 24
Source: See table 33.
Note 1. The figures are based on material from the Grängesbergsbolag (table 
32 above).
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ports on the Continent (1937: 80%). During the war the pattern changed 
radically. Rotterdam’s importance as an unloading port declined greatly, 
above all in the years 1940 and 1943-1944, whereas on the other hand 
Emden’s relative share remained fairly stable. Instead the loss of traffic 
in Rotterdam was replaced by a great increase in unloading in Hamburg 
and above all in Bremen, neither of which had previously been con­
cerned in the importing of ore from Sweden. Together these two ports 
were to receive about one-third of the Swedish exports of iron ore.
The sharp decline in the importance of Rotterdam was not due to 
any great extent to the bombing raids on the town, but resulted from 
the great risks which attached to the shipping trade off the North Sea 
coast of Holland. Losses on this route were exceptionally high.19) Thus, 
in spite of the expense of transport from Bremen and Hamburg to the 
Ruhr, which was of course greater, it was in the common interest of 
Sweden and Germany to try and cut down the Rotterdam traffic.20)
The war years not only brought a change from Rotterdam to the 
German North Sea ports but also a significant increase in the imports 
of the German Baltic ports, which rose from over 10% to about 20%. 
It happened—though to a limited extent both in time and in volume— 
that Swedish iron ore, even ore which had been transported from Narvik, 
was unloaded in Stettin to be forwarded to the Ruhr.21) On the whole
19) The Rotterdam traffic caused constant protests from the crews. Therefore 
shipping on that route had to be divided between the various Swedish shipping 
companies, who also complained that German ships only took part in this dangerous 
traffic to a much lesser extent. The German air-raid precautions were considered 
inadequate. However, the shipping companies were compensated with increased 
freight rates for freight to Rotterdam. Niederschrift 8/10-40, PM från Bränsle­
kommissionen (Memoranda from the fuel commission) 30/6, 2/7 1942, 11/1 1943, BK 
401, 402 (RA).
20) However, from the point of view of the Swedish shipping companies it was a 
significant disadvantage that fairly large quantities of high quality Westphalian coke 
had to be collected from Rotterdam, preferably by Swedish ore shipping. In the Swedish 
fuel commission it was considered very important to keep up the transporting of ore 
to Rotterdam in order to be supplied with coke for the production of gas, and also 
for the industry’s energy supply generally. Trafikkommissionens sammanträde 
26/3-43, Protokoll from ‘statsrådsberedningen’ 4/3, 25/10 1943, BK404, 405 (RA).
21) In the months round the turn of the year 1940/41 over 100,000 tons of Swedish 
iron ore were unloaded in Baltic ports for transportation to steel works in the Ruhr. 
There were also similar arrangements during the autumn of 1943 and the summer 
of 1944.
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the increase in the unloading in the Baltic ports would in fact be a 
reflection of a comparative increase in the consumption of Swedish 
ore, above all in the works on the German coast and the steel works of 
Upper Silesia.
To sum up therefore, it can be established that the war brought about 
radical changes in the relative importance of the individual import 
ports. Apart from the aspect of cost, the change from traditional ore 
unloading ports (Rotterdam) to completely untried ports (Hamburg) 
must have caused a decrease in the quantities imported. However in 
this respect also there is every reason to lay stress on the flexibility.
3. The composition of the shipping
It has been mentioned above (p. 66) that according to the trade agreements 
from 1941 onwards Swedish shipping was to deal with the transporting 
of 3.5 million tons of iron ore out of a total quantity calculated at about 
10 million tons. This figure was exceeded considerably, which is the 
more remarkable since after 9 April 1940 Swedish vessels no longer 
carried ore from Narvik but only took part in shipments across the 
Baltic. Carriage on board Swedish vessels amounted to about 5 million 
tons a year during the period 1941-1943, and therefore the share of the 
Swedish merchant navy amounted to at least half instead of the esti­
mated 35%.22) On the other hand the share of the German merchant 
navy in 1941-1943 was reduced, above all in comparison with the 
years 1939-1940 but also in comparison with the pre-war years. This 
decline in German shipping, which was absolute as well as comparative, 
was caused by a real shortage of vessels, a problem which will be discussed 
below.
22) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Hauptabteilung Statistik: Skandinavische Verschiff­
ungen an Erzen, Abbränden, Sinter und Briketts, sowie Phosphaten, R10III:106 
(B A). In this connection it can also be mentioned that the Grängesbergsbolag s 
vessels, which before the outbreak of war were responsible for the greater part of 
the Swedish shipping and had contributed about 25 % of the total ore shipping, 
almost completely disappeared as ore transporters during the war, and their share 
fell to about 5 %. Thus it was not the traditional ships which were used for the carriage 
of ore during the war. In place of the fairly large vessels which were specially constructed 
to carry ore, older and smaller ships were incorporated in the traffic. In the Baltic 
traffic the average cargo load per vessel fell from about 6,000 tons to approximately 
half during the war. Sammandrag av Luleå- och Oxelösundsleveranser (Summary ot 
Luleå and Oxelösund deliveries) (G A).
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Table 35. The composition of the iron ore shipping 1935-1944
°//O
Year Swedish German Dutch Norwegian Finnish Danish Others
1935 47 36 11 5 1
1936 35 39 18 6 ~ 1 1
1937 30 40 17 7 2 — 4
1938 30 42 16 6 2 — 5
1939 19 58 14 4 1 — 4
1940 23 62 - 1 5 1 7
1941 47 33 2 1 9 7 _
1942 46 34 3 2 7 7 —
1943 40 33 1 2 12 11 —
1944 36 44 — 3 7 11 __
Source: See table 33.
Note 1. See table 34, note 1.
2. Among other shipping English vessels for the years 1939-40 had figures 
of 3 % and 7 % respectively.
3. The figures in this table differ somewhat from those mentioned in 
German documents, which however comprise the total shipping of ore 
from Scandinavia. The German documents show the following distribu­
tion in 1941-1943:
Year Swedish German Dutch Norwegian Finnish Danish Others
1941 51 30 2 2 9 7 -
1942 54 31 2 2 5 6
1943 48 30 1 2 9 10
Source: Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Hauptabteilung Statistik, R10III:106 (B A).
The two series of figures may easily be reconciled on the basis of the 
assumption that the iron ore which was not sold by the Grangesbergsbolag 
was to a larger extent carried in Swedish ships.
4. The shortage of shipping—a bottleneck for the iron ore supply? 
Whereas the reorganisation with regard to loading and unloading ports 
did not apparently create any greater problems—if it is possible to 
draw that conclusion on the basis of the sources’ comparative silence 
on this point—it was instead the increasingly acute shortage of German
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shipping which led to the failure to collect the quantities provided for 
in the agreements. This may seem paradoxical against the background 
of an abundance of ships which existed during the whole of the first 
year of the war (above, p. 63). However the shortage was already begin­
ning to make an impact during the autumn of 194023) and of course it 
varied in degree. In general terms it can be said that the longer the war 
continued the more acute was the shortage. The question therefore is 
why was the shipping for German ore reduced to such an extent? There 
were many reasons for this.
The German merchant fleet was reduced in numbers throughout 
the war by substantial losses—although to a lesser extent on the Baltic 
itself. The following figures show the size of the German merchant 
fleet during the war:
Table 36. The German merchant fleet 1939-1944. Size and changes 
(1000 tons gross)
Period Tonnage at 
the start of 
the period
Losses Losses
in the 
Baltic
Sales of
vessels
Purchases 
and newly 
built ships
Tonnage at 
the end of 
the period
1/9-39- 31/12-40 4 493 828 36 101 46 3 610
1941 3 610 576 30 17 30 3 046
1942 3 046 287 39 73 37 2 723
1943 2 723 281 48 32 74 2 485
1944 2 485 514 48 — 150 2122
Source: Steinweg, pp. 29 ff.
Note 1. In the work Deutschlands Rüstung im zweiten Weltkrieg the figures given for 
German losses are 898,000 tons gross up to and including 1940, 335,000 
tons gross in 1941, 207,000 tons gross in 1942, 170,000 tons gross in 1943 
and 349,000 tons gross in 1944.
2. In a primary source the size of the German merchant fleet is stated to be 
2,845,000 tons gross on 1/6 1942, K. Kaufmann’s report 16/12 1942, FD 
4195/45 (IWM).
23) The German consulate in Luleå to Auswärtiges Amt 2/9 1940, Ha Pol, Schweden 
Eisenerz, Band 3 (A A).
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The sharp decrease in Germany’s merchant shipping was thus due 
partly to losses at sea, but also to the new shipbuilding scheme which 
was on much too small a scale. The shipbuilding industry’s incapacity 
for new production was due partly to shortage of labour and partly 
to the excessively limited share of steel for shipbuilding resulting from 
the general steel shortage. This vicious circle was heavily stressed by 
Karl Kaufmann, Reichscommissioner for German shipping, in a great 
number of written protests to Hitler and Martin Bormann, and it was 
also apparent, for example, to Speer. In addition far too few warships 
were built which might for example form convoys for the shipping of 
iron ore.24)
At the same time as the German merchant fleet was being reduced it 
was also being given further tasks, in that Germany, because of her 
military conquests, had to maintain contact with countries which she 
occupied and supplies to her own troops in foreign countries. The 
traffic to and from Norway seems to have made particularly heavy 
demands on the shipping, as did the traffic in the Mediterranean.25) 
In addition — and more important — the German fleet decreased, 
since a large part of it was placed at the disposal of the German navy. 
The extent of this can be gauged only by occasional instances, but on 
these occasions it was very large. At the turn of the year 1941/42 no less 
than 60% were engaged by the navy and on 1 June 1942 only slightly 
less. Not only was a large proportion of the total tonnage involved: 
so also were the biggest and most modern vessels, which were required
24) E.g. K. Kaufmann to M. Bormann 1/10-42, 7/3-43, K. Kaufmann’s 6th-8th 
reports, FD 4195 (IWM). The problem of German shipping and shipbuilding was also 
discussed in Zentrale Planung, 8 :e Besprechung betreffend Schwedenverkehr und 
Schiffsbau 26/6-42, FD, FIandakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM). The German navy also 
indicated that the excessively low ration of iron and steel for the building of warships 
was a reason for the superiority of the allies at sea which caused great loss of cargo 
ships, Dönitz’s argument in Zentrale Planung’s 40:e Besprechung 4/5-43, FD, 
Handakten Milch, vol. 47 (IWM). The vicious circle (no shipbuilding—no shipping 
of ore—no steel production—no shipbuilding) was also pointed out in Zentrale 
Planung 35:e Besprechung 2/3-43, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 47 (IWM).
25) These points of view are also vigorously put forward in Kaufmann’s reports. 
Against the background of Germany’s shortage of shipping her interest in transit 
traffic to and from Norway via Sweden is understandable.
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by the German navy, while those which went in civil traffic were smaller, 
old fashioned and clearly undermanned.26)
Thus the German shipping which was at the disposal of civil traffic 
was considerably less than was stated in table 36, above. Certain data 
can be given. On 1 June 1942 the ‘free’ shipping amounted to 947,000 
tons gross, in the autumn of 1943 to 1,021,000 tons gross and on 31 
July 1944 812,000 tons gross.27)
Another reason for the shortage of shipping—although it varied 
in degree and it is hardly possible to quantify it—was of course the fact 
that the vessels had to sail in convoy or under escort by warships. This 
meant that the vessels’ tour of duty was prolonged.28)
In the civil traffic on the Baltic coal-fired steamships were used almost 
exclusively. The acute oil shortage in Germany prevented more sub­
stantial motor shipping. In addition there was a large reserve of Swedish 
motor shipping inside the blockade, most of which was laid up. In order 
to cure the shipping shortage the conversion of Danish motor vessels 
into steam vessels was also planned.29)
However some rations of oil were distributed for the rapid transporting 
of ore. In 1941 15% of the ore imports were carried in motor ships. 
This proportion was gradually reduced and the last motor vessels were 
loaded with iron ore in January 1944.30) But on the other hand it is 
possible to maintain that from the transport point of view it was ad­
vantageous for the German iron ore supply that such a large proportion 
of coal-fired Swedish shipping was stationed in Sweden on 9/4 1940.
In the shipping agreements between Germany and Sweden it was 
implied that the vessels which carried ore were to have a return cargo 
of coal or coke. However this was not always the case. Instead it appears 
that vessels carrying ore from Sweden often returned in ballast. Likewise 
there were vessels which carried coal to Sweden and returned to Germany
26) OKW, WiRüAmt, Tätigkeitsbericht 26/1-42, T77:367:1210470 (NA). Kauf- 
mann’s report 16/12-42, FD 4195 (IWM).
27) Kaufmann’s reports, FD 4195 (IWM).
28) Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund, styrelseprotokoll 5/10—42 (G A).
29) Deutschlands Rüstung, p. 244.
30) 8:e and 9:e Besprechung der Zentrale Planung, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 
(IWM), Reports from Sjöfartskommittén to UD, H 40 Ct (UD A), Svensk Sjöfarts­
tidning 1941,p. 99.
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without any cargo of ore. Thus in spite of the prevailing shortage of 
shipping, the tonnage which was available was not rationally used.31)
In Germany efforts were being made to compensate for the sharp 
decline in German merchant shipping by the most extensive use possible 
of vehicles from occupied countries. As is plain from table 35 above, 
the proportions of Norwegian and Danish shipping increased, as did 
the Finnish.32) The most important factor would have been the extent- 
far greater than the terms of the agreements prescribed—to which 
Swedish vessels could be assigned to the transporting of ore. From the 
date of the agreement on 13 June 1940 to the end of that year 800,000 
more tons of ore than had been agreed on were carried on board 
Swedish vessels, and during the year 1941 about a million tons more. 
The substantial transport in Swedish vessels was also considered in 
Germany to be of great value.33)
The situation was considered to be so serious that the German govern­
ment planned a railway line from Narvik to the Oslo fjord for transporting 
Swedish Norrbotten ore.34) Thus the contribution from Swedish shipping 
meant above all that the quantities of exports to Germany could be 
fairly well maintained. The exports of iron ore from Sweden to Germany 
amounted to a total of about 35 million tons in 1940-1943 instead of 
the 40 million tons provided for in the agreement. Bearing in mind 
all the difficulties, the reorganisation of shipping—and of the import 
ports too, the reduced number of vessels, the shortage of German
31) This problem occurred from the start. Svensk Sjöfartstidning 1941, p. 458. 
Above all the Germans aimed at speedy ore deliveries with the return journey in 
ballast. The Swedish motor vessels, which received supplies of oil for transporting 
ore to Germany, always returned home in ballast. VPM from Trafikkommissionen 
30/6-42, HP 39 H, Tyskland (UD A). Ballast in one direction of the voyage obviously 
meant increased costs, but as the shipping companies were compensated for this in 
the form of higher rates this could lead to a preference for going one way in ballast. 
Svensk Sjöfartstidning 1941, pp. 157, 457, Finanstidningen 1941, pp. 573,612. From the 
German point of view also it was most profitable in a wider context that there should 
be coordinated shipping of ore and coal. Zentrale Planung 9:e Besprechung 15/7-42, 
F D, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM).
32) The Danish vessels had apparently achieved the same conditions as the Swedish 
ships, Vereinbarung 31/8-41, Ha Pol, Schweden, Eisenerz, Band 3 (A A).
33) Kaufmann’s 9th report, FD 4195 (IWM), Wied to Auswärtiges Amt 20/10-42 
Ha Pol, Schweden, Eisenerz, Bd 3 (AA).
34j Deutschlands Rüstung, p. 312.
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shipping, the shortage of oil for motor vessels and the poor coordination 
of the traffic, it can be established that transport by sea was well main­
tained during the war. The loss of almost 5 million tons of Swedish 
iron ore during the war could hardly constitute any serious bottleneck 
for the German steel industry.35) On the other hand it can reasonably 
be asserted that 5 million tons of high quality Swedish iron ore would 
have constituted a very valuable addition to Germany’s iron ore supply, 
and the reasons for this will be given in the following chapter.
35) 5 million tons of Swedish iron ore correspond to about 3 million tons of iron. 
The total German (Reich) consumption 1940-43 amounted to about 70 million tons 
of iron (see above, p. 52).
IV
THE IRON ORE SUPPLY FROM A SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND 
COMMERCIAL POINT OF VIEW
A. Introduction
In earlier research on the importance of Swedish iron ore for Germany 
during the second world war only sporadic attempts have been made 
to integrate the iron ore supply with the other socio-economic and 
commercial economic realities which were current in Germany during 
those years. This situation is all the more remarkable since of course 
supplies of iron ore did not take place in isolation from other socio­
economic influences.1) To gain a more subtle appreciation of the German 
need for Swedish iron ore it is necessary to study the supply of various 
kinds of iron ore to the steel works from general economic and com­
mercial economic aspects.
In making its choice between various kinds of ore for its pig-iron 
production a steel works has to resolve several different problems. 
In this context certain very special metallurgical aspects are disregarded, 
viz. the various chemical combinations of iron ores, which naturally 
affected their uses and prices.2) Instead attention will be focussed on 
the quality of the iron ore which was of the greatest significance for its 
price at the smelting-house works, viz. the actual iron content.
In an earlier chapter it has been shown how a steel-works based its 
pig-iron production on low iron-content domestic ores (with an iron 
content down in the region of 25%) as well as on imported ores with
1I One exception is Jäger, (1969) pp. 72 ff., who discusses the higher cost of the 
German domestic ore generally but in isolation. Jäger’s conclusions coincide with 
those reached in the present analysis, but he does not then integrate these results 
into his account of the German iron ore supply.
2) In chapter V which follows the question of the phosphorous content of the iron 
ore is discussed.
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an extremely high iron content (with an iron content up in the region 
of 65%). For reasons which will be discussed at length in the text below, 
the iron ores with a high iron content were in principle worth more than 
the types of ore with a low iron content (thus the remaining chemical 
constituents of iron ores, e.g. phosphorous content and manganese 
content, will be completely disregarded here). The price of the iron ore 
at the smelting-house works was determined above all by the mining 
and transport costs. So that the ore would be able to carry the costs 
of long transportation, e.g. across the Atlantic to Germany or from the 
very north of Sweden to Germany, it was vital that, thanks to its high 
iron content, it was of greater value to the buyer. In this regard the 
basic structure of the German iron ore supply is natural: domestic 
or near at hand ores (e.g. minett ore) with a low iron content on the one 
hand, and imported ores carried from a greater distance with a high 
iron content on the other. Schematically expressed it is possible to say 
that the German steel works had to make a choice between these two 
main types and that the difference in price was decisive.
The high price of the ore with the high iron content—still disregarding 
all aspects other than the iron content—was due to the fact that a larger 
quantity of pig-iron was obtained from a given quantity of this type 
of ore than was the case when ore with a low iron content was melted 
down. Therefore for the quantity of pig-iron produced less fuel (coke)3) 
was consumed, and a smaller number of workers had to be employed. 
In addition the smelting of iron ore with a high iron content required 
a smaller blast furnace capacity, or meant that the existing capacity— 
even in subsequent production lines—could be used in a more rational 
way.
Thus the schematic discussion above means that ore with a high iron 
content would have been specially sought after when coke prices were 
high or when for various reasons there was a shortage of coke, when 
wages were high or when there was a shortage of labour or in a situation 
in which the capacity of the blast furnaces was being used extensively. 
The same conditions naturally applied to scrap iron as the basic material
3) The saving in blast furnace coke by using Swedish iron ore instead of domestic 
ore in the Ruhr was estimated at half a ton for every ton of pig-iron produced. Zentrale 
Planung 8:e Besprechung 26/6-42, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM). Jäger 
(1969), p. 76, puts the saving at 2-3% less coke consumed for each per cent increase 
of iron content in the ore.
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for steel production.4) Conversely the steel works’ interest in ores 
with a lower iron content increased when the price of coke was low 
and when there was a good supply of coke, when the supply of labour 
was good and when there was a blast furnace capacity surplus. Thus 
the German demand for ore with a high iron content increased in the 
former case especially if several or all of the factors mentioned occurred 
in combination—while the competitive strength of the minett ore and 
the domestic ores increased correspondingly in the latter case.5)
It will therefore be of the greatest importance to find the answers 
to two questions. First, did the German steel works have a freedom of 
choice as regards the type of iron ore at the end of the 1930s and during 
the war years? With the boom period at the end of the 1930s it was 
indeed a seller’s market, but during the war years there was in actual 
fact—as has been shown in previous chapters of this research—hardly 
any need for a shortage of iron in Germany. Even if, with expanding 
governmental control, the individual steel works did not have complete 
freedom of choice of iron ore, the German political leaders nevertheless 
conceded a theoretical right of choice between the two main types, 
ores with a low iron content (domestic and minett) and ores with a 
high iron content (imported ore from Sweden).6) Consequently the people 
responsible for the steel production had to take into consideration the 
other conditions in the commercial and industrial life of Germany.
4) It was emphasised that the scrap iron action was important precisely because 
increased supplies meant a decrease in the consumption of coke. Zentrale Planung, 
18:e and 19:e Besprechung 28/10, 1942, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM).
) A substantial concentration of the domestic ore would of course have reduced 
the consumption of coke. Apparently the concentration of e.g. the Salzgitter ore was 
a technical problem and with the general shortage of steel during the war years steel 
could not be allocated to ore concentration plants in spite of the fact that people 
in responsible quarters were aware of its effect in saving coke. Niederschrift der 
Sitzung des Gutacht-Ausschusses über Rohstoff-Fragen am 26.5.36., R26I:29 (BA), 
Iron and Coal Trades Review, 1939, p. 411, Zentrale Planung 24:e Besprechung 5/11-42 
(Ergebnisse), FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM), von Hanneken : Stand und 
Zukunft der deutschen Eisenwirtschaft, R13P382 (B A).
6) The German negotiators of trade with Sweden tried to capitalise on this situation 
and laid heavy stress on the fact that Germany thanks to the minett ores at her dis­
position had less need of Swedish iron ore and therefore demanded a reduced price 
for Swedish iron ore. PM över sammanträde mellan de svenska och tyska regerings- 
kommissionerna (Memorandum of meeting between the Swedish and German 
governmental commissions on) 20 November 1942, Hp 64 Ct, (UD A).
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The second question, which follows on from the first, is: what in 
fact was the situation in Germany before and during the war as regards 
coke prices and the supply of coke, wages and the supply of labour and 
also the supply of blast furnace capacity? Earlier, in a previous chapter 
of this research, reference has been made to certain facts which clearly 
indicate that Swedish iron ore became desirable in Germany.7) These 
factors will be discussed further in the text which follows.
B. Questions of fuel, labour and capacity in German pig-iron production
As regards the supply of coke to the steel industry for melting down 
iron ore it has been established earlier (p. 26) that from the end of the 
1930s and throughout the war there was a marked shortage, in spite 
of the fact that the steel industry was given more and more priority 
in the distribution.8) When examination is made of the investigations 
which were carried out in Germany during this period and the discus­
sions which took place between politicians, technicians and economists, 
there emerges a very clear consensus of opinion that the ‘Engpass 
Kohle’ was the fundamental reason for the inadequate production of 
the steel industry.9) The reasons for the inadequate supply of coke 
will not be the subject of any more profound inquiry in this context,10) 
but it seems to be perfectly clear that it is primarily a question of shortage 
of labour, especially skilled labour, and a badly functioning transport 
system.11) The actual shortage of coke, as well as the rise in the price
7) See above, p. 17 ff.
8) During one of Zentrale Planung's first meetings in the summer of 1942 Speer 
said: ‘Es ist notwendig, eindeutig von der Zentralen Planung festzulegen, dass die 
dadurch im Inlande mehr zu Verfügung stehenden Kohlenmengen Zug um Zug der 
Eisenerzeugung zur Verfügung gestellt werden’. Zentrale Planung 9:e Besprechung 
15/7-42, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM).
9) It is symptomatic that the many discussions in Zentrale Planung about steel 
production and the allocation of steel to various sectors of German economic life 
were mainly concerned with the insufficient allocation of coal and coke.
10) These conditions will be accounted for in a forthcoming analysis by Sven- 
Olof Olsson, The Institute of Economic History, Gothenburg University.
1T ‘Das Entscheidende ist der Arbeitseinsatz’ (Pleiger the‘Coal Pope’). Zentrale 
Planung 16:e Besprechung 23/10-42, FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM).
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of coke,12) meant that blast furnaces had to be blown out and at times 
had to be left unused.13) The coal shortage also caused a shortage of 
gas which hampered subsequent production lines. From this aspect 
it was obviously a common concern both for the government and the 
steel sector that the imports of ores with a high iron content should be 
stimulated as much as possible, so that the production of steel could 
be increased with a reduction in the use of coke.
In this connection it is necessary to pause and contemplate the annual 
German exports of coal and coke to Sweden (about 3 million tons and 1 
million tons respectively), which may seem paradoxical against the 
background of the situation on the German coal market. However the 
exports to Sweden, which came to a large extent from conquered areas 
of Poland, constituted a smaller burden on the German coal market, 
above all as regards blast furnace coke, since the use of Swedish iron 
ore by the steelworks meant large savings of this important product 
many times over. Actually the readiness of the Germans to deliver 
coal and coke indicates that Germany did not lose overall by the ex­
change.14)
A comparatively high consumption of imported ores with a high 
iron content also had the advantage that mining at the domestic iron 
ore mines could be reduced—as in actual fact happened from 1941 
onwards—and a large labour force which would otherwise have been 
engaged in iron ore mining could now be employed in coalmining or
12) The development in the price of coal and coke will not be the subject of any 
special investigation here. However as an example of the sharp rise it may be men­
tioned that the price of coal-coke f.o.b. Emden was H Reichsmarks per ton in 1937 
and 16.70 Reichsmarks per ton in the summer of 1942. Notiz über die Hochofen werk 
Lübeck AG, T83:57:3426597 (N A).
13) An example of the blowing out of the blast furnaces due to the shortage of coke, 
Reichsvereinigung Eisen: Bericht über das IV Quartal 1942, T71:34:428508 (NA), 
an example of the insufficient use of capacity due to the coke shortage, Hochofenwerk 
Lübeck AG, T83:57:3426600 (N A).
'4) Speer expressed his view on the exports of coal and coke to Sweden in the 
following way: ‘So dass eigentlich über Kohle noch ein verhältnismässig gutes Geschäft 
gemacht wird. Die Kohle, die wir für die Schwedenerze hergeben, macht sich bei der 
Erzeugung des Eisens mehrfach bezahlt’. Zentrale Planung 8:e Besprechung 26/6-42, 
FD, Handakten Milch, vol. 46 (IWM).
6
82
in other sectors of industrial life where there was a shortage of labour.15) 
Here we touch upon the second important bottleneck for the German 
steel industry, viz. the shortage of labour. This shortage occurred 
generally, but was accentuated as regards skilled workers and technicians 
of various kinds. The reason for this was not far to seek—the need 
of the armed forces for soldiers and specialists of various kinds—and 
substitutes in the form of prisoners of war or other imported labour 
could not fill the gap at all for many reasons. In spite of the fact that the 
steel industry as an important sector for the preparation of warfare 
was not affected by conscription to the same degree as many other 
sectors of German commercial and industrial life, the shortage did in 
fact cause fundamental disruptions in German steel production.16) 
To summarise the matter, it can be established that the situation on 
the German labour market was such that the interest in Swedish iron 
ore was further accentuated.
In this context only a brief reference will be made to a third bottleneck 
in German commercial and industrial life, which was of importance for 
Germany’s attitude to Swedish iron ore. It concerns conditions of
15) When the mining of Dogger ore in Südbaden was no longer considered necessary 
the labour force could be transferred back to coalmining in the Saar, Deutschlands 
Rüstung, p. 76. Also, the exceptionally large exports of Swedish iron ore in 1943 
meant that the mining in Germany could be slowed down and about 1,000 miners 
could be transferred to other tasks. Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Tätigkeitsbericht für 
das Jahr 1943, R10III:8 (B A).
16) The shortage of labour, above all of skilled labour, was put forward as being
the narrowest of the bottlenecks in the production of steel after the shortage of coke, 
see e.g. Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Hauptring Eisenerzeugung, Tätigkeitsberichte, 
T71:34:428355fr. (NA), Bezirkgruppe Nordwest der Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisen
schaffende Industrie, Lagebericht, R10III:7 (B A), Reichsvereinigung Eisen, quarterly 
reports, T71:34:428508 ff. (N A), or Zentrale Planungs Besprechungen, FD, Handakten 
Milch, vol. 46-48 (IWM). Two examples may illustrate the favoured position occupied 
by the steel industry in spite of everything. From May 1939 to May 1941 total employ­
ment in Germany fell by almost 8%, and within industry as a whole by 5.5%, while 
employment within the steel and metal industry increased by almost 14%. OKW, 
WiRüAmt, Ergebnisse der volkswirtschaftlichen Kräftebilanz vom 31 Mai 1941, 
T77:367:1210145 (N A). At the end of May 1939 the proportion of conscripts in the 
total number of males in the population in employment was 23.6%, it was 21.4% 
ofthe workers in industry, and 17.3 % of the steel and metal workers. OKW, WiRüAmt, 
Die beschäftigen Männer in der deutschen Industrie am 31.5.41. T77:367:1210153 
(NA).
83
transport by rail as well as canal. Steel production required great scope 
in transport. It was calculated that for each ton of rolled steel a total of 
7 tons of raw materials and fuel had to be transported. In 1937 no less 
than 20% of German railway traffic was serving the steel industry.17) 
The German transport system functioned very badly for civil purposes, 
since the transporting of troops and war materials was given priority. 
It was therefore of considerable value that the German railway and canal 
networks were not also burdened with the carriage of domestic ore— 
and of coal and coke—but that the supply of iron ore from Sweden to 
the steelworks was dealt with by Swedish goods trains and to a large 
extent by Swedish ships. It was pointed out in contemporary research 
that the actual exports of coal and coke to Sweden and the imports 
of iron ore from there made smaller demands on the scope of German 
transport than the carriage of domestic ore would do in the event of a 
suspension of Swedish iron ore deliveries.18)
Finally, as regards blast furnace capacity it has already been men­
tioned that this was limited.19) In consequence there were reduced 
opportunities for the steel works to base their production of pig-iron 
on inferior grades of ore to any greater extent. The general steel shortage 
in Germany which has been accounted for earlier also hampered a larger 
expansion of blast furnace capacity or of concentration and briquetting 
works. Instead an increase in the use of imported ores with a high iron 
content meant that better use could be made of the existing blast furnace 
capacity, as well as that of the steel furnaces and rolling mills of course.
Thus if the German iron ore supply is considered in conjunction with 
the other economic realities which the German steel industry had to 
take into account in its choice of iron ore, primarily shortage of fuel, 
labour and blast furnace capacity, it appears absolutely plain that the 
Swedish ore with its high iron content would have been a priori highly 
desirable to the German consumers during the war years. However, 
the level of desirability was of course related to the development in 
price of the Swedish iron ore.
17) Hauptring Eisen und Stahl, Rationalisierung in der Eisen schaffenden Industrie, 
R10II1:7 (B A).
18) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Betr.: Auswirkungen eines evtl. Ausfalles skandi­
navischer Erze, 26/2-43, R10III:76 (B A).
19) A certain shortage of capacity also existed in the Ruhr. Bericht des Herrn 
Bergassessor a.D. Dr. H. Winkhaus zur Frage des Erz- und Schrottpreisausgleiches, 
R13I:385 (BA).
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C. The price relationship between domestic and Swedish iron ore
It has not been possible to base any illustration of the price relationship 
between the various types of iron ore on documents of account from 
the individual producers of pig-iron. Even if such documents had been 
available it would have been difficult to study them since the steel works 
were compensated at least in part by the state for raised iron ore, coke 
and transport costs.20)
As regards the development in the price of Swedish iron ore during 
the war, there were only minor adjustments upwards (mainly relating 
to the low phosphorous grades) of the Swedish f.o.b. price. In 1942 
the f.o.b. price of the high phosphorous grades was about 10% above the 
pre-war level, and that of the low phosphorous grades was about 25% 
higher.21) The price of iron ore was linked on a price scale to that of the 
Swedish imports of coal from Germany, and therefore it became just 
as much in the Swedish as in the German interest to keep the price of
20) In a proclamation in the spring of 1941 it was resolved that the steel works 
themselves would pay for the increase in the price of Swedish iron ore, while compensa­
tion for the increase in the costs of its sea freight would be paid at the rate of 2 Reichs­
marks per ton. Payment of compensation for other iron ores would be at the rate of 
4 Reichsmarks per ton. Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan to Wirtschaftsgruppe 
Eisen schaffende Industrie 18/4-41, T71 -.85:588751 (NA). Hochofenwerk Lübeck 
showed the following rises in price for the period 1/9 1939-31/3 1942 and the compensa­
tion received for these.
Increase in costs 
(million Reichsmarks)
Compensation 
(million Reichsmarks)
Ore freights 2.5 2.3 (from Eisenkasse)
Ore prices 1.0 1.0 ”
Coal freights 3.5 2.0 ” ” and
Coal prices 1.9 — Kohlenkasse)
Total: 8.9 5.3
The difference, 3.6 million Reichsmarks, was charged to the company itself. Notiz 
über die Hochofenwerk Lübeck AG, T83:57:3426594 fî. (N A).
On the other hand the cost of scrap-iron did not increase very much in 1937-1944. 
Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 466.
21) Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Bezirkgruppe Nordwest der Wirtschaftsgruppe 
Eisen schaffende Industrie, Mehrpreis für Skandinavienerze, T71:85:588601 ff. (N A).
85
iron ore at a stable level, even if the Swedish iron ore export companies 
thought that the price increases were too insignificant in regard to the 
large rises in costs which weighed heavily on the companies, especially 
during the first years of the war.22)
But although the f.o.b. price was thus fairly stable, a considerable 
rise occurred in the iron ore price at the German steel works, mainly 
because of the increased costs of carriage by sea. This price increase 
is difficult to estimate, as the rise in costs consisted inter alia of com­
pensation and subsidies of various kinds. It seems reasonable to assume 
that there was a quadrupling of the costs of transport to German or 
Dutch North Sea ports and a re-doubling of those to the Baltic ports 
compared to the pre-war period.23) This increase in the cost of freight 
would have meant almost a re-doubling of the price of Swedish iron 
ore at the German steel works.24)
But as the price of iron ore rose in this way, the price of scrap iron 
was fairly stable. Therefore scrap iron became comparatively cheaper 
as a basic material for steel production. Apart from all the other ad­
vantages described above, scrap iron thus became especially desirable 
even from the point of view of price. Together these factors account 
for the great interest which the Germans plainly showed in an increased 
supply of scrap iron.25)
In spite of the very substantial rise in the price of Swedish iron ore as 
shown above, the ore was still extremely desirable in Germany from 
the point of view of price during the second world war. The price devel­
opment and the situation of shortages on the German coke, labour
22) The key role of coal and coke for the general price development in Sweden was 
often stressed, e.g. Statens Bränslekommission and many others to Statsrådet och 
Chefen för Kungl. Handelsdepartementet, Nov. 1941, Handelskommissionens prot. 
1941 (RA). The Grängesbergsbolag’s dissatisfaction with the low prices affected 
otherwise good relations with the Swedish government. Trafikaktiebolaget Gränges- 
berg-Oxelösund styrelseprotokoll 12/2, 19/12 1940, 21/12 1942 (GA).
23) See the chapter on sea transport, p. 65 note 14. Compensation for the increased 
costs of Swedish iron ore was paid to the companies from 1/7 1940 at the rate of 10 
Reichsmarks per ton of steel. Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan, Reichskommissar 
für die Preisbildung 5/6-40, R26IT27 (B A).
24) According to certain information the price of Kiruna D-ore (60% Fe, 1.8% P) 
rose c.i.f. the Ruhr from 15.70 Reichsmarksin 1937/39 to 25. so Reichsmarks in 1940/42. 
Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 466.
25) Statistisches Handbuch von Deutschland 1928-1944, p. 466, Milward (1970), 
p. 227.
86
and transport markets were reasons for this, and from a commercial 
point of view Swedish ore was of great interest to governments and 
businessmen alike.26)
Is it possible then to estimate the ‘profit’ made in German com­
mercial and industrial life by the wide use of Swedish iron ore? A 
contemporary analysis—biased, certainly, but well-informed—of a 
possible increase in the consumption of domestic ore enables a more 
exact estimate to be made of the situation during the war years.
In the big effort which was being made at the end of the 1930s to 
increase the use of domestic German iron ores, the aspects of cost and 
profitability had, as has already been pointed out (p. 31) been pushed 
into the background in favour of political, military and propaganda 
arguments. The iron ore in Salzgitter had a very unfavourable chemical 
composition, and therefore required extra preparation. The mining, 
roasting and sintering of this ore involved great expense. It was already 
perfectly clear at this time how difficult to work and unremunerative 
these grades of iron were, but the politicians had their own way.27) 
Because of the shortage of coke and labour described above the cost 
of producing pig-iron on the basis of Salzgitter and Dogger ores rocketed, 
and pig-iron could be bought more cheaply from outside. This rise in 
costs, which caused growing irritation in the steel works, was acknow­
ledged by the politicians responsible, but they maintained that the 
mining of domestic ores with a low iron content was necessary because 
of the emergency and was also desirable because it was estimated that 
the demand for steel in Europe after the war would reach such propor­
tions that the German steel industry would not be able to base its 
production entirely on imported ores. There were plainly substantial 
questions of prestige involved in the attitude of the politicians and those
26) Niederschrift über die am 18. Dezember 1940 im Reichswirtschaftsministerium 
abgehaltene Besprechung betr. Eisenerzpreisausgleich, R13I:382 (BA).
27) See e.g. Niederschrift der Sitzung des Gutachtausschusses über Rohstoff- 
Fragen 26/5-36, R26I:29 (B A), with a discussion between Goring on one side and 
the technicians and economists on the other. In a later and different context (in con­
versations with the head of the Grängesbergsbolag, Waldenström, in 1937) Goring 
in fact explained that Germany preferred Swedish iron ore from the point of view of 
cost among other things. At this meeting Goring also expressed a wish for a 10 year 
contract with Sweden for the delivery of ore, Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelö- 
sund styrelseprotokoll 7/4-37 (G A).
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responsible for the Reichswerke Hermann Goring in their decision to 
continue the mining of domestic iron ore.28)
In fact the difference in price between the comparatively expensive 
domestic iron ore and the imported ore became of such importance 
that steel works which based their production of pig-iron mainly on 
domestic iron ores had to be compensated by other companies which 
used imported iron ores to a large extent.29) As a paradox it may be 
mentioned that Göring’s creation, the state-owned Reichswerke Her­
mann Göring in Watenstedt, which was to produce steel from Salzgitter 
ore with a low iron content, expressed a wish to import iron ore from 
Sweden to reduce its consumption of coke which was above normal.30) 
The privately owned steel works were not opposed to this idea, since 
there would then be a reduction in the cost of compensation paid by 
them.31) From the summer of 1940 onwards there was a possibility 
of getting compensation for the steel works which based their production 
on domestic iron ore in a takeover of the steel works in Lorraine which 
had considerably lower production costs. In December 1940 the Reichs­
werke Hermann Göring gained control over the large de Wendelworks.32)
In fact the steel works were opposed in principle to compensation 
brought about by large differentials in costs. It was thought that the 
politicians exaggerated the need for domestic iron ore, and the un-
2S) Niederschrift über die am 18. Dezember 1940 im Reichswirtschaftsministerium 
abgehaltene Besprechung betr. Eisenerzpreisausgleich, von Hanneken, Stand und 
Zukunft der deutschen Eisenwirtschaft, R13I:382 (BA). Cf. Petzina pp. 102ff. 
Industriel, 1939, p. 392, U.S. Strategie Bombing Survey, p. 101.
29) Ibid., von Hanneken to Poensgen 18/11-40, R13L382 (B A).
30) On learning of the fact that Hermann Göring had decided to use Swedish 
iron ore in the Reichswerke Hermann Göring in Watenstedt the spokesman for the 
private sector of the steel industry, director Poensgen, was called upon to say that 
Thyssen on one occasion had bet Pleiger, head of Reichswerke Hermann Göring, a 
number of bottles of Sekt that the Reichswerke would at one stage have to use Swedish 
iron ore for its production of pig-iron. Then Vogler from Vereinigte Stahlwerke had 
been of the opinion that it was simply not possible just to wager a couple of bottles 
of Sekt on such an important question and the bet was raised to 10,000 Reichsmarks. 
Niederschrift über die am 18. Dezember 1940 im Reichswirtschaftsministerium ab- 
gehaltene Besprechung betr. Eisenerzpreisausgleich, R13L382 (BA). On Thyssen’s 
attitude towards the Reichswerke Hermann Göring see Chapter II, note 8.
31) Aus der Besprechung mit Herrn General von Hanneken am 10.12.40. im Reichs- 
wirtschaftsministerium, R13E382 (B A).
32) Milward (1970), pp. 226 f.
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economic and irrational consequences of such a high consumption were 
put forward. Certain representatives of the private steel industry con­
sidered that the mining of domestic ore was unnecessary but realised 
that the steel industry had to use it for political reasons.33) Naturally 
there entered into the prolongation of this discussion the steel industry’s 
fear of controls of coke and freight costs and of an increase in govern­
ment influence generally, which had begun with the foundation of the 
Reichswerke Hermann Goring and would perhaps end in the socialisation 
of the whole sector.34)
How great was the difference in price between the imported iron ore 
and the domestic? In this context it is normal to calculate on the basis 
of the cost per ton of pig-iron produced, as the use of the poorer iron 
ore always meant an increase in the costs of blast furnace coke and 
labour. It is hardly necessary to point out that all calculations of this 
kind are tentative.
According to one well-informed analysis the average cost of producing 
one ton of Thomas pig-iron at four steel works in the Ruhrusing imported 
ore as the raw material amounted to just over 42 Reichsmarks—plus 
an estimated capital profit and taxes of about 4 Reichsmarks. The cost 
of producing one ton of pig-iron in the Ruhr using exclusively domestic 
iron ore was estimated at almost 97 Reichsmarks. In the latter case 
the cost of production was in fact twice as high.35) Corresponding
33) Wenzel from Vereinigte Stahlwerke explained on one occasion: '. . . es würde 
den schärfsten Wiedersprach der allerhöchsten Stellen herbeiführen, wenn wir er­
klären wollen: “Wir haben es nicht nötig”, obwohl es wirtschaftlich für uns das 
allerangenehmste wäre’. Niederschrift 28/7-41, R13I:385 (BA). By and by however 
there was a decline in the use of the Salzgitter ore by the Ruhr works. Hermann 
Göring-Werke, FD 3175/45 (IWM).
34) Niederschrift über eine am 11. Dezember 1940 mit Herrn Kommerzienrat Dr 
Hermann Röchling geführte Besprechung, R13I:382 (BA). Niederschrift über die 
am 18. Dezember 1940 im Reichswirtschaftsministerium abgehaltene Besprechung 
betr. Eisenerzpreisausgleich, R13E382 (B A), Niederschrift über die am 28. Juli 1941 
abgehaltene Sitzung betr. Erz- und Schrottpreisausgleich, R13I:385 (BA). See also 
the interpretation of the relationship between politicians and representatives of the 
steel industry in Eichholtz, pp. 51 f.
35) Bericht des Herrn Bergassessor a.D. Direktor Dr. H. Winkhaus zur Frage des 
Erz- und Schrottpreisausgleiches, R13F385 (B A). The cost of 46 Reichsmarks relates 
to the year 1935/36 and since then the price of iron ore had risen. On the other hand 
pig-iron produced from domestic iron ores had to bear other costs in the subsequent 
production process which were not included in the sum of 97 Reichsmarks which 
was given. According to the investigator these extra costs cancelled each other out.
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production in the neighbourhood of the domestic iron ore mines e.g. 
at the Reichswerke Hermann Goring-, was apparently not as costly as 
in the Ruhr, but a more precise estimate of this is not possible.36)
Thus by way of summary a rough estimate would indicate that the 
production of pig-iron in Germany during the war years based on 
domestic iron ores would be twice as expensive as that based on Swedish 
iron ores. It was apparently also less expensive to produce pig-iron 
using Swedish iron ores as the basic material than to use the minett 
ores, in spite of the fact that—at least in the winter of 1941—con­
siderably less was paid for the minett ore than before the war.37) If the 
general assumption is made that in 1942 in Germany (4AltreiclT) 4.5 
million tons of pig-iron were produced with Swedish iron ore as the 
basic material, and that this production meant a saving of 40 Reichs­
marks per ton of finished pig-iron in comparison with the cost of using 
domestic iron ore, this would mean a total German socio-economic 
saving of about 180 million Reichsmarks in that year, which can be 
compared with the f.o.b. value of the total exports of Swedish iron ore 
to Germany in the same year, viz. 90 million Reichsmarks.
However the arithmetical example is in a sense hypothetical. In order 
to maintain production of pig-iron unchanged in the event of a possible 
loss of the deliveries of Swedish iron ore a great increase in the mining 
of iron ore in Germany would have been required, yielding approximately 
a further 19 million tons (the production in ‘Altreich’ in 1943 was 15 
million tons).38) In addition other demands were to be made both on
36) Not even the best informed people were able to make adequate comparisons 
of costs between the Reichswerke Hermann Goring and the rest of the steel industry. 
Reichsvereinigung Eisen to Speer 28/1-43 R10III:53 (B A). See also a very dubious 
calculation in Jäger (1969), p. 75. Klein’s estimate that the cost of pig-iron produced 
from domestic iron ores was 10% higher than the cost of pig-iron produced from 
Swedish iron ore is clearly too low. Klein, p. 42.
37) Bemerkungen zu dem Schreiben des Herrn von Hanneken vom 18.11.40., 
R13I:382 (B A). While the price of minett ore had been about 5 Reichsmarks per ton 
before the war, in January 1941 the price paid was between 3.50 and 4.50 Reichsmarks 
per ton. From 1942 onwards the price was increased to 4.50 Reichsmarks per ton. 
Note 7/1-41, Deutsche Waffenstillstands-Delegation to Auswärtiges Amt 16/6-42, 
HaPoI Frankreich, Eisenerz (A A), Der Militärbefehlhaber in Frankreich to Ober­
berghauptmann Gabel 6/5-42, T71:21:412166 (N A).
3S) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Ausfall skandinavischer Erze, 1/343, R10III:78 
(B A).
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coal mining and on the transport potential. Apart from the enormous 
cost of investment in the mines, ore concentration plants, the transport 
system, blast furnaces etc. and greatly increased running costs, such a 
re-structuring of the iron ore supply would of course fall heavily on 
other sectors of German economic life.
Set in such a context the supply of iron ore to the German steel 
works obviously becomes a latent but threatening bottleneck, nothing 
like as obvious as the shortage of coke, for example, but just as important 
in a wider perspective. From this point of view the Swedish iron ore 
deliveries were plainly of very great importance to the German war 
economy.
VIRON ORE QUALITY AND THE IRON ORE SUPPLY
A. Introduction
In the preceding analysis of the German iron ore supply during the latter 
part of the 1930s and during the second world war no qualities of the 
iron ore apart from its actual iron content were considered. In this 
respect the present account is similar to earlier works dealing with prob­
lems connected with this question.1) In this, however, an extremely 
important facet of the issue is lost in the combination of problems to 
which the German iron ore supply gives rise. It concerns the varying 
content of phosphorus in the iron ore and its consequences for the 
continuing production of steel.
In fact the phosphorus content of the iron ore played a decisive 
role at this time for the subsequent processing of the steel and for its 
various uses. From iron ore with a high phosphorus content, e.g. the 
major part of the Swedish iron ore, which contained 1-2% phosphorus, 
Thomas steel was produced which was in turn made into ship plates, 
railway tracks, builders’ hardware, etc. On the other hand, for the 
production of certain high quality steel products, e.g. for machinery 
and for use in armaments, iron ore with a low phosphorus content or 
scrap iron were required as raw materials.2) The iron ores containing the 
least phosphorus went into the production of acid Martin, Bessemer 
or electric steel, while iron ores with a somewhat higher phosphorus 
content—0.1% at the most—were being used as raw material for the
1) Although this issue is touched on by Jäger (1969), pp. 134, 184 f., he does not 
however integrate this issue into the bigger problem with which he deals, viz. the 
German steel industry’s need of foreign iron ore.
2) On the other hand a high phosphorus content in the iron ore was desirable 
for the manufacture of certain other products. Gemeinfassliche Darstellung des 
Eisenhüttenwesens, p. 16.
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production of basic Martin steel. This latter steel did not have the 
qualities which the steels mentioned above possessed but it was in fact 
superior to the ordinary Thomas steel and it was therefore used within 
the armaments industry.3) Thus the dividing line between the low 
phosphorus and the high phosphorus iron ores was drawn at O. i%.4) 
Of the total German supply approximately 20-25% came below that 
line.5)
With the accelerated rearmament from the end of the 1930s it is 
possible then to assume that there was a strongly increased demand 
in Germany for Martin steel and consequently for low phosphorus 
iron ore as well as scrap iron. How could this expanding demand be 
satisfied?
B. Germany’s supply of raw materials for the production of high
quality steel
1. Introduction
The domestic iron ores almost without exception had a high phosphorus 
content. Only in Siegerland in western Germany were smaller quantities 
of low phosphorus iron ore mined. For this reason alone all the talk 
towards the end of the 1930s about a German armament industry 
based on domestic iron ore was divorced from reality. Therefore the 
country’s supply of iron ores which were poor in phosphorus had to 
come mainly from imports from abroad at this time. Ot Germany’s 
imports of these grades Spain accounted for about 500,000 tons (tons 
of iron) and North Africa for 300,000-500,000 tons. About 600,000 
tons were imported each year from Norway and about 900,000 tons from 
Sweden.6) In all this meant, e.g. in 1938 an import of about 2.5 million
3) The basic Martin steel had a phosphorous content of 0.02-0.os%, the Thomas 
steel 0.04—0.08 %, ibid., pp. 97, 107.
4) Reichsstelle für Eisen und Stahl, Eisenbilanz 2/10-39, RlOIII:! (B A).
5) See table 37 below, Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Erzbilanz 1943, RIOlI!:I (BA).
6) See table 13, p. 34. The volume of the imports of iron ores with a low phos- 
phophorus content from Sweden is not shown in any official trade statistics. The in­
formation is based on a German collocation, Schwedenerz—Ausfuhr nach Deutschland 
1929-1943, 4/7-44, R7X:46 (B A). Milward (1970), p. 213, states that the iron ores in 
Normandy and Anjou were of great importance because of their low phosphorus 
content. However, in the German documents these iron ores are classified as high 
phosphorus, e.g. Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Erzbilanz 1943, R101IE79 (B A).
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tons (tons of iron), while Germany’s supply of scrap iron amounted to 
3.5 million tons, of which l.i million tons were imported.7) Thus of 
Germany’s total supply of raw materials for the production of steel 
that year, about one third can be classified as low phosphorus iron 
ores.
However the importation of low phosphorus iron ores during the 
latter part of the 1930s was not free from problems. At the same time 
as the demand for this type of iron ore was accentuated, deliveries from 
what was traditionally the most important delivering country, Spain, 
were reduced for natural reasons. In order to compensate for the reduced 
deliveries from Spain Germany took a greater interest in the iron ore 
deposits in North Africa. However the allies’ superiority at sea caused 
the newly established connections to be cut off at the outbreak of the 
war, at a time when Spain, partly for the same reason, was unable to 
increase her deliveries to Germany.
With the conquest of Austria and access to her low phosphorus iron 
ore deposits the Germans assumed that substantial assistance in the 
supply of these grades would be forthcoming. However, in spite of the 
fact that great efforts were being made, the Austrian production never 
exceeded 900,000 tons (tons of iron) per year. Next to this, therefore, 
the low phosphorus iron ores from Norway and Sweden became the 
most important ores during the war years.
The loss of important import markets and a severely reduced import 
of scrap iron meant that the shortage of these kinds of material became 
acute already at the start of the war.8) While the supply of grades of 
iron ore with a high phosphorus content was mainly a problem of 
cost and transport, as is evident from previous chapters, the supply 
of low phosphorus iron ores and scrap iron then formed a real bottleneck 
in the production of certain grades in the German steel industry. The 
shortage in supply of materials of these kinds in fact varied in degree 
during the war years but never ceased to be an acute problem.
In what way then did the Germans try to deal with this ‘ausgesproche-
7) See above, p. 25.
8) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Eisenwirtschaft seit Kriegsausbruch, pp. 21, 37, 39, 51, 
R10III:6 (B A).
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nen Materialmangel’?9) Three solutions seem to have been nearest 
to hand. First, there was a suggestion of trying to extend the possible 
uses for the Thomas steel which was produced from the grades of iron 
ore which had a high phosphorus content. Secondly, attempts were 
made in various ways to increase the supply of scrap iron to the steel 
works, and thirdly, efforts were made to stimulate the imports of low 
phosphorus iron ores.
2. The adaptability of Thomas steel
A measure close at hand for the prevention of a situation in which there 
was a shortage of low phosphorus materials was of course the practice 
of stringent economy with these materials. There was a possibility of 
economising by trying to extend the serviceability of Thomas steel and 
above all by restricting the steel works’ use of Martin steel for purposes 
where it was possible to use Thomas steel instead. This applied partic­
ularly to the production of ammunition which swallowed up steel, 
where Thomas steel was used more and more.10) Through certain technical 
innovations within the field of steel production during the war, there 
was a reduction in the content of dangerous materials, including phos­
phorus, in some of the Thomas steel, which could consequently be 
used in several fields in which Martin steel had previously had the 
monopoly.* 11) After 1943 there was a distinction in Germany with 
regard to technique between the ordinary Thomas ingot steel on the 
one hand and the refined ‘Austausch’ steel on the other. In 1943 about a 
million tons of ingot steel of the latter refined variety were produced in 
Germany, which corresponded to barely 10% of the production of 
ordinary Thomas ingot steel. Apparently this proportion did not in-
9) Reichsvereinigung Eisen summed up the situation in a communication to the 
Reichsministerium für Bewaffung und Munition 29/1-43, as follows: 'Zusammen­
fassend ist zu sagen, dass die ausreichende Versorgung der Eisenschaffenden Industrie 
mit P-haltigen Rohstoffen ausschliesslich eine Transportfrage ist, während an P- 
armen Rohstoffen ein ausgesprochener Materialmangel besteht, der eine sorgfältige 
Beobachtung der jeweiligen Versorgungslage und eine entsprechende Steuerung er­
fordert’. R 10111:52 (B A).
10) Janssen, pp. 73 f., Bericht des Herrn Bergassessor a.D.Dr. H. Winkhaus zur 
Frage des Erz- und Schrottpreisausgleiches, Rl3:1:385 (BA).
11I Klein, pp. 133 f., Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Jäger-Programm, T71:34:428351 
ff. (N A). Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Tätigkeitsbericht für das Jahr 1943, T71:34:428525 
(NA).
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crease in 1944 either.12) Thus the technical advancements did not provide 
any radical solution to the problem of the inadequacy of the supply 
of raw materials with a low phosphorus content.13)
3. The supply of scrap iron
On an earlier occasion (p. 85) reference has been made to the great 
interest in Germany during the war in an increase in the supply of 
scrap iron, because of its coke-saving qualities. Since scrap iron also 
had great advantages as a raw material for the manufacture of high 
quality steel products, this interest naturally increased more and more. 
Finally, the development in the price of scrap iron favoured it as against 
iron ore.14)
In an earlier chapter it has been shown that the yearly imports during 
the period before the outbreak of war, from Great Britain and the 
U S.A. among other places, amounted to about 1 million tons. After 
the outbreak of war the German steel industry had to rely on sources 
in Germany or in the conquered areas. As was apparent from the earlier 
account of the German scrap iron supply (p. 25) the attempt to increase 
the supply of scrap iron to any greater extent was unsuccessful. Only in 
1943, when there was an increase in the supply of scrap iron due to 
Speer’s scrap iron campaign and to supplies from Eastern Europe, could 
the situation be regarded by the politicians responsible as satisfactory 
from this point of view.15) However, the inadequacy of the scrap iron 
supply was throughout a source of anxiety for the steel industry.16)
) Stahlerzeugung in Deutschland und in den von Deutschland besetzten Ländern, 
T84:41:1319495 (NA), Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Hauptabteilung Statistik, Roh­
stahlerzeugung nach Sorten 1943, okt.-dec. 1944, T84:41:1322834, 869 ff. (NA).
) One possible way of increasing the production of Martin steel was to permit 
an increase in the phosphorus content of the steel at the expense of a lower quality. 
Niederschrift zur 10:e Besprechung der Zentralen Planung 15/7-42, FD, Handakten 
Milch, vol. 46 (IWM).
14) As stated earlier, the price of imported iron ores rose sharply at the outbreak 
of the war, while the price of scrap iron remained stable, Statistisches Handbuch von 
Deutschland 1928-44, p. 466.
15) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Tätigkeitsbericht für das Jahr 1943, R10IIL8 (BA), 
Deutschlatids Rüstung, p. 197.
16) E.g. Eisenwirtschaft seit Kriegsausbruch, pp. 52 ff. R10IIL6 (BA), Reichs­
vereinigung Eisen to Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition 29/1-43 
R10III:53 (B A).
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Certainly it was possible to increase the part played by scrap iron in 
the feeding of the blast furnaces through additional premiums,17) but—in 
spite of all the efforts—scrap iron never became an effective means of 
overcoming the shortage of raw materials with a low phosphorus 
content.
4. The supply of grades of iron ore with a low phosphorus content
Thus neither economising nor technical innovations nor the supply 
of scrap iron could effectively assist in compensating for the shortage 
of raw materials with a low phosphorus content for the production 
of high quality steel. This made it a more urgent task for the politicians 
responsible in Germany to maintain or preferably increase the produc­
tion and importation of these grades of iron ore.
Extensive efforts were of course made to increase production in Austria. 
In fact the Austrian iron ores had a low iron content of about 30% 
which was further reduced, however, because of the accelerated mining.18) 
Like all other iron ores with a low iron content these iron ores also 
became comparatively more expensive to use in production. Above 
all a shortage of labour hampered a further rise in production in Austria.19)
German interest would therefore have to be directed mainly towards 
the imports. After the imports from North Africa had almost completely 
disappeared, those from Spain, Norway, Sweden and also for a short 
period the conquered areas of the Soviet Union continued.
As has been mentioned earlier, the production of iron ore in Spain 
had already declined considerably during the civil war and in the chaotic 
conditions which also prevailed during the years which followed produc-
17) Deutschlands Rüstung, p. 197. From the first six months of 1942 to February 
1943 the consumption of scrap iron in loading the blast furnaces rose from 6% to 
12% in the production of pig-iron. Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Vermerk betr. Ent­
wicklung der Eisenerzeugung, des Schrotts- und des Roheisens-Verbrauches 1942, 
R1QIII:79 (B A). In the autumn of 1944, after the deliveries from Sweden had ceased, 
scrap iron may have constituted 40 % of the loading of blast furnaces. Reichsvereinigung 
Eisen zur Lage 28/9-44, T71:34:428500 (N A).
1S) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Phosphorarme Erze, Bilanz 1943, 27/3-43 R10III:76 
(BA). Hitler explained 1943 the increased iron ore mining: ‘Im besonderen soil 
der Eisenerzberg in der Ostmark auf keinen Fall geschont werden.’, Deutschlands 
Rüstung, p. 238.
19) Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Steigerung der Eisenerzförderung am Erzberg 
11 /5—44, Bericht über den Steirischen Erzberg 14/6-44, R7VIL129 (BA).
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tion was further reduced. Thus the Spanish production of iron ore fell 
from 3.2 million tons in 1939 to just over 1.6 million tons a year in 
1941-1942 and the quantities for export had to be taken partly from 
existing stocks.20) Neither were the Spanish exports of iron ore to 
Germany characterised by the stability which for example distinguished 
the Swedish deliveries, but gave the impression to a greater extent of 
improvisation.21) The actual transport was expensive and had to be 
carried out partly by rail through France.22) Furthermore Germany 
was not the only importer of Spanish iron ore. During the whole of 
the war there were exports—greatly reduced, certainly, in comparison 
with the pre-war period, but regular—to Great Britain.23)
The Norwegian iron ore mines—the most important was Sydvaranger, 
situated farthest to the north—contained ores with a low phosphorus 
content. However, the Norwegian iron ore was also characterised by a
20) Apparently there was great confusion at the Spanish iron ore mines, and part 
of the labour force left. Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Phosphorarme Erze, Bilanz 1943, 
27/3-43, R10IIE76 (BA), Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Bergbau Spaniens Mai 
1943, R7VIL136 (BA). The Spanish production and exports of iron ore developed 
in the following way from 1936 to 1942 (million tons of ore):
Year Production Exports Year Production Exports
1936 2.3 1.7 1940 2.2 0. S
1937 1.3 0.8 1941 1.6 0.6
1938 2.5 Li 1942 1.8 0.7
1939 2.4 1.3
Source: Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Bergbau Spaniens, R7VII: 138 (BA).
21) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Bericht 31/3-43, R10IIE76 (BA). The conditions of 
importing from Sweden were put forward as an example which ought to be followed. 
Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Erzabteilung, R10III:76 (B A). As an example of the un­
predictability of the Spanish iron ore exports it may be observed that deliveries 
which had left Spain in October 1943 had not yet reached the Ruhr in February 1944. 
Speer to Ganzenmüller 8/2-44, R10III:53 (B A).
22) The rail freights were about 75% higher than the sea freights. Reichswirt­
schaftsministerium, Prüfungsstelle Frachten 28/4-43, T71 :S5:388625 (NA).
23) Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition, Eisenerze, Lagebericht 
zur spanischen Eisenerzförderung und -ausfuhr unter besonderer Berücksichti­
gung der britischen Bezüge 19/7-44, R3:1655 (BA). During the period 1941-1943 
almost 45 % of the Spanish iron ore exports went to Great Britain. Estadistica del 
commercio exterior de Espaha.
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low iron content, and in order to meet the cost of transport to Germany 
the iron ore had to be concentrated and made into briquettes.24) For 
this imported fuel was needed, which, with the previously documented 
German shortage of coal and freight space, was difficult to supply. 
To this must be added the fact that the coal as well as the iron ore had 
to be carried on the North Sea, where the risk of attack by the allies 
was great.25)
Consequently the Norwegian mining companies did not experience 
during the war the period of prosperity which would otherwise have 
been expected. In several of the mines—among them Sydvaranger— 
mining was periodically discontinued during the war years and exports 
to Germany, which had amounted to just over half a million tons (tons 
of iron) during the pre-war years, were reduced during the war to about 
half.26)
In Germany great hopes were attached to deliveries of grades of iron 
ore with a low phosphorus content from the conquered areas in the 
east, primarily from Krivoj-Rog. However as a result of destruction 
by the Russians no real mining was started in these mines, and instead
24) Norges Offisielle Statistik, Norges Bergverksdrift 1935-1944.
25) In the Norwegian official reports the shortage of coal was put forward as the 
most important cause of the standstill at Sydvaranger. Sydvaranger usually required 
about 4,500 tons of coal a month and a round voyage with a convoy in 1943 took 
3-4 months to complete, and so 4 medium-sized vessels had to be regularly engaged 
in this traffic if the mining was to be maintained. Reichswirtschaftsministerium, 
Vermerk für Herrn Präsident Kehrl 17/5, 8/6-43, T84:90:1380944ff. (NA), Speer 
to Terboven 24/6-43, T84:106:1400869 f. (N A).
26) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Phosphorarme Erze, Bilanz 1943, R10III:76 (BA). 
The Norwegian production of iron ore developed as follows in 1937-1944 (million 
tons of ore):
Year Production Year Production
1937 l.i 1941 0.6
1938 1.5 1942 0.3
1939 1.4 1943 0.3
1940 0.7 1944 0.3
Source: Norges Offisielle Statistik, Norges Bergverksdrift 1937-1944.
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the deliveries had to be taken from existing stocks. Owing to the great 
transport difficulties this import was also kept down.27)
Therefore the only country which managed to satisfy to an increased 
extent Germany’s need of iron ores with a low phosphorus content 
during the war was Sweden. Already in the autumn of 1939 there were 
promptings from Germany to make deliveries of iron ores with a low 
phosphorus content on the largest possible scale.28) In 1936 Swedish 
exports of these grades had amounted to 870,000 tons (tons of iron). 
After the outbreak of war these exports increased sharply and in 1940- 
1943 they amounted to just over 1.5 million tons a year. Therefore the 
proportion of iron ore with a low phosphorus content in the total 
Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany rose from 18% in 1936 to 27% 
in 1940-1943.29) This sharp rise in the deliveries to Germany was 
partly due to the fact that the earlier Swedish exports to Great Britain, 
which consisted to a large extent of grades with a low phosphorus
27) Because of extensive Russian blastings in the pits—there was only underground 
mining—and the removal of materials, the mining could not start before extensive 
repairs and substantial investments had been made. Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisen schaffende 
Industrie, Erster Arbeitsbericht der Berg- und Hüttenwerksgesellschaft Ost mbH, 
T84:124:1423855 ff. (N A), Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Phosphorarme Erze, Bilanz 
1943, R10III:76 (BA).
2S) Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund styrelseprotokoll 16/12-39 (GA).
29) The official trade statistics did not distinguish the phosphorus content in the 
iron ore trade. According to a German report the following quantities of iron ore 
with a low phosphorus content were exported from Sweden to Germany:
Year Central Sweden Norrbotten Total
million %0f million %of million %0f
tons of total tons of total tons of total
ore exports ore exports ore exports
1935 0.5 26 0.7 20 1.2 22
1936 0.7 30 0.8 13 1.5 18
1940 1.6 50 1.0 17 2.6 29
1941 1.8 45 1.0 14 2.8 25
1942 1.8 51 0.7 14 2.5 30
1943 1.8 48 0.7 12 2.5 25
Source: Reichwirtschaftsministerium, Schwedenerz-Ausfuhr nach Deutschland, 
R7X:46 (B A).
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content, ceased from 9 April 1940, but the main reason was the com­
paratively sharp rise in the production of these grades in Sweden during 
the war years.30)
Iron ores with a low phosphorus content were to be found in the 
large Norrbotten mines in Kiruna and Gällivare as well as in a large 
number of smaller iron ore mines in central Sweden. However the 
geology of the Norrbotten mines was such that it was not possible to 
mine only low phosphorus grades because there was always a certain 
relationship between the grades with a low phosphorus content and 
those with a high phosphorus content. An increase in the deliveries 
of iron ores with a low phosphorus content from Norrbotten would 
therefore also have meant an expansion in mining, and the exporting 
of iron ores with a high phosphorus content, which it would hardly 
have been possible to achieve, given the shortage of tonnage mentioned 
above (p. 71 ff).31)
On the other hand several of the smaller iron ore mines in central 
Sweden—some of which were owned by German steel works could 
have extended their exports of iron ores with a low phosphorus content 
considerably, or could have begun such an expansion.32) While low
30) The production of iron ores with a low phosphorus content (under 0. i / 0) in 
Sweden in the years 1936-1939 was almost exactly 20% of the total iron ore produc­
tion. After that it rose to 27% in 1940 and 29% in the years 1941-1944. SOS, Bergs­
hantering 1936-1944. On the export of iron ores with a low phosphorus content 
to England, PM 1/9-38, H40Ct (UD A).
31) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Phosphorarme Erze, Bilanz 1943, R10IIE76 (B A).
32) Amongst the larger export mines in central Sweden were inter alia—apart from 
the Grängesberg field—the Idkerberg, Ställberg, Stripa, xStnberg, Riddarhyttan, 
Bastkärn, Norberg and Dannemora, all of which were Swedish owned. It is worth 
noting that mining in the last named mine, due to the Iov/ phosphorus content in 
the iron ore has been classic for the Swedish iron industry, expanded substantially 
during the war and was orientated towards exports. The owners, Fagersta Bruks AB, 
on the basis of the favourable export prices of this iron ore, chose to buy iron ore 
from other places instead. Wretblad, pp. 501, 503.
In the area round Ludvika there were a number of mines which were under common 
management and were owned by the German steel works Hoesch AG in Dortmund 
with Fried. Krupp AG as minority shareholder (33%). These included Bergverks 
AB Vulcanus, which operated mines in the Blötberg, Håksbergs Nya Gruv AB, 
Gruv AB Lekomberg and AB Stollberg’s mines. Fr. Krupp AG, Geschäftsbericht 
der Hauptverwaltung des Erzbergbaues 1943/44, FD 2459/44 (IWM), Stora Långviks 
Gruv AB was also German owned (Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Düsseldorf) and it operated 
ïntrânget’s mines, the ores of which were characterised by the very low phosphorus 
content (under 0.oi%). During the war this company also developed Smâland’s
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phosphorus grades accounted for 30% of the exports to Germany 
from central Sweden in 1936, the proportion increased during the war 
years to just under 50%.33) These increased deliveries of iron ores with 
a low phosphorus content slowly led to a certain uneasiness within 
the foundry circles of central Sweden, where they began to fear that they 
themselves might be short of this type of iron ore in the future.34)
Taberg, the ore of which was wanted in Germany because of its vanadium content. 
According to one estimate the German owned mines in central Sweden accounted 
for 17% of the lump ore production and 18% of the ore concentrate production in 
this area in 1942. Första Kammarens protokoll 1943, nr 35, p. 19. The German ad­
ministration showed great interest in the mines owned abroad, see e.g. Reichswirt­
schaftsministerium, Stand und Entwicklung der von deutschen Firmen in europäischem 
Ausland betriebenen Bergwerke, R7VII:125 (B A).
On the whole the war years meant a certain re-structuring of Swedish iron ore 
production and exporting, which was due at least partly to the German demand for 
grades with a low phosphorus content. While iron ore mines not belonging to the 
Grängesbergsbolag had exported about 800,000-1,000,000 tons (tons of ore) a year 
in the 1930’s, these exports were doubled during the war. The Swedish production 
of iron ore with a low phosphorus content showed the following development in 
1936-1944 (million tons of ore):
Year Central Sweden Norrbotten Total
1936 0.9 l.i 2.0
1937 1.2 1.5 2.6
1938 1.3 1.3 2.6
1939 1.2 1.3 2.6
1940 1.6 1.2 2.7
1941 1.8 0.8 2.6
1942 1.8 0.7 2.5
1943 1.8 0.9 2.8
1944 l.i 0.6 1.6
Source: SOS, Bergshantering 1936-1944.
Note 1: Iron ores with a low phosphorus content are those with less than 0. t %.
33) See note 29 above.
34) The discussion was prompted by a lecture given by the engineer Karl Rutberg 
at Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB in December 1943 and it led to a government 
inquiry into Sweden’s deposits of iron ores with a low phosphorus content. Affärs­
världen 1943, pp. 934 ff., 954 f., 1,000, Första kammarens protokoll 1943, nr 35, pp. 
18 ff. In Germany it was believed that the initiative stemmed from M. Waldenstrom 
in the Grängesbergsbolag, who wanted to avoid competition from other mines, 
and from J. Wallenberg, a member of the Swedish delegation negotiating with Germany, 
and therefore that the campaign was directed politically and economically against 
Germany. Auswärtiges Amt to Reichswirtschaftsministerium 14/6-44 with supple­
ments, R7X:46 (B A).
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C. Summary
It is possible to establish beyond debate that the supply of iron ore to 
the German steel industry during the war years constituted in a particular 
respect a serious and highly significant bottleneck, viz. as regards grades 
of iron ore with a low phosphorus content for the production of certain 
kinds of high quality steel. Contemporary statements about this matter 
are innumerable, and comment is made with equal frequency on the 
great advantage it was to Germany’s armament industry that Sweden 
managed to increase her deliveries of this particular grade. The Swedish 
concessions were of course dictated by political reasons.35)
In the revised sources no compilation—apart from a few optimistic 
forecasts—has been found regarding the actual supply of grades of ore 
with a low phosphorus content. Therefore the following table, in 
which the net scrap iron supply is also given, is somewhat tentative.
Table 37. Germany's supply of iron ore with a low phosphorus content and net scrap
iron in 193S and 1941 
(million tons of iron)
1938 1941
Iron ore Net scrap iron Iron ore Net scrap iron
Domestic
Siegerland 0.5
Purple ore 0.5
Austria - 0.8
Total 2.5 1.8 3.0
Imports
Sweden 0.9 1.5
Norway 0.7 0.3
Spain 0.5 0.4
North Africa 0.7 0.1
Total 2.8 1.1 2.3 0.9
Source: 1938 see table 13 above p. 34, and also Schwedenerz-Ausfuhr nach Deutsch­
land, R7X:46 (B A), 1941 see tables 22-25 above p. 49 ff and the sources 
stated there.
35) In May 1940 the German ore negotiator Wenzel (Vereinigte Stahlwerke) 
said: ‘Die Schweden erklärten ohne weiteres bereit zu sein, so viel wie nur eben möglich 
phosphorarme Erze zur Verfügung stellen zu wollen’. OKW, WiRüAmt, Vermerk
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It is clear from the table that the low phosphorus Swedish iron ore 
became very important and of course the Germans tried to stimulate 
exports in every way. The grades with a low phosphorus content were 
always given priority in the Swedish-German trade negotiations, and 
the price increases allocated to the Swedish iron ore related almost 
without exception to the iron ore with a low phosphorus content.36) 
The Germans were also prepared at times to deliver war materials 
merely in exchange for Swedish iron ore with a low phosphorus con­
tent.37)
über die Stockholmer Verhandlungen 7-9 Mai 1940, T77:699:1911542 ff. (NA). 
See also note 9 above. In another statement from Reichsvereinigung Eisen it was 
said: ‘Während der Mehrbedarf an phosphorreichen Erzen für die geplante Kon­
tingentserzeugung aus inländischer Förderung ohne weiteres aufgebracht werden 
kann, besteht . . . auf der P-armen Seite eine erhebliche Unterdeckung’. Reichs­
vereinigung Eisen to Speer 10/4-43, R10III:86 (B A), Reichswirtschaftsministerium, 
Vermerk 4/11-43, R7VII:383:1 (B A).
3S) Protokoll über Besprechungen des deutschen und des schwedischen Regierungs­
ausschusses für Fragen des Zahlungs- und Warenverkehrs zwischen Deutschland und 
Schweden 28/11-19/12-41, 7-18/12-42, 10/12-43-10/1-44, HK vol. 352 (RA). 
Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund styrelseprotokoll 3/12-41, 22/12-43
(GA).
When Sweden after pressure from the English and Americans limited the quantity 
of exports to 7 million tons for the year 1944, the Germans nevertheless considered 
themselves satisfied as far as the various types of ore were concerned, i.e. with a 
comparatively high proportion of iron ores with a low phosphorus content. OKW, 
WiRüAmt T77:693:1902660 (NA), Vortrag Dr Rohland 23/3-44, T71:34:428551 ff 
(N A). The quality aspects was never referred to by the English or the Americans in 
their negotiations with the Swedish Foreign Office. All types of ore always made 
them ‘see red’. It appears that they had completely misunderstood the situation. 
In an investigation by the Ministry of Economic Warfare 4/1—40 it was suggested 
that it was precisely the high phosphorus content of the Swedish iron ore which was 
important, since Germany herself had such a good supply of iron ores with a low 
phosphorus content. N347/19/63 (P R O).
37) In a ‘Führerbesprechung’ Speer gave the following arithmetical example to 
demonstrate that deliveries of armament materials to Sweden in exchange for iron 
ores with a low phosphorus content would be a good business proposition for 
Germany: ‘Der Preisunterschied zwischen Eisenerz und Rüstungsgut ist ein so aus­
serordentlicher, dass bereits mit geringen Waffenlieferungen eine grosse Erzmenge 
abgedeckt werden kann. So kostet z.B. ein Panzer 4 250 000 RM, eine Tonne Erz 
10-20 RM. Der Panzer hat ein Einsatsgewicht von 40 to., so dass ein Panzer wert- 
mässig 12,500 to. Erze (RM 20) bringt somit Stahl (bei 65% Fe-Gehalt) für 200 
Panzer’. Speer’s Führerbesprechung 11/11-43, R3:1514 (B A), Reichsvereinigung 
Eisen, Aktennotiz 5/11-43, R10III:53 (BA).
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The importance of the grades with a low phosphorus content is 
perhaps best illustrated by an analysis which was made within the 
Reichsvereinigung Eisen of what a stoppage of the Swedish iron ore 
deliveries would mean to the German steel industry. While it was con­
sidered possible to compensate for the loss of the Swedish iron ores 
with a high phosphorus content by an increase in the mining of other 
iron ores, e.g. minett ore, it was stated in the analysis that the important 
Swedish iron ore with a low phosphorus content was ‘nicht ersetzbar’ 
for the production of quality steel.38)
38) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Auswirkungen eines evtl. Ausfalles skandinavischer 
Erze 26/2-43, R10III:76 (BA), Ausfall skandinavischer Erze 1/3-43, R10III:78 
(B A), Ausfall an Schwedenerzen 24/8-44, R10III:53 (B A).
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SWEDEN’S IRON ORE EXPORTS AND WAR TRADE POLICY
A. Introduction
As shown in an earlier chapter of this research, the Swedish exports of 
iron ore to Germany were a subject of great interest politically to the 
warring powers during the second world war. Of course the iron ore 
exports also played an important role in Swedish trade and foreign 
policy. However, the Swedish government had for years been involved 
in the exporting of iron ore (owning from 1907 a half share in Sweden’s 
two largest iron ore mines, Kiruna and Gällivare), but because the 
exports were increasingly bound up with politics, the government’s 
interest in controlling and regulating activities quite naturally increased. 
‘No other exports can expose us to such great risks as the exports of iron 
ore’.1)
During the war years trade negotiations between Sweden and Ger­
many were also to take place on two different levels. Spokesmen for the 
Swedish export mines (ore sellers) and for the German steel works 
(ore buyers) were above all negotiating about technical questions of 
minor importance and they had to act as a group of experts to whom 
matters could be referred. The more important questions relating to 
export quantities and prices were discussed at the superior government 
commissions, which were also the contracting parties. The government 
commissions’ way of dealing with the question of prices at times caused 
great bitterness among the ore exporters.2)
*) During the interwar period the Swedish Foreign Office came to the con­
clusion that the government ought to take responsibility for the control of foreign 
trade in its entirety. Ffägglöf, pp. 14 ff., Sohlman, pp. 65 f. The quotation from a 
memorandum on measures taken in connection with Sweden’s foreign trade in the 
event of a war or a crisis 1/9-38, H40Ct (UD A).
2) Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund styrelseprotokoll 12/2-40, 21/12-42 
(G A), Mallet to Eden 23/12-40, N 7530/24/42 (P R O).
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The principal features of Swedish trade policy during the second 
world war have been thoroughly investigated in Gunnar Hägglöf’s 
well-informed work Svensk krigshandelspolitik under andra världskriget, 
in which much attention is devoted to the exports of iron ore from 
Sweden.3) In the present chapter, however, the Swedish war trade 
policy will be discussed partly from other viewpoints and partly in the 
light of other sources. The iron ore exports constitute the axle round 
which the other questions are grouped.
The following table will serve to give an immediate idea of the extent 
of the iron ore exports in terms of value, and their relationship to the 
rest of the Swedish exports:
Table 38. The Swedish exports in 1936-1944 
(million kronor and %)
Year Total exports 
(million kronor)
Exports to 
Germany 
(million 
kronor)
Exports to 
Germany as 
% of total 
exports
Iron ore
exports to 
Germany as 
% of total 
exports
Iron ore 
exports to 
Germany as 
% of total 
exports to 
Germany
1936/38 1 786 301 17 8 46
1939 1 888 371 20 10 50
1940 1 328 494 37 12 32
1941 1 345 558 41 12 28
1942 1 319 529 40 11 28
1943 1 172 537 46 16 34
1944 853 345 40 10 25
Source: SOS, Handel
Thus Germany’s share of Sweden’s total exports increased considerably 
during the war years. This was partly due to a sharp increase in the 
exports there in terms of value, but also to a reduction in the volume of 
foreign trade generally. Before the war broke out iron ore was clearly 
the dominant product exported to Germany (almost half of the export
3) Apart from his experience in his job as head of the trade policy department 
at the Swedish Foreign Office (UD) during the greater part of the war, Hägglöf 
has also drawn on Swedish Foreign Office documents. In the following account there 
will not be a reference to Hägglöf in every individual case.
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value), whereas during the war the share fell to about 30%. The paradox 
is that the iron ore exports to Germany during the second world war 
lost some of their comparative importance in terms of value while at 
the same time acquiring an unprecedented importance in political 
terms.
However it is perfectly clear that the Swedish iron ore exports in 
other respects cannot be considered in isolation from trade and foreign 
policy.4) Changes within the exports of iron ore caused, or were in 
turn caused by, changes in other spheres of trade policy or in foreign 
policy generally. Viewed in this way the iron ore exports constituted 
one of the many means of exerting pressure, political as well as economic, 
which were exploited during the second world war. In German domestic 
diplomatic language a suitable term for this was in use, viz. ‘Daumen­
schrauben (thumb-screws). For the various parties it was a question of 
having the opportunity to tighten certain screws in order to achieve 
the desired results. The changes in the realities of foreign and trade 
politics determined which party could tighten the most sensitive screws 
the most at the time. It is from this aspect that the Swedish exports 
of iron ore are examined in the account which follows.
What thumb-screws could be used against Sweden? On the other hand, 
what were Sweden’s trump cards?
It is possible to compile a very long list of these but it will still not be 
beyond dispute since the various means of applying pressure constantly 
changed in character and strength. Only some of the more important 
ones will be mentioned here.
The German thumb-screws on Sweden operated both in the political 
and economic spheres. The German deliveries of coke and coal were 
considered to be basic necessities for Swedish economic life. In addition 
Sweden imported a large number of important products. German 
deliveries of war materials—and not least promises of such deliveries— 
were also a useful means of bringing pressure to bear. Finally Germany 
also exercised control over the so-called Gothenburg traffic. On the 
political level German military superiority during the first years of the 
war obviously constituted a source of strength.
The Swedish trade and political trump cards consisted of a number
4) For Sweden’s foreign policy see Carlgren, who without adding many new facts, 
also incorporates trade policy into his account. Carlgren, p. 27, note 6.
108
of products which were of interest to Germany, above all iron ore and 
ballbearings. On the general political level Sweden could also use the 
German transit traffic through Sweden to Norway and Finland as a 
thumb-screw. Germany’s increasing military weakness during the latter 
part of the war was also exploited by the Swedish negotiators.
The principal economic means of pressure by the allies on Sweden 
lay above all in the goods which Sweden was allowed, with the consent 
of the British, to import via Gothenburg, mainly oil and rubber, 
together with promises of deliveries of certain war materials. With an 
increase in their military strength from 1943 the negotiating position 
of the allies was strengthened and gradually threats were made about 
special treatment of Sweden in the future, and confiscation of Swedish 
property abroad and blacklisting of Swedish companies were suggested.
During the greater part of the war Sweden had no economic means 
of putting pressure on Great Britain (up to 9 April 1940 imports of 
iron ore and steel from Sweden were considered by the British to be of 
great importance). Instead, Sweden had to exploit the military weakness 
of the allies during the first years of the war.
B. The period up to the outbreak of war
It was apparent within the Swedish Foreign Office for several years 
before the outbreak of the second world war that the Swedish exports 
of iron ore to Germany were of such a sensitive nature that they would 
cause political difficulties for Sweden in a possible conflict of high 
politics. In articles which had great coverage and were often highly 
exaggerated, and which appeared in the Swedish as well as in the foreign 
press, the German dependence on Swedish iron ore was stressed, and 
there were speculations about the consequences of this for foreign 
politics. The speculations were nourished to some extent by the almost 
simultaneous proposals from England and Germany to Sweden, during 
the boom year of 1937, for increased deliveries of iron ore. The require­
ments of England were dictated above all by the fact that deliveries from 
Spain had quite naturally been severely reduced.5) The blockade theory, 
i.e. that of attempting to reduce Swedish exports to Germany through 
personal purchases, was not so predominant on this occasion.6) By
5) See above, p. 36 f.
6) Palmstierna to Sandler 10/5-37, H40Ba (UD A).
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the intervention of the Swedish government in the shape of changes 
in the law, increased exports to Germany as well as Great Britain were 
made possible. However the slump in 1938 caused a decline in England’s 
interest in Swedish iron ore, and in spite of reminders from the Swedish 
Foreign Office, who wanted a more even distribution of exports to 
Germany and Great Britain, the agreed quantities were not collected.7)
In the spring of 1939 England’s interest in Swedish iron ore was in­
creasing again. However, at this time the behaviour of the English was 
entirely dictated by the blockade theory. In order to reduce German 
imports of Swedish iron ore substantial orders were planned in Sweden, 
which was something which the Swedes also found desirable in order 
to resist expected German demands for increased imports of iron ore.8) 
The English were emphatically maintaining an attitude to Swedish 
iron ore which was to assert itself throughout the war, viz. that a stoppage 
of the Swedish deliveries of iron ore to Germany would be a staggering 
blow to the enemy’s steel industry and would therefore constitute per­
haps the most effective blockade weapon which the allies had against 
Germany.9)
During the spring and summer of 1939 the Swedish Foreign Office 
also received constant reports about the great importance which was 
attached abroad to the Swedish exports of iron ore. At times the tone 
became rather hostile. T am afraid we have to destroy your mines’ 
was once a well-known expression of an English diplomat in the spring 
of 1939.10) At about the same time a German diplomat let fall that
7) Söderblom to Prytz 14/7-38, H40Ba (UD A). When the English returned in the 
spring of 1939 the SwedishForeignMinister expressed his disappointment with Eng­
land’s behaviour. Hudson to Halifax 1/3-39, Memorandum 1/4-39, Nl 189/1189/42, 
N1842/1818/42 (PRO).
8) A record kept by the British Minister for Foreign Trade permits us to assume 
that it concerned the whole of the Swedish iron ore exports. Hudson Memorandum 
6/4-39, Ashton-Gatwin Memorandum 1/5-39, N/1910/31/63, N2238/31/63 (PRO). 
Prytz to Hägglöf 13/7-39 H40Ba (UD A).
9) On the British blockade policy see Medlicott, I, pp. 44 ff., 180 ff. At the beginning 
of September 1939 the English Member of Parliament Sir Ralph Giyn presented 
a memorandum to the Swedish envoy to London which ended with the following 
pathetic appeal: ‘Probably there has never been a case in history of a state, itself 
remote from active participation in the war, having such a real opportunity of making 
decisions of si ch an absolutely decisive character’. Hägglöf, p. 35.
10) Hägglöf, p. 27.
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if Sweden cancelled the ore exports Germany would take the ore, like 
Bohemia, by force.11)
In the cross-fire between German claims for continuing and increased 
iron ore deliveries (which also created currency for Swedish imports 
from Germany) and English demands for a stoppage of the deliveries 
to Germany, Swedish trade policy was faced with great difficulties 
and had to show great flexibility and adaptability. A rigid adherence 
to stale principles of neutrality was considered quite impossible in this 
situation.
C. From the outbreak of war to the 9 April 1940
The actual outbreak of war did not cause any cuts in the Swedish 
deliveries of iron ore to Germany and Great Britain. Very soon, how­
ever, in order to regulate trade between the countries, parallel negotia­
tions started between Sweden and Germany and between Sweden and 
Great Britain, the so-called double negotiations. In both cases the Swedish 
exports of iron ore were at the heart of the discussions, in which English 
negotiators tried to reduce, and German negotiators tried to increase, 
the deliveries. As Hägglöf’s thorough investigation has shown, it was a 
question for the Swedish negotiators of fixing an upper limit to the 
exports to Germany which was acceptable to both parties.
In this context the long and complex sessions of negotiations during 
the autumn of 1939 will not be described. Instead the extent to which 
it was politically and economically possible for the various parties to 
lend force to their arguments will be examined.
The negotiating strength of the English (thumb-screw) lay in the 
country’s ability to continue her deliveries to Sweden of certain important 
goods. In other respects the English negotiators had to appeal to the 
desire to safeguard common democratic values.12) The Swedish negotia­
tors argued along the following lines vis-à-vis Great Britain. Germany’s 
military superiority in northern Europe meant that Sweden felt it 
necessary to adopt a cautious attitude towards that country. Thus for 
Sweden the exporting of iron ore to Germany was more a political 
than an economic question. Germany’s documented request that she 
might deliver goods of vital importance to the Swedish national economy
u) Winther to Söderblom 17/4-39, H40Ct (UD A).
12) Bohemian, pp. 85 ff.
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also entailed as a consideration the exporting of iron ore by Sweden.13)
On the other hand in the simultaneous negotiations with the German 
government commission the Swedish negotiators had no particularly 
strong arguments in favour a reduction of the export quantities. Instead 
they had to prolong the negotiations until agreement had been reached 
with the English.14)
At the start of the negotiations the German negotiators already 
showed a pronounced interest in the iron ore, while other subjects 
were of secondary significance. The German chief negotiator maintained 
‘that from the German point of view there was only one problem of real 
importance, and that was the iron ore’.15) Germany’s readiness to deliver 
all kinds of goods to Sweden—among other things, thanks to the con­
quest of Poland, it would be possible to satisfy Sweden’s total needs 
for coal and coke—was an extremely strong argument in the negotiations, 
especially as the imports from the West became smaller. The whole 
of the foreign political situation in the autumn of 1939 favoured the 
German negotiating position.16)
On 19 October the English accepted that the quantity exported to 
Germany in the year 1938, 10 million tons, was to be applied as the 
maximum quantity to be exported in future years. This constituted a 
substantial concession from the stands which had been taken earlier 
and of course it was greeted with great satisfaction in Sweden since it 
enabled an agreement to be concluded with Germany. The fact that the 
English accepted the high export figure must have been due to their 
hopes that they would nevertheless be able to prevent exports via Narvik, 
the importance of which as a shipping port was greatly overrated in 
Great Britain. It was also assumed that the war would be short-lived. 
Before the ice outside Luleå broke up in May the war would be over, 
or the negotiating position would be different. Great importance also
13) Ibid., Monson to Foreign OiBce 7/9-39, N4298/1189/42 (PRO), UD to the 
Swedish Minister in London 17/10, 26/10-39, HP64Ba (UD A).
14) Hägglöf to Boheman 5/10-39, HP64Ba (UD A).
15) Ibid. PM angående samtal rörande de tysk-svenska handelsförbindelserna 
(Memorandum of conversations about Swedish-German trade connections) 26/9-39, 
HP64Q (UD A).
16) Richert to Boheman 9/9-39, HP64Ct (UD A), Walter and Wied to Auswärtiges 
Amt 23/9-39, HaPol VI, Schweden, Handel 11, Nr 1, Bd2 (A A), UD to the Swedish 
Minister in London 26/10-39 HP64Ba (UD A).
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seems to have been attached to the Swedish promises not to make any 
technical improvements in Luleå in order to increase shipping on the 
Baltic, and also to make certain ‘technical’ preparations (e.g. calling 
up miners) in order to reduce imports. The only alternative—a situation 
in which no agreement was reached—was considered to be worse from 
the British point of view. Sweden could manage without imports from 
Great Britain, while certain Swedish exports (special steel, charcoal 
iron) were of great importance to Great Britain. A situation in which 
no agreement was reached would also cause a substantial loss of public 
support.17)
Nevertheless, in discussion with the German representatives the 
Swedish negotiators adopted a very strict attitude—among other reasons, 
in order to extract advantages in other fields—and offered only 7 million 
tons a year.18) German military threats—of minelaying in Swedish 
territorial waters—persuaded the Swedish negotiators to weaken, and 
in December 1939 agreement was reached on deliveries of 10 million 
tons of iron ore during the year 1940. In actual fact however Sweden 
was pressed to exceed the limit in the agreement. For the year 1939 
contracts were concluded between German buyers and Swedish export 
mines for a total of 11.5 million tons. In addition the Swedish negotiators 
had to accept in silence the drawing up of contracts for 11 million tons 
for the year 1940. Thus Sweden had to acquiesce tacitly in breaches 
of the earlier agreement with the English in the month of October. 
There was no mistaking the satisfaction of the Germans over the results 
achieved in the negotiations.19)
However, English opposition to the Swedish iron ore deliveries to 
Germany did not cease after the agreement in October. There was 
mounting opposition to the terms of the agreement, and it was con-
17) Foreign Office Memorandum 13/10-39, Memorandum by the Minister of 
Economic Warfare 31/10-39, N5162/1189/42, N6104/1189/42 (PRO). Medlicott, 
I, pp. 147, 152, Boheman, p. 87. 
ls) Boheman to M. Wallenberg 11/11-39, HP64Ba (UD A).
I9) Protokoll über Besprechungen der deutsch-schwedischen Regierungsausschüsse 
betreffend den deutsch-schwedischen Warenverkehr im Jahre 1940 vom 12/1-40, 
Anlage 1, Gutachten, Aufzeichnung über den Ausgang der deutsch-schwedischen 
Wirtschaftsverhandlungen von Dezember 1939/Januar 1940, HaPol YJ, Handel 
13A, Bdl (AA).
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sidered that they were far too favourable to Sweden.20) The annoyance 
of the English increased when the quantities of iron ore exported by 
Sweden to Germany during the year 1939 were made known, viz. 10.9 
million tons. Information about overtime at the Swedish export mines— 
which was in breach of the promises made by Sweden in the autumn— 
also annoyed the English.21)
However the Finnish winter war gave the allies an opportunity to 
combine aid to Finland with control over the iron ore mines in the 
north of Sweden. The latter aim was of course the principal one, and 
was considered by many people—including Churchill above all—to be 
extremely important.22) Parallel with attempts to get permission to 
march through Sweden the English tried, inter alia by promising to 
deliver war materials, to commit Sweden to firmer military co-operation.23) 
The arguments of the English were along the following lines: After 
Finland was defeated the Soviet Union would border on Sweden to the 
north. The advance positions would be considered by Germany to 
constitute such a serious threat to the iron ore deliveries from the north 
of Sweden that Germany would be compelled to resort to military 
intervention against Sweden. The Swedes—fully realising that the 
primary aim of the allies was not aid to Finland but control over the 
ore fields—in fact remained cool, and maintained that there were no 
reasons for Germany to attack Sweden, since the iron ore deliveries 
functioned so excellently just as they were.24) The slightest threat to 
the iron ore deliveries would—the Swedes maintained—bring about a 
successful German attack and ‘Sweden might well be made a shambles
20) In Great Britain the internal criticism was directed against her own negotiators 
who had come from the industries. Hambro, whose bank did much business with 
Scandinavia, was considered to have been too co-operative. Sargent Memorandum 
7/12-39, N7247/1189/42 (P R O).
21) Medlicott, I, p. 188, M. Wallenberg to Boheman 20/11-39, Prytz to Boheman 
7/1-40, HP64Ba (UD A), Foreign Office to Monson 31/12-39, N58/19/63 (P R O).
22) War Cabinet Conclusions 22/12-39, 29/2-40 (P R O). The literature on this is 
plentiful. Last thoroughly dealt with by Woodward, p. 42 ff.
23) M. Wallenberg to Boheman 12/1, 14/1, 15/1-40. Uppteckning av Halifax' 
uttalande vid samtal med Prytz, (Record of Halifax’s statements in conversation with 
Prytz) 19/1-40, HP64Ba (UD A), Stanley to Halifax 24/1-40, N1069/1069/42 (P R O), 
Medlicott, I, p. 186.
2+) UD to the Swedish Minister in London 20/1-40, M. Wallenberg to Boheman 
24/1-40, HP64Ba (UD A), Mallet to Halifax 14/2-40, Mallet to Cadogan 4/3-40, 
N1943/9/56, N2872/9/56 (P R O).
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like Poland long before (allied) aid could be effective’.25) However 
from this point of view Sweden’s interest in contributing to a quick 
end to the hostilities between Finland and the Soviet Union seems 
quite natural.26)
The difficulties in the trade policy sessions between Sweden and Great 
Britain during the winter of 1939/40 originated in the highly exaggerated 
view of the English about the great importance in the short run of 
Swedish iron ore, ‘possibly the most important issue of Economic 
Warfare today’.27) In addition, the real importance of the Swedish 
iron ore was misinterpreted (see above, chapter V, note 36). Sweden 
tried in every way, inter alia by giving international coverage to an article 
by the Swedish industrialist Gerard de Geer, to moderate this opinion. 
However she was not successful in convincing international opinion of 
the strength of the arguments.28)
The Germans, however, had every reason to be satisfied with the 
results they had obtained in the negotiations with Sweden. The German 
negotiators considered that the Swedish government, although it had 
been under pressure from the English, was decidedly friendly towards 
Germany.29) A worrying sign that Sweden’s ability to make deliveries 
was not assured was to be found in the increasing conscription of 
miners, crane-drivers, and other groups which were essential for the 
iron ore exports. In Germany the demands for the exemption of these 
groups of workers were increased little by little.30)
25) Mallet to Halifax 14/2-40, N1943/9/56 (P R O).
26) A Swedish ‘Munich’ would give Sweden time to build up a stronger defence 
against future Russian aggression. Mallet to Foreign Office, 24/2-40, N2331/9/56 
(P R O). Mallet was also able to report strong Swedish pressure on Finland to accept 
Russia’s terms. Mallet to Foreign Office 1/3-40, N2627/9/56 (PRO).
27) Extract from a letter from Monson in M. Wallenberg to Boheman 20/11-39, 
HP64Ba (UD A). In the English documents, from the Foreign Office as well as from 
War Cabinet Conclusions, the proofs are innumerable.
2S) Documents in slip-case XVI, H40Ct (UD A), Monson to Foreign Office 5/6-39, 
N2910/31/63 (P R O). M. Wallenberg to Günther 25/2-40, HP64Ba (UD A). Müllern 
has based his account of Germany’s slight dependence on Swedish iron ore on de 
Geer’s article, Müllern, pp. 108 ff. According to Medlicott, de Geer’s article was 
considered by the author himself to be ‘all nonsens’. Medlicott, I, p. 191.
29) Aufzeichnung über den Ausgang der deutsch-schwedischen Wirtschaftsver­
handlungen vom Dezember 1939/Januar 1940, HaPolVI, Handel 13A, Bd 1 (A A).
30) Wenzel to Walter 14/2-40 (copy), HP64Ct, Richert to Boheman 2/3-40, 
HP39HTy, Richert to Boheman 4/4-40, H40Ct (UD A).
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D. From 9 April 1940 to the summer of 1943
With the German attack on Norway and Denmark on 9 April 1940 
Sweden’s connections westwards were almost completely cut off, and 
Sweden could see herself enclosed in the magnitude of the German 
economy. The English had to recognise, not without bitterness, that 
their chances of influencing the volume and character of Sweden’s 
iron ore exports had disappeared for several years to come.31) The 
Swedish negotiators now had only one party to negotiate with—but a 
superior one. Sweden’s strength in the negotiations was to be found, 
just as before, in her ability to export to Germany interesting products 
at reasonable prices, primarily—but by no means exclusively—iron 
ore.
New trade agreements were made yearly between Sweden and Ger­
many. In the discussions which preceded the signing of the agreements 
the German negotiators could emphasise their country’s military 
successes and her continuing ability and wish to supply Sweden with 
important goods. A continuous exchange of goods featured in the 
more extensive German plans which aimed at a long term incorporation 
of Sweden into the magnitude of the German economy. The Germans 
were therefore anxious to maintain Sweden’s ability to produce and 
deliver.32) On 9 April there was already discussion in the trade policy 
committee at the German Foreign Office about compensating Sweden 
for the loss of her English coal deliveries.33) Throughout the contemporary 
German analyses the great advantages of a peaceful and practical in­
corporation of Sweden into the Greater German economy were stressed.34)
31) Memorandum Addis 21/6, 22/8, 30/10-40, N5010/24/42, N6295/24/42, 
N6971/24/42, Memorandum Collier 19/11-41, N6506/84/42 (P R O).
32) On 10 April 1940 there was already a detailed statement 164 pages in length. 
OKW, WiRüAmt, Betrachtung der Wirtschaft der drei nordischen Staaten nach der 
Besetzung Norwegens und Dänemarks durch deutsche Truppen, T84:89:1379780 
(N A), Ribbentrop to the German legation in Stockholm 18/4-40, Handakten Wiehl, 
Schweden Bd 5 (AA), Aufzeichnung des Gesandten Clodius 30/5-40, AzDAP, 
Ser. D, Bd IX, pp. 390 ff.
33) Sitzung des Handelspolitischen Ausschusses am 9 Mai 1940, Handakten Wiehl, 
Schweden Bd 5 (A A).
34) OKW, WiRti Amt, Betrachtung der Wirtschaft der drei nordischen Staaten 
nach der Besetzung Norwegens und Dänemarks durch deutsche Truppen, s. 163 f., 
T84:89:1379780 (NA). Aufzeichnung des Legationsrats van Scherpenberg 28/8-41, 
AzDAP, Ser. D, Bd XIII, s. 332 ff.
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The German deliveries of coal and coke to Sweden—in spite of the fact 
that there was a clearly documented shortage of these types of goods 
in Germany—fall easily into place in the larger pattern.35)
However, in the renewed negotiations for a settlement in the summer 
of 1940 the Swedish negotiators were pressed to make certain con­
cessions, among others the abandonment of the export quantities for 
1938 as the standard. The English had to accept that the Anglo- 
Swedish agreement of the previous autumn had lapsed.36) In addition 
Sweden had to accept fairly sharp increases in the prices of coal and 
coke imports from Germany.37)
In one very special respect Sweden’s iron ore exports were in fact 
to be used as a means of putting pressure on Germany. This concerns 
Sweden’s refusal in April 1940 to send weapons and many other things 
through Sweden to the troops fighting in Narvik. This refusal was 
countered by a German ban on exports of war materials, which was 
considered by the Swedes to be a very serious act of retaliation. The 
argument was then used as a Swedish counter thumb-screw that without 
imports of anti-aircraft devices and artillery from Germany Sweden 
would hardly be able to defend the north of Sweden against attacks 
by the allies, and the iron ore exports would also be in extreme danger. 
These arguments made an impression, but the question was resolved 
by the withdrawal of the English troops from the Narvik area.38)
With the German advantage which was accentuated after 9 April, 
the demands, which have been mentioned above, for the exemption of 
the Swedish miners were intensified. Therefore during the summer ol 
1940 the Swedish military authorities had larger numbers of workers 
sent back on leave of absence to take part in the accelerated mining 
operations and the exporting of iron ore to Germany, whose own
35) See above, p. 81.
36) Memorandum Addis 21/6-40, N5010/24/42 (PRO). Moreover after Germany 
had conquered the French iron ore mines, the Swedish exports of iron ore were 
considered to be of purely academic interest. Memorandum Sargent 17/6-40, 
N4974/124/42 (P R O).
37) Ergebnisse der Besprechungen des deutschen und des schwedischen Regierungs­
ausschusses in der Zeit von 26 Mai bis 6 Juni 1940, HP64Q (UD A).
38) Handlingar rörande Sveriges utrikespolitik under andra världskriget, 7, Transi- 
teringsfrågor, pp. 83 ff. Walter, Schnurre and Wied to Auswärtiges Amt 27/4-40, 
Handakten Clodius (A A), Aufzeichnung Schnurre 28/4-40, Aufzeichnung Wiehl 
11/5-40, Handakten Wiehl, Schweden Bd 5 (A A).
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stocks of iron ore were at their lowest and whose demand for it was 
at its highest during that very summer.39) The German demands were 
also formalised in a paragraph in a confidential protocol which was 
appended to the trade agreement for the year 1941 and which was made 
in December 1940.40) In January 1941 only a fraction of the Swedish 
miners were called up.41)
Apart from exempting miners from conscription the Swedish author­
ities had to take all sorts of necessary steps of a ‘technical’ nature in 
order to allow the exports of iron ore to take place with the least possible 
interruption. These involved for example the traffic by rail between 
Kiruna and Luleå, simplification in the sample-taking of the iron ores 
and above all a great effort to make the loading of iron ore in the port of 
Luleå as rapid as possible (three shifts, etc.), so that they reached a 
volume which had been inconceivable until then.42) During the month 
of July 1940 almost Li million tons were loaded, a record which was 
broken only in 1969, but by that time the port of Luleå had been sub­
stantially extended. In Germany Sweden’s good intentions for a maximum 
increase in iron ore exports were also noted with satisfaction.43)
From the summer of 1940 Sweden’s economic life slid—far too
3g) UD to the Commander-in-Chief 10/6-40, H40Ct, documents in slip-case XVII, 
H40Q (UD A).
40) The regulation applied to the miners in the mines of central Sweden, who 
mined the ore with a low phosphorus content which was of such importance for the 
German armament industry (above, p. 91 ff)and it was brought into effect for the first 
time in the agreement in the summer of 1940. Ergebnisse der Besprechungen des deutschen 
und des schwedischen Regierungsausschusses in der Zeit von 26 Mai bis 6 Juni 1940, 
and was repeated for the year 1941, UD to statssekreteraren i Socialdepartementet 
30/12-40, H40Ct (UD A).
41) Out of Sweden’s 5,266 miners who were eligible for military service, 2,165 
were granted a postponement of it. Of the remainder the overwhelming majority were 
on leave of absence and only a very few were called up. Uppskovsforteckning (Post­
ponement list) 21/1-41, H40Ct (UD A).
42I Deutsches Konsulat, Luleå to Auswärtiges Amt 6/8-40, OKW, WiRüAmt, 
T77:699:1911420 (NA). A colourful description of the conditions in Luleå in the 
summer of 1940 is given in LKAB's newspaper Skip/Malmaren, October 1969.
43) Wenzel to von Hanneken 15/5-40, OKW, WiRüAmt, T77:699:1911540 (N A), 
WiRüAmt, Vermerk über die Stockholmer Verhandlungen am 7. 8. und 9. Mai 
1940, T77:699:1911542 (NA).
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smoothly from the point of view of the English44)—more and more 
into the sphere of influence of the German economy. Exports were 
almost completely directed to Germany or to areas controlled by 
Germany. The price development in Swedish-German trade also became 
unprofitable from the point of view of Sweden. The German advantages 
in negotiation were exploited above all in the negotiations in the summer 
of 1940:
Table 39. Index of values in points for the Swedish-German trade in 1939-1941
(1938 = 100)
Exports f.o.b. Imports c.i.f.
Iron ore Total Coal & Coke Total
1939 91 93 114 106
1940 July 91 105 144 132
August 95 107 168 147
September 96 106 172 149
October 96 107 190 159
November 93 107 200 166
December 92 106 200 167
1941 First 6 months 98 112 213 182
Source: PM rörande förändringarna i den svensk-tyska handeln under första halv­
året 1941 (Memorandum on changes in the Swedish-German trade during 
the first six months of 1941), Statens Priskontrollnämnd 1/9-41. HP64Ct 
(UD A).
Germany was also granted credit by Sweden—but not in fact on the 
iron ore imports. As has been shown in an earlier chapter of this 
analysis, the iron ore was transported on board Swedish vessels to a 
much greater extent than had been decided on in the agreements. German 
vessels were built in Swedish shipyards. There was an extensive transit 
traffic to Norway and Finland on the Swedish railways. This traffic 
has been estimated at about 20% of Sweden’s total goods traffic. 
Finally the so-called Gothenburg traffic, which supplied Sweden with
44) An article by Hägglöf in the Berliner Börsenzeitung on German-Swedish trade 
relations supports the view of the English that Sweden had now decided on a quick 
and complete adaptation to the new conditions. Memorandum Addis 22/8-40, 
N6295/24/42 (P R O).
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certain vital goods imported from the west, could only take place with 
the consent of the Germans.45)
The results produced in Sweden were not in fact entirely dictated by 
the thumb-screws used on her by Germany. Of course the large foreign 
trade with Germany was of extreme importance from an economic 
point of view.46) In this respect the Swedish government was therefore 
very keen on maintaining the exports of iron ore on as high a level 
as possible in order to keep the Swedish economy on its feet.47)
At one time there was discussion in German diplomatic circles of the 
desire to use further thumb-screws on Sweden. It was thought that 
the maintenance of the status quo would produce the greatest advantages. 
Otherwise, the nearest thumb-screw to hand was to be found in a refusal 
to allow traffic via Gothenburg to continue. However this traffic also 
meant certain advantages for Germany. Part of the mineral oil which 
was imported via Gothenburg was in fact used in Swedish warships 
which convoyed German transports.48)
E. From the summer of 1943 onwards
The great change in Swedish foreign policy took place during 
the summer and autumn of 1943. Certain hints of an imminent change 
in climate were already present in the autumn of 1942. In the trade 
agreement with Germany for the year 1943—signed in the middle of 
December 1942—the Swedish negotiators were able, after promptings 
from the U.S.A., to advance their position, above all as regards credit
45) See e.g. Die Gesandtschaft in Stockholm an das Auswärtige Amt 19/9-41, 
AzDAP, Ser. E, Bd I, pp. 434 f., Aufzeichnung des Gesandten Schnurre 1/12-41, 
ibid. pp. 754 ff., Dankwort to Auswärtiges Amt 29/7-42, Handakten Wiehl, Schweden 
Bd 6 (A A). As we know, German troops were also transported through Sweden 
in the summer of 1941 from Norway to Finland, the so-called Engelbrecht division. 
According to German opinion, the Swedish authorities had shown a very positive 
attitude towards the transit. Sweden should therefore be rewarded by a German 
consideration in the matter of the Gothenburg traffic. Richert to Günther 7/7-41, 
HP39HTy (UD A).
46) Noted in passing in Boheman, pp. 20, 140.
47) Trafikaktiebolaget Grängesberg-Oxelösund, styrelseprotokoll 21/12-42 (G A). 
Agreements recorded in the general cabinet meetings 28/6-43, HP64Ua (UD A).
4S) Die Gesandtschaft in Stockholm an das Auswärtige Amt 19/9-41, AzDAP, 
Ser. E, Bd I, pp. 434 f.
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facilities.49) However, the cold wind from the north did not pass un­
noticed in Germany. An investigation had already started at the beginning 
of the year 1943 into the effects on German economic life of a possible 
cancellation of the Swedish iron ore deliveries.50)
With the entry of the United States into the war and with Germany’s 
military setbacks, the allies’ demands on Sweden increased. The American 
negotiators in particular adopted a highly intransigent attitude towards 
Sweden’s difficulties. In the beginning it was a question of studies 
of Swedish economic life and foreign trade, but soon there were demands 
for a reduction in the Swedish exports to Germany, which were also 
considered in the U.S.A. to be of vital importance for Germany’s 
military power.51)
However, the Swedes, for reasons which have already been men­
tioned, were not at all inclined to reduce their trade exchanges with 
Germany. The imports from Germany were of fundamental importance 
for the country’s economy, and the allies would not be able to compensate 
for a possible reduction in them.
In the negotiations which took place between Sweden on the one 
hand and Great Britain and the U.S.A. on the other during the summer 
and autumn of 1943, of which Hägglöf has given a comprehensive 
description elsewhere, Sweden finally had to agree to a cancellation of 
the transit traffic and to a reduction in the exports to Germany for the 
year 1944. The maximum quantities for exports of iron ore were fixed 
at 7.5 million tons. The allied negotiators also made strong demands 
for reductions in the deliveries for 1943, but the Swedes managed to 
maintain successfully that they were bound by the agreement for that 
year.52)
49) PM 5/12-42, HP64Ct (UD A), Walter and Wied to Auswärtiges Amt 13/12-42, 
Sitzung des Handelspolitischen Ausschusses vom 21 Januar 1943, Handakten Wiehl, 
Schvteden Bd. 6 (A A). The English also noted the German retreat in negotiations 
and connected it with the military successes of the allies. Memorandum Cocks 21/12— 
42, N6487/56/42 (P R O).
50) Reichsvereinigung Eisen, Auswirkungen eines evtl. Ausfalles skandinavischer 
Erze, 26/2-43, R10IIL76 (B A).
51) PM 22/2, 1/3-43, the legation in London to UD 14/5-43, PM 31/5-43, Hp64Ua 
(UD A), Medlicott, II, pp. 199 f.
52) Hägglöf to UD 14/5-43, the legation in London to UD 14/6-43, Uppteckning 
av föredragning i allmän statsrådsberedning (Agreements recorded in general cabinet 
meetings) 28/6-43, HP64Ua (UD A), Medlicott, II, p. 466.
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However, during the year 1943 the exports of iron ore to Germany 
continued very smoothly (an exceptionally mild winter and no allied 
obstacles to the exports via Narvik) and the total quantity of exports 
to Germany came to 10. l million tons for the whole year, in spite of 
the fact that the Swedish authorities felt obliged to resort to certain 
‘technical’ measures to reduce the exports. In this context repair work 
on the railway between Kiruna and Luleå was suddenly begun, and 
the port of Luleå was closed two weeks earlier than was necessary from 
the point of view of the climate. In addition, personnel in the shore 
shipping ports in central Sweden were called up for military duty. When 
the high export figures—in spite of Swedish efforts—became known 
tc the allies, their annoyance became even greater.53)
When in the autumn of 1943 Sweden was to start negotiations with 
Germany about the exchange of goods during the year 1944, she was 
bound by the earlier agreement with the allies to reduce the exports 
to Germany of iron ore and ballbearings among other products. Further­
more, it was the first time in her war trade policy that the Swedish 
negotiators were bound by an agreement with the other party.
The reductions which Sweden suggested of course met with strong 
German protests and inter alia the German negotiators made threats 
about a blockade of Sweden and economic isolation.54) In actual fact 
the threat was an empty one. In August 1943 the German authorities 
had in fact carried out an analysis of Sweden’s chances of resisting an 
economic blockade. The results of the analysis were discouraging for 
Germany. Sweden could tolerate an economic blockade for a year at 
least without any serious damage.55) The fuel situation in particular, 
which had earlier been Sweden’s great problem, now showed a clear 
improvement, thanks to a stringent economy and exceptionally mild 
winters.56)
53) UDtotheSwedishMinisterinLondon 3/9-43, PM 20/9-43, H40Ct, Mitcheson 
to Ministry of Economic Warfare 7/9—43, N5388/42/42 (P R O), the legation in 
London to UD 4/11-43, Memorandum 1/12-43, H40Ct, Memorandum 20/1-44, 
the legation in London to Sohlman 21/3-44, HP64Ua (UD A).
54> PM 10/12-43, HP64Ct (UD A).
55) Reichswirtschaftsministerium, Untersuchung über die Blockadefestigkeit der 
schwedischen Volkswirtschaft, T84:131:1432070 ff. (NA).
56) Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, Deutsche Gesandt­
schaft, Wehrwirtschaftsbericht 15/2-44, T77:700:1913404ff. (NA).
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The German negotiators laid heavy stress on the fact that a reduction 
in the Swedish exports of iron ore would mean an increase in the use 
of German domestic ores with a low iron content, which required larger 
quantities of coal, which in turn would mean that Sweden would hardly 
be able to receive the quantities for which she asked.57) After protracted 
negotiations Germany had to agree to the Swedish conditions. The 
quantity for the exports of iron ore was fixed at 7.1 million tons.58)
The German negotiators had to acknowledge that a radical change 
had taken place in Swedish trade policy, and that the German thumb­
screws no longer worked as they had done before. Instead other ways 
had to be tried. By making substantial deliveries of coal, coke and many 
other goods the German authorities hoped to stimulate exports from 
Sweden.59) The German deliveries to Sweden therefore became far 
greater in value in 1944 than their counterparts, and Germany’s debt 
to Sweden disappeared over the years. However, there was no resulting 
increase in the imports of iron ore. Resignation spread throughout 
Germany.60)
As a result of the increased pressure from the allies, especially from 
the American military officers, Sweden was compelled to adopt a more 
severe attitude towards Germany. Even the Soviet Union concurred 
in the demands for a reduction in the exports of iron ore.61) During
57) PM över sammanträde mellan de svenska och tyska regeringskommissionerna 
(Memorandum of meeting between the Swedish and German government com­
missions). 13/11-43, HP64Ct (UD A).
5S) The Germans’ loss of prestige was considered so important that they tried to 
avoid publicity about the contents of the agreement. UD to the Swedish Minister in 
Washington 8/1-43, press release 10/1-44, HP64Ct (UD A). The Swedish press at 
least pointed out the reduction in exports of iron ore, e.g. Dagens Nyheter 11/1-44, 
Svenska Morgonbladet 12/1-44. However the Germans seemed satsified with the 
distribution according to grade, i.e. the relation between high phosphorus content 
and low phosphorus content. Reichsministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, 
Deutsche Gesandtschaft, Wehrwirtschaftsbericht 15/1—44, T77:700:1913462 ff.
(N A).
59) Funk to Speer 15/2-44, R7VT383/1 (B A).
60) OKW, WiRüAmt, Betr. Vierteljahres-Besprechungen des deutschen und 
schwedischen Regierungsausschusses für Fragen des Zahlungs- und Warenverkehrs 
zwischen Deutschland und Schweden 8/5-44, T77:699:1910482 ff. (NA). Reichs­
ministerium für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier Schweden: 
Überblick für die Zeit 1/4-30/6-44, T77:699:1910338 ff. (NA).
61) Deutsche Gesandtschaft to Auswärtiges Amt 13/6-44, R7X:46 (BA).
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the spring of 1944 the Swedish authorities also took necessary measures 
of a technical nature to reduce the exports of iron ore. No ice-breaking 
aid was arranged for Luleå and the miners were called up in large 
numbers.62) Of course the Germans pointed out the artificial interruptions 
in the exports, but their words were backed up by no show of force.63)
However, during the spring and summer of 1944 iron ore took second 
place to another strategic Swedish export product, viz. ballbearings. 
In the trade agreement for the year 1944 the exports of ballbearings 
had already been heavily cut down. In the spring of 1944 the allies’ 
demands went further than the agreement with Sweden of the autumn 
of 1943. On one issue after the other Sweden had to give in: she heavily 
reduced her exports of ballbearings during the summer and stopped 
them completely from October onwards, and there was a gradual 
stoppage of exports of iron ore via the Baltic in August and September. 
Attempts by the Germans to get the iron ore shipped in larger quantities 
via the Swedish ports on the west coast failed due to a shortage of 
railway wagons in Sweden. American pressure on Sweden was strong, 
and in addition the allies interfered with the shipping in Narvik which 
did not increase.64) From the turn of the year 1944/45 all exports of 
iron ore to Germany ceased. Nor was any new agreement made with 
Germany.
What in fact were the thumb-screws of the allies, with which they 
extorted all these concessions from Sweden? The English maintained 
that during the years 1940-1942 Sweden had understandably deviated 
from a policy of neutrality, but that Germany’s loss of strength now 
made it possible to return to a more strictly neutral line.65) The Americans 
were in fact far less subtle in argument. As before the imports controlled 
by the allies went via Gothenburg (liquid fuel and rubber) largely for
62) PM 6/4-44, HP 64Ua (UD A).
63) PM över sammanträde mellan de svenska och tyska regeringskommissionerna 
(Memorandum of meeting between the Swedish and German government 
commissions) 25/4-44, HP64Ct (UD A), Aktennotiz über Besprechungen mit 
Ministerialrat Ludwig vom Reichswirtschaftsministerium 17/8-44, OKW, WiRüAmt 
T77:694:1904437 ff. (NA).
64) The iron exports to Germany were of great symbolic significance for the 
Americans. Memorandum Foreign Office 10/11-44, N7064/3/42 (PRO).
65) Uppteckning av föredragning i allmän statsrådsberedning (Agreements recorded 
in general cabinet meetings) 28/6-43 HP64Ua (UD A).
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the defence of Sweden. Of course these imports were given high priority, 
and threats of stopping the imports obviously constituted an effective 
means of pressure by the allies,66) especially as Germany’s ability— 
and desire—to deliver these kinds of goods waned.67) On the other hand 
it was possible for example to hold out the prospect of increased deliveries 
of oil or aircraft in exchange for a reduction by Sweden of her exports 
of ballbearings to Germany.68) By degrees the tone grew sharper and 
Sweden was threatened with discrimination in trade policy after the 
war or with confiscation of Swedish property in the U.S.A. or in areas 
controlled by the allies, the blacklisting of Swedish shipyards which were 
building ships for Germany, et cetera.69) In order to increase the pressure 
on Sweden the allies also tried to involve the Soviet Union.70)
The Swedish negotiators did not have much to show' against these 
thumb-screws. They maintained that the adoption of measures against 
Germany which were too radical would provoke a German invasion of 
Sweden. Furthermore they pointed out that Sweden’s neutrality was
6S) The English concession to oil transports to Sweden during the war was by no 
means automatic. It was contended that imports of oil by Sweden helped to increase 
the oil supply of the German sphere of influence and that the English would not gain 
very much from good trade relations with Sweden, after she had definitely come 
under German influence. Memorandum Addis 29/6-40, Memorandum Collier 29/7-40, 
N5010/24/42 (P R O). On the other hand it was maintained that a stoppage of the 
oil deliveries to Sweden would not bring about a reduction in the Swedish exports 
of iron ore to Germany. Ministry of Economic Warfare to Foreign Office 25/8-42, 
N4388/56/42 (PRO). On the differences between the U.S.A. and Great Britain in 
their assessments of tactics against Sweden, see e.g. Memorandum Foreign Office 
16/7-44, N6375/3/42 (PRO). Medlicott, II, chapter XVI, passim.
67) Ibid. The legation in London to UD 16/8-44, HP64Ua (UD A).
68) Memorandum on the exports of ballbearings 15/3-44, HP64Ct, PM 1/4-44, 
PM 8/5-44, HP64Ua (UD A). Promises of oil deliveries had been used earlier to 
bring pressure to bear on Sweden over the transit question. Medlicott, II, pp. 191 f.
69) Uppteckning av föredragning i allmän statsrådsberedning (Agreements recorded 
in general cabinet meetings) 28/6-43, PM30/6-44, the legation in Washington to UD 
15/8-44, HP64Ua (UD A), Johnson and Mallet to SKF 7/10-44 (copy), Memorandum 
after visiting Counsellor Ravndal at the U.S.A. legation 16/10-44, HP64Ct (UD A), 
Medlicott, II, p. 493. In 1944 an English Member of Parliament raised the question 
of blacklisting the Grängesbergsbolag. N4603/3/42 (P R O). The sensational but 
casually made threat of bombing Swedish industrial plants is not discussed here.
70) Foreign Office to the Embassy in Moscow 5/8-44, N4778/3/42 (P R O).
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vital for humanitarian work at the end of the war and for active partici­
pation in international post-war work.71)
Vis-à-vis the Germans, where the negotiating position had changed 
radically, the Swedish negotiators tried to produce objective justifica­
tions for the reduction in the exports.72) However, it was absolutely 
clear to the Germans that Sweden’s behaviour was dictated by a change 
in the foreign political situation.73) Certainly it was hoped to some 
extent that Sweden’s traditional needs for coal and coke would contribute 
to a softer Swedish line, but in actual fact Germany had already lost 
this source of strength.74) The winters of 1942/43 and 1943/44 had been 
unusually mild and the Swedish stocks of coal and coke were very 
substantial.
In the summer of 1944 the trade policy commission in Auswärtiges 
Amt considered the question of possible measures being taken against 
Sweden on account of her ‘ausgesprochene Unfreundlichkeit’. After a 
lengthy discussion they were forced to acknowledge that counter­
measures would hardly be in the German interest, since Germany’s 
principle concern was not to interrupt the imports of iron ore.75)
71) Uppteckning av föredragning i allmän statsrådsberedning (Agreements recorded 
in general cabinet meetings) 28/6-43, HP64Ua (UD A), Eden Memorandum 1/8-44, 
N4777/3/42 (P R O).
72) On many occasions the arguments became bitter. When in the autumn of 1943 
the Swedish negotiators sought to justify the reduction in the iron ore quantities for 
the year 1944, they gave as the reason the fact that in 1943 iron ore had accounted 
for too large a share of the total exports to Germany, and that it was desirable to 
have a better balance between the different kinds of goods. PM nr 2 över samman­
träde mellan de svenska och tyska regeringskommissionerna (Memorandum no. 2 of the 
meeting between the Swedish and German government commissions) 9/11-43, 
HP64Ct (UD A), the legation in London to UD 9/8-44, HP64Ua (UD A). The 
reductions in the shipping of iron ore on board Swedish vessels in August 1944 were 
motivated by the factor of war risk insurance. OKM to Auswärtiges Amt 1/10-44, 
HaPol Schiffahrtsbeziehungen Deutschlands zu Schweden, Bd 5 (A A). The British 
Ambassador in Stockholm was able to report that the Swedish Cabinet Secretary 
‘was working very hard to arrange for stopping the iron ore traffic as soon as there 
was any real sign of naval activity in the Baltic’. Mallet to Foreign Office 28/7-44, 
N6667/3/42 (P R O).
73) Stinnes to Köster 27/5-44 FD 3045/49 (1WM).
7+) Stinnes to Köster 17/4-44, FD 3045/49 (IWM).
7s) OKW1 WiRüAmt, Sitzung des Handelspolitischen Ausschusses vom 29/7-44, 
T77:700:1911938 ff. (NA).
126
F. Concluding observations
The foregoing account has stressed very strongly that the exports of 
iron ore to Germany constituted one of the main factors in Swedish 
war trade policy. It is also easily fitted into the larger pattern of foreign 
politics and economics.
Swedish trade policy, and hence the exports of iron ore, was expressed 
in yearly trade agreements, the contents of which were an excellent 
reflection of prevailing conditions of relative strength as between Sweden 
and the warring powers. It has also been established that Sweden had 
to play a fairly passive role in the shaping of the agreements, and that 
possible principles of neutrality had to be put aside.
Within the framework of the trade agreements Sweden did in fact 
have opportunities to act in a more active way. They concerned the 
‘technical’ side, as has been apparent on several earlier occasions but of 
which Hägglöf and all the others make no mention. By respectively 
facilitating and obstructing the mining, transporting and re-loading 
of iron ore in Sweden and on board Swedish vessels, the Swedish authori­
ties could modify the trade agreements. The modification always took 
place in accordance with the wishes of the superior power and there­
fore strengthened the tendency which prevailed at the time.
SUMMARY
In contrast to earlier works—and they are many—which have discussed 
the Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany during the second world 
war, the present analysis has taken as its basis the conditions in the 
German steel industry. Several advantages seem to accrue from this. 
In starting with the German steel industry and its consumption of iron 
ore, the correct proportions of the imports of ore from Sweden are 
obtained at once, and it is their volume which has been over-emphasised 
in several earlier works. The study of the consumption of iron ore by 
the German steel industry has also meant that the iron ore imports 
from Sweden have been considered from the viewpoints of transport, 
business economics and technology, which have acquired a completely 
different magnitude than they had in earlier analyses, which have, almost 
without exception, neglected such problems or given a false impression 
of them.
By way of introduction (Chapter I) it was established that the German 
steel industry expanded greatly during the 1930s. It is true that during 
the actual war years production in ‘Altreich’ stagnated, but the military 
conquests in Europe—especially in France—brought about a continuing 
increase in total production, with 1943 as the peak year. In spite of the 
rise in production the steel industry suffered from too slow an increase 
in tempo. In fact in various areas the consumption of steel rose even 
more rapidly and not even urgent needs could be satisfied. Why then 
did the steel industry not increase its production? What were the bottle­
necks? It could be established that during the end of the 1930s and during 
the second world war the steel industry suffered shortages of capacity, 
of scrap iron, of coke and of transport facilities which in various ways 
obstructed a satisfactory increase in production. Was even the iron ore 
supply a bottleneck?
The question leads on to an analysis of the German iron ore supply 
against the background of the events of foreign politics (Chapter II).
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The German level of self-support was low, and the supply was therefore 
a sensitive matter politically. In the literature the first year of the war, 
up to the conquest of France, has been considered a very difficult one 
from the point of view of the ore supply. The extensive stocks, the 
sharp increase in domestic mining and also the intensive imports from 
Sweden via the Baltic meant in fact that the production of steel did not 
stagnate because of a shortage of iron ore. With the military successes 
of the following years of the war Germany gained control over increased 
iron ore resources and, at the same time, indirect but satisfactory control 
over Swedish exports, and there was therefore no need for any shortage 
of iron ore on political grounds.
However, a political guarantee of the iron ore supply was not the only 
condition for its uninterrupted working. It was important for the supply 
of Swedish iron ore that sea transport functioned satisfactorily. It is 
clear from the analysis (Chapter III) that sea transport during the war 
was exposed to many great stresses. The stable pattern of loading and 
unloading ports from the middle period of the war was suddenly broken 
up. The great increase in the shortage of German vessels for the ore 
traffic was more serious, and this shortage was for various reasons 
accentuated more and more during the war. The fact that the iron ore 
deliveries from Sweden were nevertheless kept at a high level was due 
to the involvement of the Swedish merchant navy to an extent which 
went far beyond the framework of the agreement. The concession 
by Sweden was of course dictated by the political situation, but also 
the fact that large exports of iron ore were of great interest to Sweden 
too, since they made possible imports from Germany of goods which 
were vital to the economic life of Sweden.
With the good supply of iron ore through the political resources 
described above, questions of price were of course of importance in 
making the choice of a type of iron ore. When considering this question 
it is not enough to be content with a narrow comparison between the 
various iron ore prices: the perspective must be widened to include 
conditions generally in the steel industry, and then above all the factors 
of fuel, labour and capacity (Chapter IV). Swedish iron ore, because 
of its higher iron content, made less demands on fuel than the domestic 
ore with its low iron content or the minett ores. Because of this its 
demands for labour and capacity volume were smaller. While there was 
a substantial shortage of coke, labour and blast-furnace capacity in
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Germany during the war, Swedish iron ore became very much cheaper 
in a larger context—in spite of price rises due to the increased cost of 
sea freight—than the domestic ore with a low iron content or the minett 
ores. It is not possible to estimate the total ‘profit’ to the German war 
economy from the use of Swedish iron ore. Germany's efforts to maintain 
good relations with Sweden—inter alia by substantial exports of coal 
and coke, of which there was a shortage—suggest that the advantages 
for Germany were very great.
Apart from the profit to her national economy, Germany also gained 
other advantages through the substantial imports of Swedish iron ore. 
For the production of quality steel—for the armament industry inter 
alia—grades of ore with a low phosphorus content or scrap iron were 
required as raw materials (Chapter V). Iron ore with a low phosphorus 
content was not to be found within Germany’s borders and the supply 
had to be imported instead. By virtue of the allies’ superiority at sea 
a great proportion of the imports from Spain and North Africa was 
cut off. When there was no increase in the supply of scrap iron either, 
the imports of grades with a low phosphorus content became very 
important, even more as the Swedish deliveries of these grades were 
increasing.
Sweden’s concessions to Germany in various fields were of course a 
manifestation of the situation in foreign politics. The Swedish exports 
of iron ore were an important link in the whole of Sweden’s trade and 
foreign policy during the war (Chapter YI). The analysis shows that 
Sweden’s exports of iron ore were determined by the higher political 
situation, and that the Swedish authorities played a fairly passive role. 
It was as impossible to maintain any kind of neutrality in this sector 
as it was in other spheres of Swedish foreign policy during the second 
world war.
9
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